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FOREWORD



Following the tradition established during the past decade, the present issue of the Annual Journal of the Social Sciences Society provides a bilingual outlet for airing the views of the social science students, as well as publicizing their multifarious activities. The Journal also serves as a channel of communication between staff and students, of which the contributions from teaching staff of various departments in the Faculty of Social Sciences are a good, but by no means the only, example.

One does not have to be a professional editor or publisher to appreciate the amount of hard work involved in the publication of this Journal. Considering that all this work was done by undergraduates in their spare time, one can only marvel at their energy, perseverance, and resourcefulness.

The Editorial Committee would probably wish the Journal to be judged primarily as an intellectual endeavour. This is as it should be. It is commonly agreed by scholars and educationists that the hallmarks of a sound university education in social sciences are a critical and independent mind, and a compassionate commitment to one's fellow human beings. Drawing on the Chinese heritage, one is naturally reminded of the ageless analects: "Learning without Thought is useless; Thought without Learning is dangerous"*

〔學而不思則罔，思而不學則殆〕

Happily and reassuringly, the contents of this Journal clearly show that the ancient sage's admonition has not been forgotten.



Y.C. Jao
Honorary President
Social Sciences Society

*This is Soothill's rendition, which I personally favour.

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The Conception of Man in Mao Tse-tung Thought

Dr. David Y. F. Ho

IN 1940, long before the People's Republic of China came into being, Mao Tsetung declared:

The aim of all our efforts is the building of a new society and a new nation of the Chinese people. In such a new society and new nation, there will be not only a new political organization and new economy, but a new culture as well.

Twenty-six years later, the world witnessed the Great Cultural Revolution (GCR), in which Mao himself took an active leading role. The very idea of a cultural revolution is revolutionary enough. Never before in history has there been such an ambitious attempt to create a new man, with a new culture, in a new society. Unparalleled in both its scope and intensity, the GCR is a unique social experiment that has directly involved a fifth of mankind, and has profound implications for mankind as a whole. What are the philosophic assumptions about man embodied in Mao Tse-tung Thought, the guide to action in the Chinese revolution? How are these assumptions linked to Mao's political ideology? What is the relevance that Mao's conception of man has for contemporary psychology? The present essay is an attempt to answer these questions.

One of the by-products of the GCR is the divulgence of great amounts of materials originally meant only for internal use within restricted circles and not officially published in China. These materials, including writings, letters, directives, speeches, impromptu conversations and talks by Mao, give an added dimension of depth in the study of Mao Tse-tung Thought, which cannot be gained from reading his published works alone. The impromptu conversations and talks, in particular, are most revealing of Mao as a revolutionary thinker, leader, and statesman.

Although Mao has written on a great variety of topics, ranging from philosophy to concrete matters of policy, no systematic account on human nature can be found in Mao Tse-tung Thought—as is also the case

with Marxism. However, on many occasions Mao has expressed views which are pregnant with psychological content and which reflect a basic continuity and consistency in his conception of man over a period of a half-century and more.

In discussing the conception of man in Mao Tse-tung Thought, two major questions should be kept distinct. Firstly, what distinguishes human beings from all other things? Secondly, is there a universal human nature? The first question concerns the defining characteristics of mankind as a whole, while the second concerns the opposition between the Marxist class theory and the so-called "theory of human nature" of the ruling classes. These two questions are dealt with separately in the following sections.

"VOLUNTARY ACTIVIST CAPABILITY": A CHARACTERISTIC PECULIAR TO HUMAN BEINGS

"Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed," Mao declared (1949, p. 454). As we shall see, this is a sentiment which permeates the conception of man in Mao Tse-tung Thought. What distinguishes mankind from all other things is that man and man alone is capable of exercising what Mao called *zìjué nengdòng xíng*, which can be translated as voluntary activist capability. (The translation of this term is "conscious dynamic role" or "self-conscious activity" in officially published English editions of Mao's works, but "voluntary activist capability" appears to be more apt.) Voluntary activist capability refers to active consciousness, the human propensity to take initiatives, purposefully and with self-awareness. Mao wrote:

Ideas, etc. are subjective, while deeds and actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role "man's conscious dynamic role", and it is a characteristic that distinguishes man from all other beings. [1938a, p.225]

There are thus two kinds of such dynamic role or activist capability, one manifest in the transformation of the material into the mental and the other in that of the mental into the material. In both instances, the transformation represents a sudden, qualitative change or leap in nature.

Mao later (1963, pp. 134-135) explicitly related these leaps to two corresponding stages in the process of cognition: the first "leading from objective matter to subjective consciousness, from existence to ideas," i.e., leading from practice to knowledge; and the

second "leading from consciousness back to matter, from ideas back to existence," i.e., leading from knowledge back to practice. The first stage involves essentially the formation of conceptual knowledge: "The leap to conceptual knowledge, i.e., to ideas, occurs when sufficient perceptual knowledge is accumulated." In the second stage, "knowledge gained in the first stage is applied to ascertain whether the theories, policies, plans or measures meet with the anticipated success." The second stage is more important than the first, for "it is this leap alone that can prove the correctness or incorrectness of the first leap." The central point is that social practice is the only criterion for truth. Correct ideas "do not drop from the skies," nor are they "innate in the mind," but "come from social practice, and from it alone," often arrived at only after many repetitions of the process involving the two stages of cognition.

Now, dialectical materialism asserts that consciousness, being a reflection of the objective world, has no existence apart from matter. It is a product of the activities of matter—matter which has already reached a high level of development—that is, the human brain. Mao reaffirmed the Marxist dictum that "it is man's social being that determines his thinking" (1963, p. 134). However, his interpretation of dialectical materialism is distinctive in that the dialectical cycle between social existence and consciousness is completed:

while we recognize that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines consciousness, we also—and indeed must—recognize the reaction of [the] mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the superstructure on the economic base. [1937b, p.59]

As if he was somewhat apprehensive that this might not be regarded as orthodox Marxism, Mao went on to say, "This does not go against materialism; on the contrary,

it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism." Thus, vital importance is ascribed to the role of ideas in social change. "Once the correct ideas characteristic of the advanced class are grasped by the masses, these ideas turn into a material force which changes society and changes the world" (1963, p. 134). Closely related to this emphasis on ideas is Mao's conception of the dialectic relationship between freedom and necessity. He said between freedom and the necessity. He said that Engels' statement that freedom is the understanding of necessity is incomplete: "Freedom is the understanding of necessity and the transformation of necessity— one has some work to do" (1964, p. 228).

The emphasis on the voluntary activist capability is one of the outstanding features in Mao Tse-tung Thought. Its influence on the course of the Chinese revolution and subsequent national reconstruction is reflected in the military and politico-economic as well as the cultural realm. Mao's characterization of man as the only creature capable of exercising the voluntary activist capability is taken from his essay "On Protracted War." Mao was writing at a time when China was fighting for national survival against the Japanese invasion. He declared:

Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. [1938a, p. 217]

The repudiation of "weapons decide everything," based on the conviction that "the human factor comes first," has remained a major tenet in Chinese military thinking to this day—and it also has ancient roots.

Further, "the human factor comes first" in virtually all other realms of struggle. Mao's ideas on economic development are distinctive in their emphasis on the effect of "the superstructure on the economic base." Later, Mao stated his case in even stronger

terms: "Political work is the life-blood of all economic work. This is particularly true at a time when the social and economic system is undergoing fundamental change" (1955a). In other words, people must first change for the new system to take root, before productive forces can be fully liberated. Accordingly, Maoist economics puts the accent not on expediency, but on a long-term investment in human resources through ideological education of the masses. Translated into concrete policy, economic mobilization should rely primarily on appealing to the workers' class consciousness and dedication to the ideals of the revolution, rather than on using material incentives.

In the cultural realm, the exercise of the voluntary activist capability found its most dramatic expression in the "remolding of people's souls" during the GCR. To use Mao's conceptualization, the GCR represents a translation on subjective ideas into objective action. These ideas were explicitly stated by Mao more than forty years ago: The fulfillment of the proletariat's historic mission is "to change the objective world and, at the same time, their [the proletariat's and the revolutionary people's] own subjective world—to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world" (1937a, pp. 19–20).

In Mao's interpretation of historical materialism, class struggle continues to exist even after political control has been gained by the proletariat. The establishment of a socialist society does not automatically lead to an embracement of the new ideology by the masses. While seizure of political power and ownership from the exploiting classes can be completed within a relatively short period of time, it will take many generations before remnants of their old ideas and habits can be rooted out. Struggle must therefore continue, for both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat alike— but most significantly, in the minds of men.

As stated in an important editorial in

People's Daily on October 6, 1967, the fundamental principle of the GCR was Mao's directive, "Combat self-interest, criticize and repudiate revisionism." Every revolutionary was exhorted to "regard himself both as a motive force and a target of the revolution," "reach into the very depth of his soul," and "use Mao Tse-tung Thought to cut out his selfish heart." As Mao had put it long before the onset of the GCR, "Not having a correct political point of view is like having no soul" (1957, p. 109). Thus, class struggle assumed a new, psychological dimension: It became also a struggle within the soul.

A national campaign of "struggle-criticism-transformation" was mounted to "remold people's world outlooks." The process was not to take place in private, through internal struggle alone, but publicly, through active participation in class struggle. Following Mao's dialectic formula, "unity-criticism and self-criticism-unity," each individual's struggle was linked to those of others. With struggle thus amplified, the transformation of the individual and of society became a reciprocally enhancing process, to achieve a new social solidarity on a more advanced foundation. Although the idea of self-criticism was not new—Mao had repeatedly referred to it on previous occasions—the exercise of this uniquely human capability was given particular emphasis during the GCR. (Previously, the formula was "unity-criticism-unity" which Mao had worked out in 1942 to resolve intra-Party contradictions; (see 1942a, 1957, p.87)

To be sure, as a historical event the GCR is not one which allows for any simplistic interpretation, and it is not my intention to render account of its political implications. The repercussions of the power struggle, factional strifes, and eruptions of violence which did occur—not unexpectedly, considering the scale of the mass movement—are yet to be felt. Nevertheless, on the psychotherapy" is chosen here not without reasons. A Chinese idiom often used to

characterize the completeness of self-transformation is suggestive of psychological metamorphosis: "Breaking with the womb and changing one's (very) bones." As early as the days in the caves of Yen-an, Mao likened the process of exposing errors and criticizing shortcomings to that of "a doctor curing a disease" (1942a). The object was to allow cadres who had committed errors, no matter how great, to be reintegrated into the revolutionary movement rather than to be eliminated as enemies, as long as they were willing to be "cured" of their political sickness—as all sophisticated systems of organization (e.g., the Catholic Church) must make provisions for the redemption of those who have gone astray. The GCR was an extension of "saving men by curing their ills" to the whole nation.

Central to the conception of man in Mao Tse-tung Thought, then, is the human potentiality for self-transformation. This potentiality is inherently unlimited; the essence of mankind is, therefore, not fixed or static. Even the possibility of biological transformation is contemplated. Mao's vision of mankind is something more advanced than mankind. Mankind is still in its infancy" (Mao, 1964, p. 228).

MARXIST CLASS THEORY VERSUS THE "THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE"

Mao's classic statement on human nature was made in his well-known "Talks at the Yen-an Forum on Literature and Art":

Is there such a thing as human nature? Of course there is. But there is only human nature in the concrete, no human nature in the abstract. In class society there is only human nature of a class character; there is no human nature above classes. We uphold the human nature of the proletariat and of the masses of the people, while the landlord and bourgeois classes uphold the human nature of their own classes, only they do not say so but make it out to be the only human

nature in existence. The human nature boosted by certain petty-bourgeois intellectuals is also divorced from or opposed to the masses; what they call human nature is in essence nothing but bourgeois individualism, and so, in their eyes, proletarian human nature is contrary to human nature. [1942b, p. 90]

This statement has remained the authoritative guide to theoretical discussions on human nature up to the present time in China. It embodies several major assertions: (a) No universal human nature exists in a class society—implying that conceivably it can be realized, but only in a classless society. (b) Conceptions of human nature are social products which are themselves class determined. (c) The conception of the exploiting classes (which falsely claims universality) and that of the proletariat are antagonistic to each other. All of these assertions are in essential agreement with Marx's conception of human nature.

It is clear that Mao was not addressing himself to the question dealt with in the preceding section of this essay, namely, how mankind as a whole is distinguished from all other things. Rather, he was criticizing not the idea of human nature itself, but that of universal, and hence class-transcendent, human nature embodied in the so-called "theory of human nature" is an expression reserved specifically for conceptions of human nature by the ruling classes.) Mao insisted that people's thoughts and feelings, even love, are invariably stamped with their class character. He put it quite strongly, "In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, *without exception*, is stamped with the brand of a class" (1937a, pp. 2–3; italics added).

To Mao, the "theory of human nature" serves to nullify class antagonism and blunts class struggle. In upholding universal humanity (ideas of the universal brotherhood of mankind, etc.), it deceives the proletariat into believing that class struggle is not

necessary and thus robs them of their revolutionary sentiment. On the idea of universal love of humanity, Mao wrote:

There is absolutely no such thing as love or hatred without reason or cause. As for the so-called love of humanity, there has been no such all-inclusive love since humanity was divided into classes. All the ruling classes of the past were fond of advocating it, and so were many so-called sages and wise men, but nobody has really practised it, because it is impossible in class society. There will be genuine love of humanity—after classes are eliminated all over the world.....but not now. We cannot love enemies, we cannot love social evils, our aim is to destroy them. [1942b, pp. 90-91]

Thus, any proclamation of universal love is premature before the phenomenon of class oppression has vanished: In a class society, there is no class-transcendent love. On this, the contrast with Christian ethics is most explicit and uncompromised.

In Mao's critique, the "theory of human nature" is an ideological product of the ruling classes enshrined as universal truth. Upon analysis, their conceptions of man turn out to be but a rationalization of class interests. They glorify the ruling classes and justify their status as rulers. Here, it is understandable why Confucius has been the target of severe attack in China. For, according to his doctrine, there is an innately determined, and hence unchangeable, gradation of men: "Only the wise of the highest grade and the stupid of the lowest grade cannot be changed" (*Analects*, book 17, chap. 3). Is it then not "natural" that the wise, the superior men "born with the possession of knowledge," be the rulers? In terms of the heredity-versus-environment controversy, Mao, who has an almost unlimited faith in the power of education to transform men, undoubtedly favored environmental factors as determinants of behavior. Theories which emphasize innate factors would be open to the suspicion that they might be used as ideological "weapons" to justify elitism.

In the conception of human nature by petty-bourgeois intellectuals, individualism is singled out for attack. Here, a semantic clarification seems needed. Even a casual reading of Mao's writings pertaining to individualism (1929) and liberalism (1937c) reveals that these terms do not mean what they are commonly understood to mean in the Western context, i.e., the affirmation of the individual's uniqueness, responsibility, liberty, etc. Mao did not delineate carefully the distinction between individualism and liberalism. He saw both as manifest in the selfishness and aversion to discipline characteristic of the petty-bourgeoisie. The criterion for selfishness, it should be pointed out, is stringent: Selfish behavior includes not only doing that which is directly at the expense of others, but also placing personal interests above those of the group or, simply, devoting too much attention to selfinterests.

It must not be thought that Mao negated individuality or creativity in denouncing individualism, or individual freedom in denouncing liberalism—Mao was an intensely individualistic and creative person himself. On the contrary, his writings and especially his impromptu conversations and talks abound with statements which, in different contexts, place great value on individuality and creativity: That what is needed is unity together with individuality, not complete uniformity; that Marxism-Leninism must be creatively, not dogmatically, applied to solve China's concrete problems; that education must meet the concrete conditions of each individual; and that the distinctive cultural characteristics of China's national minorities must be preserved and enhanced. Individual variation is a given in Mao Tse-tung Thought, as it is in Marxism. Marx's statement "From each according to his ability; to each according to his needs" clearly implies a recognition of individuality. For Mao, it is simply inconceivable to have people without differences in their thinking—which would negate his philosophy of contradiction. In point of fact, it is just because

of these differences that progress is possible.

What Mao has repudiated, then, is bourgeois individualism, not individuality; what he has upheld is collectivism, not complete uniformity. His ideas were incorporated into the Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party adopted at the Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress in April 1969, and retained likewise in the new Party Constitution adopted at the Tenth Congress in August 1973:

We must bring about a political climate which has both centralism and democracy, discipline and freedom, unity of purpose and ease of mind for the individual, and which is lively and vigorous.

Here is a concrete instance where abstract ideas on man exercised a fundamental influence on political ideology—an ideology in which freedom and discipline, individuality and collectivism, democracy and centralism are dialectically related.

The discussion above serves to illustrate that Mao's conception of man and his political thought are an integral whole. Political considerations, which had led Mao to repudiate the bourgeois conception of human nature, must also prompt the proletariat to project a new image of man in its own service—the conception of man in Mao Tse-tung Thought is just one such representation of this projection. Its explicit aim is to cultivate a new generation of youth that has both proletarian consciousness and learning, and who will be trusted successors to carry on the revolution. The model Maoist man has simple virtues traditionally valued in Chinese society, such as modesty, frugality, and diligence; however, he also has virtues not emphasized in, or even alien to, the traditional ethos: daring in thought and action, fearlessness in struggle, criticism, and self-criticism. The values to be inculcated are: love of collectivist life and of labor (both physical and mental), and above all, total dedication to serving the people, i.e., selflessness.

What are the implications of such an image of man for how proletarian society is to be organized? I shall touch on two aspects of this question: the relationship between the leaders and the led, and the resolution of contradictions.

A central dimension of any political ideology concerns how the common man is to be regarded. It is here that any underlying assumptions about human nature embodied in an ideology are nakedly revealed. Plato abhorred democracy because he feared the irrationality of men as collectivities. Like Confucius, he believed that the wisest—the philosopher-kings—should rule. Mao stands diametrically opposite to Plato: No other political leader has expressed the degree of trust in the masses that he has. "The masses are the real heroes, while we ourselves are often childish and ignorant" (1941), "The masses have unlimited creative power" (1955b), and "The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history" (1945a), Mao declared. Again, "The lowly are most intelligent; the elite are most ignorant" (1958)—a paradoxical statement which seems to echo biblical sentiments, and which at a deeper level, reflects the Taoist influence in Mao Tse-tung Thought.

Mao, however, did not believe in total self-regulation by the masses—at least not until the state is abolished with the realization of communism. The masses must be led by the Party, whose members must regard themselves as servants of the people, not bureaucratic politicians or bosses over them. At the same time, the masses are not to be regarded as passive recipients of direction, but must be mobilized, in accordance with the "mass line" style of leadership, to participate actively in the tasks of the revolution. Mao saw in the masses, moreover, an unlimited source of wisdom; hence, "communists... should be pupils of the masses as well as their teachers" (1938b, p. 198). The whole relationship between the leaders and the led is very aptly summed up in an analogy:

"We Communists are like the seeds and the people are like the soil" (1945b, p. 58).

But who are the people? A logical consequence of Mao's class theory of human nature is the sharp dichotomization of humanity into two broad categories: the people and their enemies. However, "the concept of 'the people' varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in the same country" (1957, p.80). For example, at the time of the founding of the People's Republic, the people consisted of the working class, the peasantry, and even the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. Furthermore, while the conceptual boundary between "people" and "enemy" is distinct, an individual's membership in either category is not fixed or unchangeable. Those who were previously enemies can join the ranks of the people through education and a genuine transformation of their world outlooks, just as some elements of the people may desert the revolution and go over to the other side. In general, the enemies are the reactionaries, the chief exploiters or oppressors of other men in a given historical period, and a small number of criminals who seriously disrupt public order. The people, who constitute the overwhelming majority, are defined by the process of elimination, comprising simply all those classes, social strata, and groups who do not belong to and are in varying degrees opposed to the enemies. In one of his most important essays, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (1957), Mao distinguished between two fundamentally different kinds of contradictions: antagonistic contradictions between the people and the enemy, and nonantagonistic contradictions among the people. Different methods are to be used for their resolution: the dictatorial for the former, and the democratic for the latter. The democratic method is epitomized in the formula "unity-criticism-unity" Mao explained that it "means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions

through criticism or struggle and arriving at a new unity on a new basis" (1957, p.87). Education and patient persuasion, rather than coercion or suppression, are the means to be used. Thus, with far-reaching ideological implications, "the dictatorship of the proletariat" of Marx has become Mao's more encompassing "people's democratic dictatorship."

RELEVANCE FOR CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY

No other science has as great a claim on the projection of a contemporary image of man as psychology does. However, no unequivocal image has been formed within psychology. Rather, three major competing images in the making may be discerned: the first from behaviorism, perhaps best exemplified in the writings of Skinner; the second from the psychoanalytic tradition; and the third from the humanistic psychologists. The Maoist image of man differs fundamentally from each of these in some important respects.

Mao would have no quarrel with Skinner (1972) that behavior is contingent upon environmental conditions, and that the environment is largely of man's own making. However, the concept of voluntary activist capability has no place in the Skinnerian world. Skinner's proposed political program is the deliberate design of a scientific culture; it aims at the control of human behavior to desirable ends through systematic manipulation of man's *external* environment. (Skinner has not, however, really come to grips with the question of what these desirable ends are, who decides them, and how they are to be decided upon.) Mao also wants the creation of a new culture—of the people, by the people, and for the people. But the creation of this culture is not the work of the politician-scientist; rather, it is to be done collectively by the common man.

In contrast to the psychoanalytic tradition, Mao's view of cognition is focused on

consciousness, not on the unconscious. Mao spoke of raising the level of class consciousness—which seems analogous to expanding the ego's sphere of consciousness. The unconscious is not mentioned in Mao Tse-tung Thought; nevertheless, there appears to be no compelling reason or logical necessity for its exclusion. Both psychoanalysis and Mao speak of conflicts and view personality growth as a process of conflict resolution. However, they differ in their conceptualization of the nature of both these conflicts and their resolution. Mao sees class antagonism, not sex and aggression, as the main driving force behind human action; to be sure, sex and aggression are common to all men—but not without class character in any concrete instance of their expression. In psychoanalysis, conflicts are internal, and their resolution is a matter of struggle within the individual. In Mao Tse-tung Thought, internal conflicts are but reflections of external conditions, the resolution of which is dialectically related to external class struggle; furthermore, each individual's struggle is linked to those of others and of human society as a whole. Psychoanalytic theory dwells on the intra-psychic life of individuals; in Mao-Tse Tung Thought, a man's character is defined in terms of what he does in relation to society.

Both Mao and the humanistic psychologists view man in an active role in relation to his environment and in determining his own future; both conceive of man as a creature who seeks the realization of his potentialities. As the most articulate contemporary spokesmen for individualism, humanistic psychologists have long extolled the unique, autonomous, and self-actualizing individual (e.g., Allport, 1961; Maslow, 1971; Rogers, 1961). Mao would have no quarrel with the idea of uniqueness; it is simply a given, implied in his philosophy of contradiction. To Mao, however, the individual is dialectically related to the group, not autonomous in relation to it. And, undoubtedly, self-actualization without class struggle is a

bourgeois luxury; it would also appear that complete self-actualization is a conceptual absurdity, since the limits of the human potential are subject to change themselves in man's process of transforming himself. To the extent that its focus on the individual's self-fulfillment is divorced from collectivist principles, the humanistic psychologists' view of man represents the kind of individualism that Mao condemned. It might be added that the Maoist model of the ideal man comes much closer to the Christian view than to the humanistic view.

The Maoist image of man, then, is not something that psychologists have envisaged. Among social scientists, it is psychologists who have virtually ignored Mao Tse-tung Thought—and I submit that this is a symptom of their provincialism. The fact remains, however, that Mao has posed some very basic questions concerning the nature of man and society which have been debated since ancient times. Are selfishness and aggression inherent in the nature of man, or can they be eradicated? Is the appeal to "serve the people" more powerful than the motivation for personal gain? Can human nature be changed? In Mao Tse-tung Thought, the phenomena of selfishness and aggression are to be understood primarily in terms of humanity's division into antagonistic classes; human nature changes in accordance with the class structure of society. Mao's assertion that class-transcendent human nature does not exist presents a fundamental challenge to contemporary personality theories, none of which have taken the notion of class seriously. While there are no conclusive answers to the questions raised—and perhaps there never will be any—one thing is certain: However human nature is conceived, the conception itself will exercise a self-fulfilling influence on how this nature is to be manifested. We have already witnessed the effects of the conception of man in Mao Tse-tung Thought on over a fifth of mankind.

A RECAPITULATION AND INTERPRETIVE INTEGRATION

The main ideas on man in Mao Tse-tung Thought can be summarized in the following propositions.

1. Human beings are distinguished from all other creatures by virtue of the fact that they alone are capable of exercising the voluntary activist capability. This capability enables humans to form conceptual knowledge (representing a leap from practice to knowledge) and, furthermore, to reflect upon this knowledge and to test for its correctness through social practice (representing a leap from knowledge back to practice). Correspondingly, in the course of transforming the objective world, man also transforms his subjective consciousness; in turn, the latter transformation gives him even greater power to act upon the objective world. The dialectic process never ends, and pushes mankind forward. Thus, the human potentiality for self-transformation is inherently unlimited.

2. In a class society, human nature which transcends class boundaries does not exist; universal human nature can be conceivably realized only in a classless society. In Mao's critique, conceptions of the ruling classes are but a rationalization of their class society: They rob the proletariat of their revolutionary sentiment. The ideas of petty-bourgeois intellectuals are attacked especially for leading to individualism. However, although bourgeois individualism is negated, individuality and creativity are affirmed; although collectivism is upheld, complete uniformity is rejected; and although "liberalism" is denounced, both discipline and individual freedom are emphasized.

The key concept which gives underlying unity to the great diversity of Mao's views is contradiction. A succinct formulation of Mao's philosophy of contradiction is given in the following quotation:

The law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law of the universe. This law operates universally, whether in the natural world, in human society, or in man's thinking. Between the opposites in a contradiction there is at once unity and struggle, and it is this that impels things to move and change. Contradictions exist everywhere, but they differ in accordance with the different nature of different things. In any given phenomenon or thing, the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary, and transitory, and hence relative, whereas the struggle of opposites is absolute. [1957, p. 91]

Thus we see the coexistence of the unity and the struggle of opposites, which under given conditions can transform themselves into each other. This constitutes the philosophical basis for man's unlimited potentiality for qualitative changes to occur, external causes can become operative only through internal causes (see Mao, 1937), so that man's transformation must take place internally as a reflection of external contradictions. That is why Mao has insisted on thought struggle in the remolding of world outlooks. Mao Tse-tung Thought is thoroughly dialectic thinking. The relationships between concept-pairs discussed above—between the material and the mental, practice and learning, the economic base and the superstructure, individuality and collectivism, freedom and discipline, democracy and centralism, the leaders and the led—are all dialectic relationships.

In Mao Tse-tung Thought, there are both continuity and change with respect to the traditional ethos of Chinese society, as well as a synthesis of Western and Chinese learning. Collectivism is continuous with the traditional social pattern of mutual dependence. The generalization from the solidarity of the family and the clan to that of progressively larger social units—the commune, the country, and, finally, the people of the world—would meet with less resistance than one would expect in a society which puts a premium on individualism. The departure from the traditional ethos lies in Mao's

defiance of fatalism and of harmony, in that underlying conflicts are to be made open and actively resolved. Marxism-Leninism is Western learning; but Mao's interpretation of it is distinctively Chinese in many respects, particularly in his belief in the power of the human spirit vis-a-vis material forces. As he has remarked about himself, "I am a native philosopher" (1964, p. 225).

Mao agrees with the Marxist position that the human essence or nature is not to be conceived as represented by abstract qualities inherent within each separate individual, but as the sum total of his social relations—a position which is more akin to those of psychologists who view personality in terms of a person's social stimulus value rather than internal structures or traits. Here, again, is continuity with the traditional value which places the person's position in his social network above individual personality. However, unlike the traditional conceptualization, this position is not static: One is not "locked" in a network of fixed relationships. Rather, a man's position is defined primarily by his social actions.

In contrast to the Western ethos, individual difference in ability, though recognized, is not given great attention or prominence. People differ, of course, in their intelligence, constitution, and so forth, but the differences are secondary to how the abilities are used. The important thing is to minimize intraindividual differences—between what a person does and what he can do—not to focus on interindividual differences. Consequently, cooperation, mutual help, and collective creativity, rather than individual competition, are the standard behavior to be encouraged.

While little attention is given to individual differences in ability, vital importance is attached to those in political outlook and behavior. On the problem of these individual differences, however, certain questions present themselves. Other than his insistence that concrete conditions require concrete analysis, Mao has not gone very far toward answering these questions. In general, one

would look for different kinds of social practice as the antecedent conditions for variation. But what makes an individual decide to engage in one kind of social practice and not in another in the first place? And since the same kind of social practice can in different individuals, even within the same context, produce different end results—i.e., in the abstraction from and summation of experience—what processes influence such variations? Class membership can explain only interclass differences; but Mao not only recognized but also attached importance to differences within the same class. Furthermore, while class origin, not being a matter of one's own choosing, cannot be changed, the road that one chooses to follow (for or against the revolution) can be changed. What makes one person decide to join the revolution and another to go against it? Can Mao Tse-tung Thought explain the phenomenon of Mao himself? Can it explain why Mao, the son of a rich peasant, deserted his own class and identified himself so totally with the aspirations of the world's revolutionary people, and in particular, so compassionately with the poor peasants of China?

Mao's primary concern, in any case, was not individual differences, but the identification of historical forces "independent of men's will" and acting in accordance with them. Nevertheless, there is a deeper question at issue here. If there is no universal human nature, how can one explain changes in one's class identification? The potentiality for identification across classes must have been present in order for such changes to occur. Surely, if the theory is to be consistent, the potentiality for self-transformation must be seen as universal, i.e., class-transcendent. Being a more general concept, it implies the potentiality for identification across classes, a communality in the nature of all men.

The resolution of this apparent inconsistency requires a clarification of the context in which Mao used the term "human

nature." His discourse on human nature did not entail the question of what is unique to human beings as a whole. Neither did he elaborate on the "theory of human nature" of the ruling classes. Most likely, however, Mao had in mind especially the extended discourse on human nature in the Chinese philosophic tradition, which focused its attention almost exclusively on man's social nature, saying very little about his animal nature. According to Confucianism, "What Heaven has decreed is called *xing* (nature)" (*Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 1). Human nature, being so decreed, is determined and unalterable through human action. Man is distinct from the beast by virtue of his possession of certain essential attributes intrinsic to him. Mencius stated explicitly that there are four such attributes: the feeling of commiseration, the sense of shame and repugnance at improper acts, the sense of respect and reverence, and the sense of right and wrong (*Mencius*, book 2, part 1, chap. 6; book 6, part 1, chap. 6). Accordingly, humanity is bound together by a common, universal nature applicable to all men.

Mao's discourse on human nature likewise focused on its social dimension: The human essence is basically social in nature. However, as might be predicted, his departure from such a nondialectic conceptualization as Confucianism was total: Man's social nature has assumed its class character because of the division of humanity into classes; and human nature, not decreed by Heaven, can be changed through class struggle.

It would be a mistake to believe that Mao denied the universality of human attributes enumerated by Mencius, just as it would be absurd to believe that Mao denied that all men have in common needs, desires, sentiments, etc. What he did assert was that in each concrete instance of their expression, these attributes are invariably stamped with a class character. That is, class character refers to the social context, content, and

mode of expression of human attributes, and to the differing criteria for judging their expressions. A distinction should be made, therefore, between a universal attribute, as the potentiality for a uniquely human experience, and its nonuniversal concrete behavioral manifestation. It is in this sense that Mao's assertion of classbound human nature is to be understood.

Further insight may be gained from a consideration of the hostile historical context in which Mao expressed his views on human nature. He and his comrades have been vehemently accused by their adversaries of violating human nature. In Chinese society, such an accusation is tantamount to saying, "You are no different from beasts." Mao's reaction was: Whose human nature? The proletariat's or the bourgeoisie's? The Chinese revolution was to decide whose image of man would prevail.

Notwithstanding the radical departure from tradition in Mao's conception of human nature, there is also continuity with it. Firstly, there is the exclusive focus on man's social nature. Secondly, one is struck by the parallel between Mao and Mencius in their exclusion of bad elements from the rest of humanity. For Mencius, the bad includes the shameless, the unfilial, etc., who are no different from beasts (*Mencius*, book 2, part 1, chap. 6); for Mao, it is the die-hard reactionaries who refuse to be reformed.

By its own criterion, that the only purpose of knowing the world is to change it, Mao Tse-tung Thought must rank as one of the most successful bodies of thought in history—perhaps even the most successful. However, I feel that I must make one point clear: The question of how faithfully Mao Tse-tung Thought has been put into practice in actuality is irrelevant to this essay and has not been dealt with here. That is a matter which can be left to the judgment of history. And it is entirely possible that Mao himself on occasion violated Mao Tse-tung Thought: From his conversations and talks, we know that he did engage in extensive self-criticisms, which is in accordance with his own prescription for personal transformation. Mao, as a person, must be distinguished from Mao Tse-tung Thought—which certainly cannot be regarded as the property of one man or even of the Chinese people. It belongs to the "people" of the world. If Mao Tse-tung Thought is to be put into practice, the process must follow Mao's dictum that qualitatively different contradictions under different concrete conditions can be resolved only by qualitatively different methods that, above all, are free from dogmatism. Mao Tse-tung Thought has a built-in flexibility for self-transformation according to historical conditions and the state of human knowledge. To regard it as absolute or everlasting truth is to violate the very spirit of Mao Tse-tung Thought itself.

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THE PROBLEM OF NONRESPONSE IN COMPLEX SURVEYS

Dr. T. K. Mak

In complex surveys and censuses, it is not uncommon that some individuals refuse to co-operate with the interviewers. The problem is particularly serious when the interviewees are requested to disclose certain personal information, or when the questions being asked, touch on behavior that is sensitive in nature and may have social stigma attached to it. In such cases, nonresponse rate is likely to be high and one should normally expect that there are some respondents who give false information deliberately. With surveys designed to measure abortions in the United States, it was found that direct questioning had resulted in very low response rate. Furthermore, if the factor of giving false answers is ignored, it is highly probable that some conclusions based on the collected data are inaccurate.

Statisticians have realized for sometime the importance of developing means of coping with these difficulties. Warner* devised an ingenious, though simple, method of resolving these difficulties commonly encountered in practice. To illustrate his method of "randomized response", let us consider the estimation of the proportion of students P who has gambled before.

Instead of being asked directly whether they have gambled before, the students are only requested to choose randomly one of the following statements:

(1) I have gambled before

(2) I have never gambled before,

and to reply (say "yes" or "no") to the chosen statement which is not revealed to the interviewer (for instance, they may choose a card at random from a deck of cards some of which have (1) printed on it and the rest have (2)). In this way, the interviewer does not know which statement the reply refers to and hence privacy is protected. Warner showed that with a statistical technique known as "maximum likelihood", it is possible to estimate P without any bias (P is likely to be underestimated if the question "Have you ever gambled before?" is asked directly) provided that the students respond according to the given instructions. A special feature of this method is that in assessing the proportion of the population possessing certain sensitive characteristics, we do not have to know about the status of each individual. To many people, except those who have done some readings in statistics before, this is somewhat hard to

imagine — how can we assess the “overall” without first knowing exactly what happens to the individuals? It is the purpose of the present article to demonstrate, without employing rigorous statistical argument, that this is indeed possible.

Since this article is written for the general reader who may not appreciate a strictly statistical argument like that of the “maximum likelihood”, we shall depart from Warner’s original method and look at a different method that would also serve both of the purposes of protecting personal privacy and allowing unbiased estimation.

Now suppose that in the interview, the student was asked to toss a fair coin while the interviewer was some distance away and was unable to see which side faces up. The respondent was instructed to respond according to the following rule: if a head is observed, say “yes”, whereas if a tail is obtained, reply faithfully to the statement “I have gambled before”. Thus a “yes” may not mean that the student actually has gambled before as the “yes” may be a response to the observation of a head. In this way the student would not feel embarrassed in the interview. Suppose a large number of students, say 1000, were interviewed and the number of “yes”s, say 600, were recorded. Thus 60 per cent of the time we obtained “yes”. Since the coin used was a fair coin, we would expect that 50 per cent of the time we recorded a “yes” that resulted from observing a head. This suggests that we have to subtract this 50 per cent from the 60 per cent to obtain 10 per cent and conclude that 10 per cent of the time we recorded a “yes” that resulted from replying to the statement. However the percentage is relative to the total number of students interviewed (1000), including those who had not replied to the statement (because a head was observed). We are interested in the proportion who gives “yes” in replying to the statement. Since we

would expect that only 50 per cent of the respondents replied to the statement (because of observing a tail), a natural estimate would be 10 out of 50, giving a final estimate of 20 per cent.

At this point, the reader has probably realized that a “no” response would definitely prove that the student has never gambled before. The students may therefore have the tendency not to react according to the instruction but always give a “no” to the interviewers and hence bias the final result. This can be easily avoided if we, instead of using a coin, ask the respondents to roll a die and report “yes” if the number 1 or 2 is observed, report “no” if 3 or 4 is observed and reply to the statement otherwise. The argument goes very much the same as before.

Since Warner’s randomized response was proposed, much research has been done, mostly in the direction of searching for statistically “efficient” methods (with greater accuracy). The method discussed here is by no means the best one. The sole purpose is to demonstrate the idea underlying the method of “randomized response” and thus remove possible suspicion that any non-statisticians have about the method, and hence obtain better co-operation from them.

*S. WARNER (1965), *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, V60.

Challenge of yesterday : The heyday of Hong Kong trade unionism, the 1920's

Mr. S.H. Ng

A common observation made of the local labour movement is that trade unions in Hong Kong are weak and docile, incapable of waging any effective challenge to the employers. (England and Rear, 1975) In trying to explain the low profile of unions, it has been claimed, among other reasons, that Hong Kong lacks a tradition of trade union organization and that its people are alien to the unionized form of collective action.

In retrospect, however, the labour history of Hong Kong is not as uneventful as many would have thought. Instead, as early as in the 1920's, unions in Hong Kong were already in the highlight in the arena of sociopolitical actions, organising a series of economy-wide strikes which threatened to paralyse the community and bring its activities to a stand-still.

Thus, the General Strikes of the 1920's may be seen as a form of union challenge in manifestation. This outburst of trade union power nonetheless, need to be interpreted in the politico-historical context of Hong Kong and China at that time.

Around the turn into the 1920's in China, the May Fourth Movement erupted and precipitated a flood of industrial and intellectual unrests including strikes and student demonstrations. On 4th May 1919, students demonstrated in a mass rally against the treatment of China by the Great Powers at the Versailles Conference at the end of the First World War. This action was soon echoed by large-scale workers' protests, representing sentiments which were partly politico-nationalistic and partly in response to the economic vicissitudes felt from the early industrialization efforts under foreign capital in the treaty parts and other parts of China. In 1920, some 9,000 mechanic members of the Chinese Engineers Institute took a brief strike and succeeded to win significant wage increases. The victory set an example which encouraged the foundation of other new unions throughout South China.

The first test of strength came shortly afterwards in the General Strike of 1922, when the seamen were at loggerhead with the ship-owners, mostly expatriate, and the workers from other trades were to call to arm in sympathetic strike. The strife coerced

employers into substantial concession by the shipping employers to most of the seamen's demands. The success of this struggle not merely elevated the Chinese Seamen's Union to the realm of power and glory but also provided the China-Hong Kong labor movement a powerful impetus. Thus witnessed then was the formation of the Hong Kong Federation of Labour from over seventy unions, of which the Chinese Seamen's Union formed the most powerful arm. Over the Mainland, the Chinese labour movement also rose to a new zenith. In the early 1920's the newly formed Nationalist Government under Dr. Sun Yat Sen in Canton sought active union with their trade union ally. Reaction to the presence of foreign capitalism became a transcending and unifying theme; both the party and the labour movement became overtly socialist and antiforeign in orientation and sentiments. A National Labour Conference convened in Canton in May 1925, with delegates representing some 570,000 organized workers. An All-China Labour Federation was formed, establishing subsequently links with the Red International of Labour Unions. By 1926, there were 180 labour unions in Canton, split largely between two labour federations, the right-wing Kwantung Provincial Federation of Labour Unions and the left-wing Labour Congress. Union membership in Canton recorded a level of almost 300,000.

This euphoria of trade unionism soon erupted into the General Strike in 1925, the second one in the trade union history of Hong Kong. Hong Kong offered the arena for initiating actions partly because of its symbolic connotation of foreign capitalism — the principal target of this trade union crusade. Spearheaded by the Chinese Seamen's Union and the General Labour Association of Hong Kong, the strikers adopted an overtly political posture, with demands covering both economic (such as those for a package labour deal comprising

an eight-hour day, workers' insurance, a minimum wage and collective bargaining) as well as non-economic ones (including complete freedom of speech, association and publication in Hong Kong, equality of treatment for Chinese with foreigners, extension of the franchise to Chinese in the same terms as enjoyed by foreigners). Militancy rose to a new height when the strikers' Mainland colleagues and compatriots declared a general boycott in resonance with similar offensive in Hong Kong. The 'Canton-Hong Kong Strike Boycott' was traumatic in terms of its geo-political scale as well as the crippling disruptions it inflicted upon the affected economies. However, in contrast to the First General Strike of 1922, the entrenched tussle gave the embattled workers no leverage at all in view of their demands. The strike-boycott persisted until late 1926, lapsing into an abortive challenge whose substantial effects were virtually nothing but to provide a subsequent reaction of conservatism in both Hong Kong and China.

In Hong Kong, the General Labour Association was hence declared unlawful under the Emergency Regulations and the Chinese Seamen's Union under the new Societies Ordinance, both in 1927, the year which also saw the introduction of the Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs Ordinance, based upon the conservative Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927, of U.K., and designed to 'suppress the illegal activities of unions rather than to encourage their legal ones'. Over the Mainland, the Nationalists succeeded in consolidating their conservative power base in the Canton Government and started to curb the union ring. In September, the Political Council of Canton decided to terminate the boycott of Hong Kong, after an earlier resolution on dispute settling regulations which forbade the use of arms by workers. In 1927, the Communists were expelled from the Nationalist Party, epitomizing the open schism between the left and

the right — a theme which was since to dominate the principal profile of the Hong Kong union history up-to-date. In 1927, union prerogative in China sank to an ebb with the closing of the Shanghai General Labour Federation. Unions, where they were tolerated, became generally regimented and subordinate to the directive of the Nationalist Government.

DISCUSSIONS.

It can be said that the movement transcending these two General Strikes — virtually the only two general strikes in the history of Hong Kong save the 1967 insurgency — engenders elements of a "revolutionary" class sentiment (consciousness). The situation probably corresponds to the four definitive criteria listed by Michael Mann of what constitute the revolutionary consciousness of the working class: "Firstly,class identity — the definition of oneself as working-class,Secondly comes class opposition — the perception that the capitalist and his agents constitute an enduring opponent to oneself.....Thirdly is class totality — the acceptance of the two previous elements as the defining characteristics of (a) one's total social situation and (b) the whole society in which one lives. Finally comes the conception of an alternative society, a goal towards which one moves through the struggle with the opponent" (Mann, 1973, p.13). The trade union movement of the 1920's was clearly enmeshed in that fundamentalist alliance between the workers, students and intellectuals, whose revolutionary spirit was a mixture of anti-capitalist and anti-foreign sentiments. The societal model that the political cult of Dr. Sun Yat San and the May Fourth Movement inculcate represents to them a plausible yet alternate image of a new social order; an allusion in sharp dialectics to the

vicissitudes of 1920 China which found herself still much a captive of foreign capital and indigenous traditional institutions in spite of the Revolution of 1911. Thus, the General Strikes seemingly bore features reminiscent of the explosion of the proletariat revolutionary consciousness: there was, for instance, "the translation of specific industrial demands into general, political demands", as in the event of the 1905 strike in Russia (Mann, p.47); secondly, it cut across the sectional boundaries of different occupations and industries — working class consciousness and power were to be

experienced in a very concrete way "through the experience of solidarity with other workers" (Mann, p.47); thirdly, the protest actions were genuinely antagonistic towards capitalism. Though without a manifest radical intent to seek primary ruptures, the vision that Sun's celebrated "Three People's Principles" exemplified was ostensibly socialist in posture.

Nevertheless, this brief explosion of concerted union consciousness and action, if viewed today, looks merely the challenge of yesterday. The present state of trade unionism in Hong Kong is hardly symptomatic of any continuities from the nostalgia of the 1920's. But, why?

A stereotype explanation for the failure of the unions to sustain its consciousness beyond the 1920's nor to recover it ever since is the isolation of the vanguard leadership of this early labour movement from the masses of the workers at the grass-root level. Trade unionism was obsessed with the political struggle against imperialism and capitalism and the leaders of most unions were ideologue/doctrinal politicians rather than bona-fide members of the particular trades which the unions purportedly represented. To the extent that economic amelioration in the workers' interest was frequently subordinated to revolutionary nationalism and the funds of

unions were diverted towards political operations, the movement because a fictitious mirage super-imposed from above, rather than evolving from a firm foundation of established rank-and-file support. Solidarity was hence in fact illusory and never total.

This line of contention, while finding favour among the official stance of interpretation which is biased towards the "job-consciousness" British model of trade union conception (Butters, 1939), seems to make the implicit assumption that the labour movement of the 1920's was as alien as the presence of western capitalism to the grass-root members of the working force in Hong Kong. However, the advent and the totality that pervaded the workers' actions during these General Strikes, as well as the duration over which the strife was extended, make it difficult to deny the cohesion and commitment of the worker-union front. On the contrary, there seems little ground to doubt the solidarity of such vanguard occupations as the seamen and the mechanics/engineering workers, granted their earlier successes in 1920 and 1922 in wresting substantial economic gains from their employers. The concern of the unions to improve work and employment conditions was therefore not imperceptible; in any event it was consistent with the broader ideological campaign against capitalism and imperialism, in which industrial poverty was seen to be rooted.

Thus, we may need to seek other factors to account for the temporary nature of union consciousness in the 1920's. The first is the structural shifts in the occupational systems that have occurred between then and today. The vanguards of the 1920's movement, including the seamen and the mechanics employed in shipyards and public utilities, were almost able to monopolize all the strategic sectors of the then maritime-oriented economy of Hong Kong. By contrast, these occupations can

now hardly claim the same degree of salience vis-a-vis the much more industrialized economy today. Unions have so far met with little success in organizing workers in such new yet key manufacturing industries as electronics, garment-making, plastics.

Secondly, one needs to concede that the actions of the 1920's do not constitute a union movement specific to Hong Kong per excellence. Instead, it may be true to some degree to describe the movement more properly as a movement in China that just embraced Hong Kong within its entity. Given the socio-political situation of that time, this propinquity is not the least unnatural. Indeed, it has been mentioned earlier that this party-union revolutionary movement in Mainland China soon bred its own internal dialectics in 1926 that was to stall the vitality of Chinese trade unionism. The political schism, together with another exogenous development in the Sino-Japanese hostilities during the Second World War, compromised further the prospect of growth of any bona-fide workers' movement in Hong Kong.

But why there was no re-discovery by the unions of their once-exalted consciousness, which seems lost permanently into the years of the twenties — not so even after the conclusion of the the Second World War and the 1949 Revolution which seems to settle the Nationalist-Communist feud in favour of the latter? A large part of the answer seems to rest with the development of what may be called "anti-revolutionary conservatism" in Hong Kong. The reactions take several forms and again, the General Strikes appear to have provided a crucial bench-mark. In response to this challenge of the workers, western employers started to pay greater attention to employment and industrial relations, many establishing personnel departments. In 1945, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce set up a sub-committee on these

matters which was to become the Employers Federation of Hong Kong in 1948. These changes, in attitude as well in substance, helped to ameliorate the vicissitudes of western capitalism as a basis for generating an alienative condition among the workers. Second, the 1926 crisis led the Hong Kong Government to start constructing a legalistic-institutional framework with the objective

of containing an otherwise overtly political and fundamentalist labour movement of a "China" identity, but instead nurturing a so-called indigenous trade unionism of the Anglo-American model. Thus, promulgated in 1927 the restrictive Illegal Strikes and Lock-outs Ordinance which effectively banned any political strikes (i.e. any such strike which was designed or calculated to coerce the Hong Kong Government by inflicting hardship upon the community) in 1948 the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Ordinance which was to legalize trade unions and their activities — with certain rights conferred as well as obligations described.

Notwithstanding these paternalistic efforts by the Hong Kong Government to promote "responsible trade unionism" as such, unionism remains on a low profile: little solidarity has been displayed among the workers for collective organisation and action. Apparently, in answering to this question "anti-revolutionary conservatism" is again depictable as an attitude which seems to have pervaded the contemporary working class — if any such viable class exists in Hong Kong at all. The well-known "refugee mentality" of those who fled to Hong Kong as the victims rather than the beneficiaries of a half-century's epoch of politico-social revolution is, for instance, a cardinal reflection of this conservatism which is presumably antipathetic towards unionism as well. The conservatism "exploded" into a "counter-revolutionary" consciousness in the 1967 civil disturbances

when an overwhelming majority of the community (which could hardly exclude the workers) drew themselves behind the Government in polarization to a highly politicized front of the left-wing union militants. Save during the brief outburst of 1967 — which itself was much an extraneous import from the Cultural Revolution in China — conservatism could even be said to have overpowered the workers' vanguards of the 1920's as well. The revolutionary/anti-capitalistic rhetoric has almost disappeared

entirely from the seamen, albeit still the most effectively organised occupational group in Hong Kong. Their unions today function more like "mutual-aid" friendly societies just indulged mildly in industry-wide wage-determination. The engineering mechanics, on the other hand, have shrunk to a much docile position; the Chinese Engineers Institute, for instance, having retreated to a token union with only 110 members, as at 1976-77.

CONCLUSION

This brings us to the conclusion. The hey-day of trade unionism in Hong Kong, epitomized in the revolutionary consciousness of the General Strikes that spanned over the 1920's, appears the challenge of yesterday that has not re-emerged ever since. Echoing Kerr's "convergence" thesis, (Kerr, et.al., 1973) the Hong Kong case therefore exemplifies the disenchantment of the workers with these ideological and revolutionary issues that were once paramount in the 1920's. Disenchantment and conservatism in this case arise as a reaction to the vicissitudes of a protracted and excessive process of revolutionary debacle that has haunted China since the turn into the 20th century; just as the revolutionary working class consciousness is said to be a reaction to the vicissitudes of capitalism. While one may

predict with optimism that radical class consciousness expands among the workers in a cumulative process — "a steady learning process by the workers, and short-term cycles of conflict emergence and resolution" (Mann, p.47), — one should also take note that the contrary may operate instead. The revolutionary zeal tends to subside and dampen, with its consciousness turned into a

plightful disillusion if that utopia post evaluation model is always nothing but visionary, when what is experienced is instead an alienating and endless series of trauma and dislocation. Clearly, the dialectic process can apply not only to capitalism but also to revolution in giving rise to reactionary forces antithetical to its cause.

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3. H.R. Butters, **Report by the Labour Officer, H.R. Butters, on Labour and Labouring Conditions in Hong Kong**, Hong Kong: Noronha and Co. Ltd., 1939.
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Impressions of a new lecturer on the attitudes and behaviour of Hong Kong University students

Dr. D. G. Race

It should be emphasised at the outset that what follows in this article constitutes a series of impressions of the way students behave and are treated in the University of Hong Kong, contrasted with the author's experiences, as student and academic, in a number of English Universities. Appeals to carefully collected empirical evidence, if any existed, might well reveal many of these impressions to be ill-founded as, possibly, will further experiences at H.K.U. Nevertheless first impressions occasionally contain insights unrecognised by those who have grown used to a system, and thus it is hoped that some value will emerge from a record of the impact on this writer of his first nine months as a lecturer.

As well, of course, as being conditioned by subjective reaction to the experience of England, the views presented here are unlikely to present a clear and well ordered set of logical arguments leading to a specific conclusion, nor even give many clues to the relative importance of each impression. Instead, the article will consist of a set of somewhat random opinions, which the writer hopes can be taken up by readers with a greater knowledge and perspective of Hong Kong University so as to sort the important from the trivial and the accurate from the inaccurate. Let us start with the most obvious, at least to a newly arrived teacher

anxious to meet students.

The staff/student gap

Only a somewhat blinkered defender of the English University system would pretend that there is no "social distance" between staff and students in English Universities. In comparison to Hong Kong, however, the "gap" in England seems to be much smaller. This may, of course, relate to the language and cultural differences between an expatriate lecturer and a group of Chinese students but it does seem as if H.K.U. maintains a stronger sense of the "teachers" and the "taught", with an inbuilt sense of superiority for the former and the need to maintain very separate existences between the two. Physical facilities may contribute to this — there are few common meeting places in H.K.U. to parallel the communal cafeteria or canteen facilities found in the U.K.; few departments have the space for "common rooms" shared by staff and students alike. Even if such places existed, however, it is doubtful whether the "gap" would decrease. Many explanations could be given for this phenomenon, including some which would justify it as being beneficial to students. This writer would suggest the influence of one factor, which deserves consideration as an issue in its own right — the competitiveness of H.K.U. students.

Competitiveness of students

It is a matter of common observation, not confined to these personal impressions, that the excess of demand over supply in higher education in Hong Kong produces intense competition for university places. It is scarcely surprising, then, that those who succeed in clearing the first competitive hurdle i.e. our students, should carry with them into university life the same set of attitudes towards relative success that they needed to jump that hurdle. Why this should affect the staff-student "gap" seems to relate to the form of teaching used in schools, with its strong emphasis on rote learning and large class teaching. This, in turn, leads students to expect, and even desire, similar "force feeding" at university so that the hard working "memorizers" can continue to be top of the competitive heap. Other methods of university teaching; the seminar, the tutorial, where students are expected to have a) read a certain amount beforehand, and b) sorted their readings and thoughts into a coherent form to participate in discussion, prove much less popular. Here those who succeeded by memory may not perform as well. Here too, the physical distance between the lecturer and the student is reduced; the lecturer can begin to know individual students, rather than a sea of faces in a lecture room. Yet this does not seem to be desired, which probably reflects the relative power of the "memorizers" in the total student body. Student pressure, therefore, serves to maintain the staff-student "gap", because if the "rules" are the same as at school, success in competition can be continued.

Emphasis on careers

The third aspect of student behaviour which has struck this writer most strongly is the excessive concern for what happens after the university experience, rather than the university experience itself. Again, only a fool would argue that English university students are not interested in their future careers, and there is some evidence of a move towards more vocational choices

being made by under-graduates as unemployment in England increases. Nevertheless it still seems a criticism of the way in which students here approach their choice of degree, to say that the overwhelming impression is that a choice of, say, psychology is not made because of a desire to improve knowledge of psychology, or because of an interest in human behaviour, but because of an intention to become a psychologist. Speaking from a department which provides a professional qualification itself does not provide a particularly sound base for such criticism, but since this is a personal article that particular argument can be ignored. The point seems to be that there is no real evidence, at least in the social sciences, of graduates in vocational subjects achieving greater rewards or better job positions any sooner than other social science graduates. The demand for graduates in general is so much higher in Hong Kong than the U.K. that students can really afford to turn to subjects which interest them, and in which they are prepared to stretch their minds a little, without seriously affecting their employment prospects. Yet the trend seems to be in the opposite direction.

Conclusion

Lest it be thought that this article is intended as a total condemnation of student attitudes and behaviour at H.K.U., let it conclude on a more optimistic note. In comparison with their U.K. counterparts, Hong Kong students, in this writer's view, work a lot harder. The problem is that sheer hard work does not an undergraduate make. If all the effort directed by students could be channelled towards thinking, rather than soaking up information, the prospects would be good indeed. It may be that it is we, as academic staff, who have to make the effort to persuade students to escape from the confines of the school-university-job conveyor belt. Or, to end on the same diffident note with which this article began, it may be that this writer is all wrong about what universities and university students should really be. First impressions have presented no evidence for the latter view, but perhaps reactions to this article might.

The Ratification of SALT II

Mr. E. V. Roberts

War has always been a dangerous exercise as a means of solving the differences that exist between states. In the First World War it is estimated that ten million combatants and civilians were killed. Only twenty years later the Second World War broke out and realized in its wake fifty million dead and, in 1945, ushered in the atomic era with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, the losses incurred in human life and destruction prior to the deployment of modern armaments pale into insignificance when compared with the capacity of the growing nuclear arsenals of the two great superpowers: the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

With the changing nature of military capability, purely military definitions of strategy are now obsolescent as Liddell Hart's comment, now almost universally accepted, put it: "old concepts and old definitions of strategy have become not only obsolete but nonsensical with the development of nuclear weapons....to aim at winning a war, to take victory as your object, is no more than a state of lunacy".¹ The urgency and immediacy of the conflicting aspirations of the Soviet Union and the USA throughout the post-war era forced a radical appraisal of the management of nuclear weapons as a foreign policy tool.

Until 1956 the Soviet Union accepted the "inevitability of war" thesis and the USA, with its virtual monopoly of nuclear delivery systems, could still think in terms of a "massive retaliation" upon the Soviet Union should it be deemed necessary. As both sides began in the middle and late 1950s to develop and deploy more sophisticated nuclear delivery systems it became obvious that some form of dialogue to minimize the danger inherent in an unrestrained arms race should be embarked on.

Indeed the international climate nurtured the possibility of a dialogue with the USSR, where the Soviet leaders, prompted by Krushchev and fostered under Brezhnev, accepted the concept that competition with the USA was to be controlled and some cooperation encouraged if the danger of a nuclear holocaust were to be avoided. From the US perspective, detente, or "the management of relations with the growing power of the Soviet Union" rapidly gained acceptance in academic, political and to some extent military circles. The formula of deterrence constituted the central concern of "nuclear detente"² in the attempt to guarantee mutual security and

regulate relations of competition, both political and military, with the Soviet Union. Further incentives to discuss arms control were prompted by the Cuban Crisis of October 1962,³ the technological breakthroughs particularly in ICMBs⁴ and ABMs; the possibilities of nuclear proliferation, the economic cost of an arms race and the increasing willingness of the two sides to compromise rather than confront.

The Partial Nuclear Test Ban of 1963 and the Limited Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 showed the possibility of agreement in areas where mutual interest coincided and where the deterrent capability and therefore perceived national security was not challenged. These agreements, peripheral to the central military power equation, prompted attempts to deal with more fundamental issues particularly that of the ABM problem. Both sides by 1969 were on the verge of deploying those systems despite the huge costs that would be involved. Neither side could afford to allow the other to unilaterally embark on an ABM system because of its possible effect on counterforce capability. Accordingly the USA, led by President Nixon and particularly Dr. Kissinger, and Mr. Brezhnev realized and negotiated upon the premise that some limitations not compromising perceived national security would be mutually beneficial.

Certain considerations were central to any concessions emanating from future agreements. Firstly there was, and still is, the sheer technical difficulty of writing an agreement on complex and constantly evolving weapons systems. A more basic obstacle, still manifesting itself, was the political and psychological framework in which the two states were locked. The opposed ideology and competitive nature of the international political relationship were a source of deep mutual mistrust. It was in this

atmosphere that the SALT I agreement was negotiated and signed in 1972.⁵

The SALT I package has two distinct parts, both of which remain in force in 1979.

- 1) The anti-ballistic missile treaty of 1972 which now limits both sides to installing ABM systems on one site apiece.
- 2) The interim agreement on strategic offensive weapons, valid for five years but abided by until superseded by SALT II. This treaty established a "ceiling" of 2347 launchers for the USSR and 1710 for the United States of America.

Reactions to the SALT I treaty were many and varied ranging from those who saw it as a great step forward in the reduction of tensions and a new accord with the Soviet Union to those who, both in the USSR and the USA, perceived the treaty as a "sell out" to the other side. Zbigniew Brzezinski, now Assistant to the President for National Security, commented in a more modest analysis: "In essence the Moscow accords represented a clear short term gain for the Soviet side, and a short term gain for the American side....On the political plane the agreements involved an American acknowledgment of United States - Soviet parity....In the strategic relationship the agreement had the effect of halting the quantitative momentum of the Soviet deployment while leaving open the competition in its qualitative aspects, where the US remain clearly superior; in the long run, however, the existing Soviet quantitative advantage could become quite significant if the qualitative US lead is erased". Against this Senator Henry Jackson (D. Washington) was extremely concerned that the US should reach an agreement which allowed an apparent Soviet superiority and

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obtained an amendment to the treaty which called upon the President in any future treaty on offensive nuclear weapons not to limit the United States "to levels of inter-continental forces inferior to the limits provided for the Soviet Union"⁶

SALT I as an interim treaty laid the groundwork for negotiations for SALT II. The achievements of SALT I, both in technical and political terms, were subject to intense scrutiny to see whether it achieved its objectives. These objectives were:

- i) Limitation of ABM defence of both the superpowers to negligible proportions
- ii) Institutionalized relationship between the superpowers
- iii) Reduction of the risk of war by promoting strategic stability
- iv) Reduction of damage likely to be suffered from war
- v) Reduction of the burden of defence expenditure
- vi) To serve as diplomatic annexe to the arms race.

It is arguable whether apart from the limitation of the ABM defence any of the above objectives were achieved as a consequence of the SALT I treaty. In particular there has been no reduction of damage likely to be suffered in war; rather has there been an increased capability particularly on the Soviet side. Defence expenditure and weapon procurement combined with qualitative improvements in research and development have reflected a large increase in defence expenditure over the last few years by the Soviet Union,⁸ and in the case of the United States the number of deliverable warheads has increased from 5600 in 1972 to 9000 in 1978.⁹

increase in fact

One of the reasons for the this large increase in capability was attributable to the gaps in SALT I which excluded for any consideration certain strategic systems. It placed no restraints on the development of new technologies, in particular on the testing and deployment of MIRVs and on the omission of any limits on strategic bombers. Within the agreed limits of SALT I both sides were rapidly building up their forces as witnessed below:

Fig. 1 Historical Change in Launcher Strength and Warheads (Included are deployed launchers, not those under construction)

Memorandum of Understanding between the USA and USSR regarding the establishment of a data base on the number of strategic offensive arms.

Selected Document No. 12, SALT Geneva. US Department of State.

	1965		1968		1972		1975		1978		1978	
	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	UR	USSR
ICBM	854	262	1054	858	1054	1527	1054	1618	1054	1400	1054	139B
SLBM	464		656	121	656	500	656	784	656	950	656	950
Long-range Bombers	783	155	545	155	455	140	432	135	343	150 ^a	573	156
Total	2056	417	2255	1134	2165	2167	2142	2537	2058	2500	2283	2504 ^b
Warheads	4270 ^b	600 ^b	3900 ^b	1300 ^b	5600	2200	8500	2800	9000	4500		

a/ Since 1972 the Soviet Union has built no new bombers, but some former tankers were included in 1978 bomber total.

b/ Estimates.

Sources: 1965 from "WORLD ARMAMENTS and DISARMAMENT", SIPRI Yearbook, 1974; 1978 from the U.S. Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year, 1980; intermediate years from The Military Balance 1978-79, IISS. These sources follow somewhat different practices in counting.

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union pledged themselves to the rapid evolution of SALT II, technical, domestic and international political trends precluded an easy executive agreement. The exaggerated expectation of a lessening of competition was not borne out. On all fronts it seemed as if worse rather than better relationships were evolving.

Firstly, on the international front, the Middle East war of 1973 and the increasingly more aggressive posture of the

USSR in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, increased mutual suspicion of political motives. Secondly, in technical relationships the accelerated nature of research and development, enhanced the feasibility of the cruise missile¹⁰, and raised the new generation of SLBMs in the USA balanced by the Backfire bomber and a whole new generation of MIRVed missiles in the USSR¹¹ which, in turn, raised fears about each others military intentions and nuclear stability. Thirdly, the domestic sphere both

sides were beginning to have doubts about the wisdom of treaties which seemed to work to their disadvantage. Although the domestic debate, as one would expect, was much more publicized and detailed in the USA there is increasing evidence that the elite in the Soviet hierarchy was also voicing its concern.¹²

In the USA the three administrations covering the period 1972-1979 reaffirmed their commitment to a SALT II treaty. The Nixon-Kissinger, Ford-Kissinger and Carter-Vance partnerships all reaffirmed, at one time or another, their determination to reach some agreement with the USSR despite the mounting opposition within the US Senate in particular. In November 1974 the Brezhnev-Ford summit established guidelines for a SALT treaty that would run until 1985. In simplified form the agreement established equal numerical limits for both sides (already a commitment for the US administration under the Jackson amendment). The Soviet Union withdrew its demand that US aircraft in Europe and Asia, as well as British and French nuclear forces, be included in SALT II limitations. The overall limit for each side was to be 2400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBM, SLBM and, for the first time, strategic bombers). Out of the total 1320 could be launchers of MIRVed missiles.¹³ The Vladivostok agreements were to constitute the basic framework for debate and to generate the grounds for support and opposition for the envisaged SALT II treaty. To sign the treaty took another four years when President Carter and Brezhnev signed a number of documents which collectively will be known, if ratified, as SALT II.¹⁴

The SALT II agreement consists of three basic parts: a treaty to last until 1985; a shorter term protocol that will expire on December 31st, 1981; and a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations. In addition SALT

includes a commitment by the Soviet Union on the issue of the Soviet Backfire bomber; an agreed memorandum listing the number of strategic weapons deployed by each side, according to various categories; and a lengthy set of agreed statements and common understandings which set forth interpretations with respect to many of the provisions of SALT II.¹⁵

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned the matter is no longer under debate and they insist that the treaty be ratified by the United States without delay and with no amendments. In a speech given in March 1979 Mr. Brezhnev summed up the SALT talks:

"Of course, in some aspects the treaty could have been better from our point of view. Not everything in it accords with our wishes. But it is a reasonable compromise which takes into consideration the interests of both sides. On the whole it is an important and good endeavour.

"Firstly the new agreement, if it is signed, ratified and comes into effect will create.... a more definite barrier in the way of further stock-piling of the most destructive and costly types of arms....it can be definitely said that its implementation will do no damage to the Soviet Union.

"Secondly... the agreement will mean the curbing of the arms race.... Thirdly the agreement will have undoubtedly a beneficial effect on the international climate in general".¹⁶

It is worthwhile noting the emphasis placed on the security interests of the Soviet Union, the admission of compromise and at a later date the warnings issued by the Soviet Union of the dangers inherent were the US Senate to introduce major amendments.

This concern has manifested itself since 1976 when the Soviet policy makers discerned a "rightist" tendency in the USA, and a deterioration in USA-Soviet relationships. This was particularly evidenced by the "hardliners" in Moscow (in the party, in the police apparatus and in the armed forces) who are particularly suspicious of the SALT II treaty.¹⁷ At present Mr. Brezhnev and the SALT proponents have held them at bay but perhaps the Soviet premier was hinting at the domestic reaction when he insisted that the Treaty should be signed without any amendments. In fact it seems that the Soviets are surprised at the power of the domestic actors in the United States of America and are much more at home dealing with the Executive Branch. As Morton Schwartz remarks:

"They do not understand, for example, the principle of limited government, the rule of law, the separation of powers and majority rule. They have difficulty even conceptualizing the value we place on individual liberty, freedom of speech and the press, the concern we have regarding the morality of our public leaders... Obviously, Soviet comprehension is severely limited by their truncated political preconceptions".¹⁸

However the Soviets, despite concern over US policy, detente, and the feeling that the United States is over-reacting to the Soviet initiatives to behave on an equal superpower basis in a global capacity, have concluded that the treaty is desirable and that future negotiations over a possible SALT III should progress.


Far more complex is the United States reaction to the proposed SALT II treaty where the full interplay of arguments for and against an agreement is being witnessed between the Executive and Legislative branches and various pressure groups. An

optimistic President Carter, in his report delivered on 18 June 1979 commented that, "when ratified it (SALT II) will be a truly national achievement of the Executive and the Congress, an achievement of civilians and our military leaders, of liberals and conservatives, of Democrats and of Republicans".¹⁹ He went on to point out the great advantages of the treaty and the dangers inherent in its non ratification. In effect seven major points in the treaty's favour were outlined by the President, these being:

- 1) The treaty reduced the dangers of nuclear war particularly with the equal "ceilings" agreement. *ceiling*
- 2) It preserves options to build the forces necessary to maintain a strategic balance and thus preserve security through an adequate deterrent. *adequate deterrent*
- 3) It leads directly to the next step in more effectively controlling modern weapons. *control*
- 4) It slows down, it even reverses, the momentum of Soviet arms build up.
- 5) It has not led to a cut in United States forces (emphatic reference was made here to the M-X system).
- 6) It cuts the cost of the arms race.
- 7) It gives an opportunity to initiate deeper cuts in the proposed SALT III treaty.

If, President Carter continued, the treaty were not signed then the consequences for the United States would be quite dramatic. Spending on otherwise unnecessary strategic equipment would have to be increased to offset the Soviet build up which would ensue.²⁰ (See diagram below).

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Source: SALT II Testimony, July 9-11 1979. Current Policy No. 72A, United States Dept. of State Bureau of Public Affairs. ACDA Director George Seignious. Page 23. Testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.²¹

As a consequence of this arms race a great threat to nuclear stability would result, leading to increased tension between the East and West with a possible confrontation between the two superpowers. Also, he added, the European allies and others "who support the treaty" would feel their security threatened.

The Administration fully supporting President Carter made great efforts to convince Congress of the advantages of the treaty and were at great pains to keep them informed. As Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance stated quite clearly, "these sessions have been held to receive your advice as well as to report progress. Time and time again issues raised by Senate have been taken up in negotiations....(in negotiations with the Soviet Union) we.... were conscious of the need to meet a number of specific objections raised by Senate".²³

In the Senate hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George M. Seignious, and Ambassador Ralph Earl all spoke strongly in favour of the treaty, choosing to emphasize different positive points relating to their own fields of interest and attention.²⁴

In the Administration's defence of the SALT agreements great attention was given to the criticisms of it launched by those who had major reservations, for the Senate was by no means unanimous in its support and, for the ratification, a two-thirds majority was necessary.²⁵ Indeed a poll taken in January 1979 could only identify 35 Senators who were marginally in favour and of those, eight were considered to be

wavering. Against the treaty were counted 29.²⁶ To have any chances of success the Administration would have to satisfy the criticisms levelled at its "package". Those criticisms covered a series of packages, from a concern for the provisions of the treaty themselves mainly of a technical nature, to the wider security issues of military ability at all levels in the face of the Soviet military build up and American response, to the need to "link" the SALT II treaty to Soviet good behaviour particularly with the Soviet activities in Africa, the Middle East, Cuba or Asia and in relation to the "human rights" issues; to concern for the NATO and European alliance in particular and the other alliance systems in general. Certain groups could be discerned in Senate in relation to SALT.

One of the most consistent critics of the agreements since SALT I was Senator Jackson who alluded to the proposed treaty and President Carter's role in it as a "Policy of Appeasement" similar to that of the United Kingdom during the negotiations with Hitler's Germany in the immediate pre-war period. Supported by pressure groups such as "The Committee on the Present Danger" (whose members include such influential characters as Former Secretary to the Treasury H.H. Fowler, and Douglas Dillon, Eugene Rostow, Former Secretary of Defence David Packard and Chief Spokesman Paul Nitze) and the "Coalition of Peace through Strength" (with 175 Republican and Democratic members of Congress plus Admiral Thomas Moorer and General Lyman L. Lemnitzer) and the American Conservative Union, they combined forces in the argument against any ratification of the treaty, as its only function would be to the Soviet advantage and massively reduce the US power in any future global or regional confrontation. They assumed collectively a "hawkish" stance and were in favour of a more aggressive response in the light of perceived Soviet expansionism.

They perceived SALT II as a legitimizing of Soviet superiority and US inferiority. Their strategy has been to campaign actively against its ratification by pointing out its defects and by threatening to introduce radical amendments which on Secretary of State Defence H. Brown's own admission would kill the treaty.²⁷ At the same time the insistence of this group on "linking" the treaty with Soviet good behaviour found little support from the Administration who insisted that the treaty should be judged on its own merits, and assured the objectors that "it's a deliberate, calculated move that we are making as a matter of self interest for the United States" and "I made it clear to President Brezhnev that Cuban military activities in Africa, sponsored or supported by the Soviet Union, and also the growing Cuban involvement in the problems of Central America and the Caribbean, can only have a negative impact on US-Soviet relationships".²⁸ The US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski also spelled out the dangers of linkage: "Our position on linkage is clear. We believe that limitations should not be held hostage either to American or Soviet policies or to competition between us...(linkage) is not a prescription for policy but for paralysis".²⁹

A more moderate line was taken in the Senate by the group who were basically in support of SALT II but had genuine reservations about the technical details which might compromise United States security. Three main areas of criticism were identified by this group namely verification, ambiguities and loopholes in the treaty, and equality with the USSR. To go through the details is, perhaps, inadvisable as its technical nature would be daunting. However on all three counts evidence given to Senate in the period spanning June and July seemed to have satisfied Senate that adequate precautions had been undertaken by the negotiators.³⁰ Nevertheless, the

majority of Senate were greatly influenced by the evidence presented by General David C. Jones USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Dr. Kissinger on their attitude towards the SALT ratification issue. Both expressed concern about the wider security interests of which the SALT agreement were only part. General Jones in his evidence to Senate warned that "we are seriously concerned lest the nation repeats its earlier mistakes through complacency, an incomplete understanding of the Soviet military build up, an insufficient appreciation of the broader consequences of Soviet momentum in terms of stability, global power relationships and long term United States interests. Therefore we consider it absolutely essential that if the nation accepts the SALT II agreement, it does so on the full understanding that we will be required to undertake a series of important strategic modernisation programmes in order to maintain strategic parity within the limits agreed on"... (if the recommendations are taken) "then history will record SALT II as a step forward"; (without this commitment) "we will find that SALT II made little difference and may have been a net loss".³¹ Support of General Jones was given by Dr. Kissinger who re-emphasized the need to develop the new M-X, the air-launched cruise missile and the sea-launched cruise missile but he also added that there was a need for additional spending on conventional arms also.³² The administration went to great pains to assure Senate that the new systems would be deployed³³ and in response to Kissinger's statement given to the Senate Armed Services Committee said that the Carter administration would seek a "substantial increase" in the 1981 defence budget, "so as to expand overall defence by three percent a year after inflation".³⁴

A compromise leading to ratification was now taking shape. Senate would agree to a ratification of SALT providing there was

increased defence expenditure. Whereas the Administration was accepting a 3% increase influential Senators were demanding 5%. Even Senator Jackson seemed to have resigned himself to this compromise as did Senators Sam Nunn, John Tower, and Senator Goldwater.³⁵ Whereas in January 1979 the prospects for a ratified SALT II were grounds for considerable concern to the Administration the actual treaty, the justification of it by its supporters and the compromise effected between the legislative and executive branches on minor amendments and force modernization led to an acceptance of its desirability. By June 1979, a poll of Senators showed 60 in "general favour", of whom eight were wavering, and 40 opposed of whom nine could be won over. By August 1979 Senator Cranston suggested that 30 were firmly in support but only twelve were certain to vote against SALT II³⁶ and the Administration was confident that it could achieve the two-thirds majority.

Despite the evidence cited in September 1979 that Soviet Union troops were stationed in Cuba and of possible Soviet evasions of the SALT I provisions it still seems probable that SALT II will be ratified under the present administration. It remains to be seen whether or not as Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown predicted SALT II "will reflect what I believe to be the basic posture of the American people — not a pointless belligerence but a sensible determination to defend our nation and our interests and to preserve the peace and safety of the entire human race."³⁷

Footnotes

1. Liddell Hart, *Deterrence or Defence* (London Stevens, 1966), p. 66.
2. There are many definitions of deterrence but the most widely accepted, certainly in the United States and must probably in the Soviet Union, is summed up by Secretary of Defence Brown; "Our potential adversary must be convinced that, whatever the circumstances if they were to start a course of action that could lead to war they would either, (1) Suffer unacceptable damage or (2) be frustrated in their action to achieve their objective". U.S. Secretary of Defence Brown, SALT II. Senate Testimony, July 9-11, 1979., p. 10 Current Policy 72A. U.S. Department of State Bureau.
3. For an analysis of the Cuban Crisis see E. Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (Philadelphia, Lippincott 1966).
4. See glossary for explanation of terms.
5. For more detailed and fuller explanation of SALT I refer to Strategic Survey 1972 (I.I.S.S. 1973) pps. 14-19. For agreements and implications. The Military Balance 1972-1973 (London IISS 1973), pp. 83-86. Also Appendix A.
6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "How the Cold War was played". Foreign Affairs Vol. 51, 1972-73, PPS181-209 Kissinger's Critique. The Economist. Feb. 3, 1979, pps. 17 and 18.
7. For a more detailed investigation of the above points see Colin S. Gray, "SALT and the Strategic Balance", British Journal of International Studies. Vol. II, No. 3, Oct. 1975, pps. 183-209.
8. "East-West Balance", Economist. Sept. 9, 1978. pps. 74-75. Also the Military Balance 1978-1979. (I.I.S.S. 1978) p. 88.
9. See Figure 1.
10. The Cruise missile was successfully tested March 5, 1976.
11. The Soviet nuclear missiles SS17, SS18 and SS19, SS20 were all MIRVed and deployed between 1975 and 1977. See The Military Balance 1978-1979 (IISS 1978) p. 81.
12. Prospects of Soviet power in the 1980s. Adelphi Papers No. 151 and 152 (IISS 1979) Special reference may be made to "The United States in Soviet Perspectives", A. Dalin, No. 152, pp. 13-22.
13. S.A.L.T. Ceilings and why are they so high? Milton Leitenberg. British Journal of International Studies; Vol. 2, No. 2. July 1976. pp. 149-164. Also refer to Appendix A.
14. For exact details of the treaty; Department of State Publication 8984 General Foreign Policy Series, No. 316, June 1979.
15. Ibid. Also Appendix A and 8.
16. Speech by L. Brezhnev March 1979. Survival, July/Aug. 1979, IISS Documentation: Soviet Policy towards Europe, pp. 176-177.
17. A. Dalin, The United States in Soviet Perspectives, op. cit., pp 15-16.
18. Schwartz Morton, Soviet perceptions of the United States, (Forthcoming) Berkeley. (University of California press). Quoted in Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s. Adelphi Papers, No. 151, page 17.
19. President Carter, Department of State Publication 8984, op. cit., p. 3.
20. Ibid. p. 4.
21. For further estimates of S.A.L.T./NO SALT see SALT II Testimony July 9-11 1979, op. cit., page 23.
22. President Carter, Department of State Publication 8984, op. cit., p.4.
23. S.A.L.T. II testimony July 9-11, op. cit., p. 4. It is also worthwhile noting that the House of Representatives was also fully consulted. For evidence given to the House refer in particular to the "Hearings on the Strategic Arms Limitation talks to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. 95th Congress, June 7th 1978 — Oct. 12th 1978. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 1979.
24. For details see SALT II Testimony July 9-11, 1979. op. cit. pp. 1-33.
25. At one point President Carter was seriously considering making SALT II into an Executive Agreement. He gave up this idea on Jan. 14, 1979 because it would most probably have alienated Congress so much that he would not have been able to maintain the agreement.

26. "Towards Security or Danger, a balanced account of the Debate" Foreign Policy Association, p. 27.
27. Sec. of Defence, Harold Brown. Comment made during an interview on April 5th 1979, U.S. Press Release.
28. President Carter in address before the joint session of Congress. June 18, 1979. Dept. of State Publication B984, op. cit., p. 5.
Also see; P. Warnke and M. Krapa, 'The awesome facts behind S.A.L.T.', Across the Board, p. 5.
29. Zbigniew Brzezinski: Speech to Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, April 14, 1979. Quoted in "SALT-II", The U.S. Communication Agency, American Center, New Delhi.
30. S.A.L.T. II Testimony, July 9-11, 1979. op. cit. Also CIA testimony to the House of Representatives, Hearings on the Strategic Arms Limitation talk to the U.S. House of Representatives, June 7 1978 — Oct. 12 1978, op. cit. Also for technical details of verification; Scientific American, Feb. 1979, Vol. 240, No. 2, pp. 38-46.
31. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, July 11, 1979. S.A.L.T. II testimony July 9-11, 1979, op. cit., pp. 33-36.
32. Kissinger's statement to Senate panel on SALT II, 31st July 1979. U.S. Press Release.
33. S.A.L.T. II Testimony, July 9-11, 1979, op. cit.
34. U.S. Press Release, 31st July 1979.
35. U.S. Press Release, August 2nd 1979.
36. Senator Cranston report, U.S. Press Release, 1 August 1979. The twelve against the treaty were all Republicans; see Appendix C.
37. S.A.L.T. Testimony, July 9-11, 1979, op. cit. p. B.

Glossary

- ABM (antiballistic missile):** Any missile capable of destroying an enemy ballistic missile in flight, before the latter reaches its target.
- ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile.**
- Backfire:** U.S. code name for a Soviet supersonic bomber which has a range of 5,500 miles and can carry nuclear weapons. U.S. experts disagree as to whether or not Backfire should be classified as a strategic weapon.
- Ballistic missile:** A missile propelled by a rocket. The rocket's thrust determines the missile's course and point of impact. Unlike aircraft or cruise missiles, a ballistic missile returns to earth in a free fall and hence cannot change course in mid-flight. (However, see MIRV.)
- Counterforce:** The use of strategic weapons to destroy an adversary's strategic weapons.
- Cruise missile:** A pilotless aircraft that flies like an airplane at subsonic speeds within the earth's atmosphere. It can be guided all the way to its target. It can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, can be short-range or long-range, and can be launched from the air, ground or sea.
- Deterrence:** Preventing an adversary from launching a first strike by maintaining a second-strike capability.
- First strike:** The first offensive move of a general nuclear war. It implies an intention to knock out the opponent's ability to retaliate.
- Hardened:** See silo.
- ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile):** A land-based, rocket-propelled missile capable of delivering one or more nuclear warheads over a distance of 3,000 nautical miles or more.
- Kiloton:** The yield of a nuclear weapon equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT. (The bomb detonated at Hiroshima in 1945 had a yield of approximately 14 kilotons.)
- Launcher:** In SALT terminology, a device, such as a silo, a submarine tube or strategic bomber, from which a strategic weapon is launched.

MAP (multiple aim point): A proposed system for moving ICBMs at random among a large number of covered and otherwise empty launch sites. See mobile basing mode.

Megaton: The yield of a nuclear weapon equivalent to 1 million tons of TNT.

MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle): One of several nuclear warheads mounted on a single missile (such as the U.S. Minuteman III or the Soviet SS-19). Each MIRV, after separation from the missile booster, can be directed at a separate target.

Mobile basing mode: Any system for making ICBMs less vulnerable to attack by making them mobile and thus hard to locate.

MX (Missile-Experimental): An advanced U.S. ICBM, still in the development stage, designed to carry eight to ten MIRVs.

Nuclear weapon: A weapon whose explosive force comes from the fission (atomic bomb) or fusion (hydrogen bomb) of atomic nuclei. All strategic weapons are nuclear, but some nuclear weapons are made for tactical use.

Second strike: A nuclear attack in response to an adversary's first strike. A second-strike capability is the ability to absorb the full force of a first strike and still inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

Silo: An underground launcher for an ICBM, usually "hardened" with reinforced concrete to reduce its vulnerability.

SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile): A ballistic missile carried in, and launched from, a submarine.

Strategic bomber: A bomber of intercontinental range, capable of serving as a strategic weapon.

Strategic weapon: A long-range weapon — for example, an ICBM, SLBM and strategic bomber — designed to destroy military or civilian targets in the adversary's homeland.

Tactical weapon: A weapon intended for battlefield use in a regional or local theater of operation. Synonym: theater weapon. Both terms are in contrast to the term strategic weapon.

Throw-weight: The combined weight of all warheads, guidance systems and penetration aids carried by a single missile; the useful payload potential of a missile booster.

Triad: The threefold structure of U.S. strategic forces, consisting of strategic bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs.

Warhead: That part of a missile containing the explosive intended to detonate on reaching the target.

Yield: The force of a nuclear explosion, expressed in terms of the number of tons of TNT that would have to be exploded to produce the same force.

CHRONOLOGY 1972 — 1979

1972: May 26: President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, in Moscow, signed the SALT one interim agreement and the accompanying Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States stressed the importance of further negotiations towards a more complete Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Aug. 3: The U.S. ratified A.B.M. treaty 8B-2.

Sept. 4: Senate approved SALT One Interim Agreement B8-2, identical to the A.B.M. vote. Also passed 56-35 is Jackson Amendment specifying that future SALT treaty would require equal limits on U.S. and Soviet Strategic forces.


Oct. 3: Nixon and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko signed ABM treaty and letters exchanged between the two countries putting the 5-year period of SALT into effect.

1973: Talks convened but little progress, made Middle-East crisis. Strains in d'étente.

- 1974: August 10: Nixon resigned the Presidency, succeeded by Gerald Ford, who committed himself to SALT II.
 Nov. 24: Ford and Brezhnev met at Vladivostok and issued a joint statement pledging the two governments to seek a SALT I agreement for the period 1977-1985, which would include limits on the total number of SNDV'S.
- 1975: June 20: Secretary of Defence Schessinger announced that the Soviet had deployed their first MIRVed missiles.
 July 30: Ford and Brezhnev met in Helsinki on SALT, — no specific agreements.
 Oct. 12: Kissinger says in interview that SALT two "90%" complete. Problem over growing issue of Backfire bomber and Cruise missile.
- 1976: Jan. 21-22: Kissinger visited Moscow on SALT, revealed afterwards that new proposals presented, "prospects for reductions" press reports said Soviets proposal lowering Vladivostok limits for 2,400 to 2,200.
 March 5: Successful Air-launched cruise missile tested by U.S. airforce.
 November 2: Jimmy Carter defeated Ford for the Presidency.
 Dec. 3: President — elect Carter committed himself to a SALT agreement.
- 1977: March 14: Presidential press secretary Powell refuted linkage between SALT negotiations and human rights issue.
 March 27-30: Vance took Carter's proposals to Moscow — rejected by Kremlin.
 May 11: SALT talks resumed in Geneva and continued without adjournment until conclusion of SALT negotiation two years later.
 May 18-24: Vance and Gromyko met in Geneva and agreed on three-part framework.
 June 31: President Carter announced cancellation of B1 bomber.
- 1978: July 13: Vance and Gromyko ended two days of SALT talks in Geneva. Sept. 9: Chief U.S. SALT negotiator Wanke completed two days of talks with Gromyko. Remaining major issues were (1) Development and definition of new missiles, Backfire and the number and range of cruise missiles on bombers. Later Geneva negotiators agreed firm treaty limits.
- 1979: Jan. 14: Carter confirmed that he would send SALT II to the Senate as a treaty, rather than as an executive agreement to both Houses of Congress.
 April 4: Assistant to the President National Security Affairs Brzezinski said, "the United States and the Soviet Union are on the verge of an historic achievement".
 May 8: Vance and Dobrynin held 26th meeting, reportedly to wrap up final substantive details.
 May 9: Vance and Brown announced U.S.—Soviet agreement on a SALT II treaty.
 June 18: President Carter and President Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna.
 June 22: Treaty sent to Senate for ratification by President Carter.

Appendix A


Agreed Strategic Force Limits



*Not constrained by SALT I
Heavy Bombers, numbers as of mid 1972

Source: Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. (July 9-10) op. cit. Page 3.

Appendix B SALT II Treaty







Source: Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance: Testimony on the SALT two agreement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. (July 9 and 10). SALT II SENATE TESTIMONY July 9-11, 1979. Current Policy No. 72A. United States Department of State, Washington D.C. page 6.

Appendix C

THE NUCLEAR COMPETITION

* Estimates for 1979 onwards



Source: The Economist September 9, 1978, page 74-77.

Appendix D

Some Key U.S. participants in the S.A.L.T. II Ratification Issue and their general attitudes: As August 1979

President Carter	Acceptance without modification. No linkage. A good treaty
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance	Acceptance without modifications, major negotiator with Soviet Union, frequent appearances in support of treaty
Secretary of Defence Harold Brown	Acceptance without modification. Good compromise treaty
Chief National Security adviser Zbigniew Brezinski	Acceptance without modification. Good compromise treaty
Ambassador Ralph Earle II (Chmn. of U.S. SALT Delegation throughout 1979)	Acceptance without modifications
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency George M. Seignious	Acceptance without modification; argued role of SALT II as part of wider role of disarmament and arms control
C.I.A. Director Stanfield Turner	Assurances of ability to verify the treaty. No comment on desirability of S.A.L.T. or acceptance
C.I.A. Ray McRory (Specialist on SALT II and verification)	As above
General David C. Jones Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff	Acceptance but emphasis on modernization of military and strategic forces and increased defence expenditure
Dr. H. Kissinger Former Sec. of State under Nixon and Ford	Acceptance but with reservations. Continued monitoring of treaty essential and possibility of linkage. Emphasis on greater defence spending
Edward Kennedy Probable Democratic Presidential candidate	Unqualified support and acceptance of treaty. Urged deeper cuts in SALT III
Howard Baker Senate Republican leader Probable Republican Presidential candidate	Non-acceptance of treaty without major amendments. Regards treaty as "of secondary importance to a strong national defence"
Frank Church Chmn. of Senate Foreign Relations Committee	Qualified support, likely to agree to minor amendments to secure the treaty — those amendments being acceptable to the Soviet Union
Robert Byrd Senate Majority Leader	Qualified support. He reacted strongly to the Soviet Union's attempts to warn congress about the amendments

A. Creoson Senate Assistant Majority Leader	Support for treaty, concerned with greater cuts at SALT III
Henry M. Jackson Senate Committee on Arms Control	Leanings against treaty. Might give support if Administration increases defence expenditure but more likely to reject.
Robert Dole Possible Candidate for Presidency	Outright support for treaty
Senator Sam Nunn	Support with increased arms expenditure
Russell Long Chmn. Finance Committee	Non-committed
George McGovern (Senator)	Support
J. Bidden	Support
P. Nitze Former SALT negotiator and Former Assistant Secretary of Defence	Outright opposition to the treaty
Paul C. Warnke Former Chief negotiator for SALT	Support
M. Toon Ambassador to the Soviet Union	Support
Averill Harriman Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union	Support
J. Brown Governor California	Support

The 12 Republicans counted against the treaty in a vote; B. Dole (R. Kansas), P.V. Domenici (R. New Mexico), J.W. Warner (R. Virginia), H. Bellman (R. Oklahoma), A. Simpson (R. Wyoming), R.S. Shfeiker (R. Pennsylvania), R.W. Jepsen (R. Iowa), S. Thurmond (R. South Carolina), G.J. Humphrey (R.N. Hampshire), M. Wallop (R. Wyoming), W.L. Armstrong (R. Colorado), H.H. Schmitt (R. New Mexico)

Major Pressure Groups

Opposed: Coalition of Peace through strength (membership includes strong military contingency)
American Conservative Union. Committee on Present Danger.

Support: Americans for S.A.L.T. (membership includes C.B. Yost, Clark M. Clifford, Henry Cobot Lodge)
American Committee for East-West relations.
Centre for Defence Information

The People's Commune and the Socialist Transformation of the Chinese Peasantry

Dr. K. K. Tse.

**This paper was originally presented at the Tenth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, New Delhi and Lucknow, India, December 10-22, 1978, and will be published in Joan Mencher (ed.) The Social anthropology of Peasantry (N.Y. Carolina Academic Press, 1980)*

The purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective on the nature and direction of transformation of the rural people's commune in China. I shall begin with an examination of the Chinese formulation of the imperative of eliminating the so called 'three major differences' (between town and country, worker and peasant, mental and manual labour) in socialist transition, relating it to the classical Marxist formulations of the question and the historical experience of the Soviet Union. This will be followed by an analysis of the basic structure and internal dynamic of the people's commune system with a view of clarifying its role in serving as the basic unit for the 'proper handling' of the contradictions between the peasants, the collective and the state as well as in facilitating the narrowing of the 'three major differences'.

The So called 'Three Major Differences': theoretical and comparative perspectives

The launching of the Great Leap Forward and the formation of the people's communes marked a critical turning point in the Chinese road to socialism. A hallmark of the Great Leap Forward strategy was the attempt to simultaneously develop agriculture and industry, central and local industry, advanced and indigenous technology ('walking on two legs') and to narrow the 'three major differences', between town and country, worker and peasant, and mental and manual labour. The most important surveying institution specifically designed to accomplish this gigantic historic task is the rural people's commune, instituted on a nation-wide scale in 1958 at the height of the agricultural collectivization campaign.

The formulation of 'eliminating the three major differences' as a central task in socialist transition was a novel formulation; it was systematically put forth for the first time only during the Great Leap Forward. It signifies a major departure from the Soviet theory and practice of 'socialist transition' and constitutes a characteristic feature of the Chinese approach to socialist revolution and socialist construction. Although there has emerged a growing body of literature devoted to the analysis of the variety of measures and policies relating to the gradual elimination of the 'three major differences' in China, there has been few attempts in the West to examine the theoretical significance of this formulation in the terms of the Marxist theory of socialist transition. In this part of the paper, I shall briefly examine this vital theoretical question.

To the founding fathers of scientific socialism, the division and opposition of town and country, industry and agriculture, in their modern forms, are the critical culmination of the division and specialization of labour which, though it did not begin with capitalism, was developed under it to an extraordinary and transforming degree. The specifically capitalist development of the productive forces involves not only a massive shift of human and material resources in favour of urban concentrations, but also a conquest over the countryside, which becomes 'ruralized', since it by no means represented in the past an exclusively agricultural milieu. From being a centre of all kinds of production, the country becomes 'agriculature', i.e. a separate industry for food and raw materials, separated in turn into various specialized types of farming, districts, etc.

In *Capital*, Marx shows that capital first seizes control of the productive process outside and town: 'in the countryside, in villages lacking guilds'. This corresponds to the first historical form of capitalist control of production, that of manufacture, in which the subsumption of labour to capital remains external and formal. But with the advent of machine production capital seizes hold of the real substance of the labour process, dynamically reshaping and diversifying all branches of production by the technical-organizational transformation of the productive process. The removal of all fetters on the mobility of labour and the separation of one secondary process after another from agriculture (given the corresponding revolutions in transport) opens the way to an accelerated, permanent urbanization based on the 'concentration of the motive power of society in big cities' (Marx) and the subordination of agriculture as merely one branch of industry. The dominance of the town is no longer externally imposed: it is now reproduced as part of the accumulation process, transforming and spatially reallocating rural production 'from within'.

The progressive character of the separation between town and country, industry and agriculture in the historical epoch of capitalism was unambiguously recognized in the writings of Marx and Engels. But to them, the unprecedented growth in production under capitalism also creates the necessity and conditions for ultimately combining the two forms of production and eliminating the distinctions between town and country. As Marx put it in *Capital*.

"In the sphere of agriculture, large-scale industry has a more revolutionary effect than elsewhere, for the reason that it annihilates the bulwark of the old society, the 'peasant', and substitutes for him the wage-labourer. Thus the need for social transformation, and the antagonism of the classes, reaches the same level in the countryside as it has attained in the towns..... The capitalist mode of production completes the disintegration of the primitive familial union which bound agriculture and manufacture together when they were both at an undeveloped and childlike stage. But at the same time it creates the material conditions for a new and higher synthesis, a union of agriculture and industry on the basis of the forms that have developed during the period of their antagonistic isolation."¹

In *Anti-Duhring*, Engels has also written,

"Only a society which enables its productive forces to mesh harmoniously on the basis of one single vast plan can allow industry to be dispersed over the whole country in the way best adapted to its own development and to the maintenance and development of the other elements of production. Accordingly, the abolition of the antithesis between town and country is not merely possible. It has become a direct necessity of industrial production itself, just as it has become a necessity of agricultural production and of public health to boot. Only the fusion of town and country can eliminate the present poisoning of air, water and land, only such fusion will change the situation of the masses now languishing in the towns, and enable their excrement to be used for the production of plants instead of for the production of disease."²

The abolition of the antithesis and division between town and country has been a classic objective of revolutionary socialism since Marx and Engels' days. The *Communist Manifesto* called for 'the combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; the gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country'. Engels spoke of socialism as 'abolishing the contrast between town and country, which has been brought to its extreme point by present-day capitalist society'. To Marx and Engels, "the antagonism between town and country can exist only within the framework of private property. It is the most crass expression of the subjection of the individual under the division of labour, under a definite activity forced upon him —

a subjection which makes one man a restricted town animal and the other a restricted country animal, and daily creates anew the conflict between their interests."³

Lenin, writing at the turn of this century, has argued that the separation between town and country is 'one of the most profound and most general of the contradictions of the capitalist system.'⁴ after the October Revolution, he repeatedly affirmed the long-term goal of eliminating the differences between town and country, worker and peasant, mental and manual labour. In *A Great Beginning*, he wrote,

"Clearly, in order to abolish classes completely, it is not enough to overthrow the exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, not enough to abolish their rights of ownership; it is necessary also to abolish all private ownership of the means of production, it is necessary to abolish the distinction between town and country, as well as the distinction between manual workers and brain workers."⁵

In another text written in the same year, Lenin put it in more forceful terms the central importance of eliminating the differences between the worker and the peasant in socialist transition:

"We say that our goal is equality, and by that we mean the abolition of classes. Then the class distinction between workers and peasants should be abolished. That is exactly our object. A society in which the class distinction between workers and peasants still exist is neither a communist society nor a socialist society. True, if the word socialism is interpreted in a certain sense, it might be called a socialist society, but that would be mere sophistry, an argument about words.... One thing is clear, and that is, that as long as the class distinction between workers and peasants exists, it is no use talking about equality, unless we want to bring grist to the mill of the bourgeoisie."⁶

Let us recapitulate our discussion thus far. To Marx, Engels and Lenin, the separation and antithesis between town and country, mental and manual labour predated the emergence of the capitalist mode of production but has since been greatly accentuated under it. The reproduction of the capitalist mode of production entails the continuous reproduction of this antithesis. The capitalist development of the productive forces, however, also laid the material foundations for the ultimate elimination of the antitheses and distinctions between town and country, industry and agriculture, mental and manual labour. One of the primary tasks in the period of 'transition to communism' is precisely the gradual elimination of these differences.

It is important, however, to note that underlying this formulation is the basic assumption that the accomplishment of this historic task is premised on definite material conditions, the most important of which is the attainment of a sufficiently high level of

development of the productive forces in the society concerned. This raises a number of fundamental but often neglected issues: In a society with a low level of development of production but in which the party of the proletariat has nevertheless seized state power, is it possible and/or necessary to eliminate the 'three major differences' without having attained a high level of development of the productive forces? Or to put in another way, are there any contradictions between the rapid development of the productive forces and the gradual elimination of these differences in such a society? To the extent that the capitalist socialization of the production process is a contradictory process involving the sharpening of the 'three major differences', what does a specifically socialist socialization of the production process entail? In what ways do the 'three major differences' inherited from the old society manifest themselves as class differences and class contradictions in a 'socialist' society? And

what are their implications for the nature and forms of the class struggle in the entire epoch of socialism?⁷

These are some of the issues that emerge from our examination of the classical Marxist formulations concerning the elimination of the 'three major differences'. Hardly any of these have been addressed by Marx or Engels as such since they had not witnessed the victory of any proletarian revolution in their life time and thus these issues have not been posed to them in a practically way. The October Revolution was the first victorious proletarian revolution and Russia at the time of revolution was characterized by a relatively low level of development of the productive forces. Lenin, however, did not live long enough to theoretically and practically confront these issues; he died after scarcely three years since the end of the Civil War and the promulgation of the NEP.

The mid-1920s witnessed a great industrialization debate among the Bolshevik leaders over the strategies — and possibility — of socialist construction in an economically backward and isolated Russia. None of the questions formulated above, however, received any serious attention by the protagonists in this debate. To almost all of the latter — including Preobrazhensky, Bukharin, Trotsky, and Stalin — it appears axiomatic that in a society with such a low level of development of the productive forces as in Russia, the question of eliminating/reducing of the 'three major differences' was hardly on the agenda. It seems that an unquestioned assumption generally held by the Bolsheviks leaders are that the rapid development of the productive forces necessarily entails the widening — at least temporarily — of these differences, and that it is only after the creation of a solid material base that these differences could in turn be gradually eliminated. This is particularly evident in Preobrazhensky's

formulation of the 'law of primitive socialist accumulation', the basic logic of which was taken over by Stalin in toto in his subsequent agricultural collectivization campaign. According to Preobrazhensky, the rapid industrialization of the country necessarily entails the 'exploitation' of the non-socialist, petty-bourgeois sector (i.e. primarily agriculture) by the state-controlled sector (industry). The Soviet state is to mobilize the maximum possible economic surplus from the former so as to finance an accelerated programme of industrialization. Under such circumstance, Preobrazhensky recognizes, the tensions between town and country are bound to be acute while the worker-peasant alliance may be seriously undermined. In the subsequent forced collectivization campaign under Stalin, the worker-peasant alliance was completely shattered. The peasantry was ruthlessly expropriated and compelled to offer their 'tribute' to the state, which became possible only after the strengthening of an immensely repressive state apparatus. Rapid industrialization in the Soviet Union was achieved at the cost of a sharpening of the antithesis and contradictions between town and country, industry and agriculture.

The historical experience of the Soviet Union also shows that these contradictions tend to reproduce themselves over time and the development of the productive forces to a high level does not in any way automatically contribute to their resolution. The widening of the 'three major differences' leads inexorably to the emergence of new vested interests which may prove to be powerful obstacles for further advance on the path of socialist transition.

It is instructive here to consider the position of Stalin on the 'elimination of the three major differences' in the post-World War II era, in which the Soviet Union has already been transformed into a major

economic and military power. Stalin wrote in 1952,⁸

"Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that the conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but, mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas in industry we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry i.e. ownership by the whole people, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that *only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear*. It therefore cannot be denied that the disappearance of *this essential distinction* between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us." (Emphases added)

In this formulation, Stalin underlines the continued existence of the distinction between industry and agriculture in terms of the differences in the *conditions of labour*, and the fact that this distinction is manifested in the coexistence of two forms of ownership in the U.S.S.R., ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. The reproduction of these two ownership forms, Stalin stresses, constitutes the basis for the preservation of commodity circulation. Insofar as the realization of the communist society implies the disappearance of commodity production, the epoch of socialist transition must necessarily involve the process whereby the conditions for the continued existence of commodity production are progressively eliminated, which necessitates among other things the abolition of the distinction between industry and agriculture, between the ownership of the whole people and collective ownership.

This formulation as it stands is consistent with the positions of Marx, Engels, and Lenin outlined above.

However, a closer reading of the text *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* shows unambiguously that this pronouncement by Stalin is purely incidental. Nowhere in the text — or in any of his other writings — did Stalin attempt to pursue this analysis, and more significantly, to spell out the necessary measures to be implemented in order to gradually eliminate the distinction between industry and agriculture, between ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. In fact, in the same chapter of the text, there are a number of other formulations which are overtly at odds with the quotation above and which apparently reflect more faithfully Stalin's point of view. Consider the following remarks:

"Of quite a different character is the problem of the disappearance of *distinctions* between town (industry) and country (agriculture) and between physical and mental labour. This problem was not discussed in the Marxist classics. It is a new problem, one that has been raised practically by our socialist construction..... Some comrades assert that in the course of time not only will the *essential* distinction between industry and agriculture and between physical and mental labour disappear, but so will ALL distinction between them. That is not true. *Abolition of the essential distinction between industry and agriculture cannot lead to the abolition of all distinction between them.* Some distinction, even if inessential, will certainly remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work in industry and in agriculture.... But this indicates that my previous formulation was unprecise, unsatisfactory. It must be discarded and replaced by another formulation, one that speaks of the *abolition of essential distinctions* and the *persistence of inessential distinctions* between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour.⁹ (Emphases added)

Stalin distinguishes here between 'essential' and 'inessential' distinctions. The crucial point is of course what constitutes the distinction between the two types of distinctions. Stalin nowhere makes this clear. What Stalin fails to confront theoretically and practically is the problem of eliminating one of the most essential distinctions between industry and agriculture, namely, the distinction in the forms of ownership between the two. Instead there is a tendency on Stalin's part to subsume this essential distinction under the category of 'inessential distinctions'. Elsewhere in the pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, Stalin mentioned in passing the question of 'how the two main forms of ownership will ultimately become one', and considered that 'this is a question which requires separate discussion'. Mao Tse-tung in his critique of the text seized upon this vital issue and commented sharply, "Stalin is avoiding the issue, having failed to find a method or suitable formulation on the transition from collective to public ownership".¹⁰

THE CHINESE APPROACH

It has been pointed out that to Lenin, among other Bolshevik leaders, the abolition of the distinction between workers and peasants is a primary task in the epoch of socialist transition, and that the material prerequisite for the accomplishment of this task is the development of the productive forces to a sufficiently high level. There does not seem to be any disagreements between the Bolshevik and Chinese leaders on these points. The crucial and fundamental difference lies in the ways the respective parties approach and 'handle' the contradictions between the worker and the peasant in the very process of developing the country's productive forces.

China on the eve of the socialist revolution, like the Soviet Union at a comparable period of time, was predominantly an agrarian society. Rapid industrialization of the country, again as in the case in the Soviet Union, has to rely to a substantial extent on savings from the agrarian sector.¹¹ There exists therefore an objective

contradiction between the interests of the peasant masses and the state's ever-increasing needs of marketable surplus for industrialization. As revealed in the Wan-sui documents,¹² one of the most important lessons Mao drew from the Soviet experience of socialist construction is that this contradiction constitutes by far the most dangerous and weakest point in the entire period of socialist transition. Mao reproached Stalin for his failure to recognize for less to resolve, this contradiction. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, the development of the productive forces — on the basis of 'primitive socialist accumulation' — was a contradictory process involving the accelerated growth of industrial production on the one hand and the suffocation of the agricultural sector on the other, with the result that the 'three major differences' were being widening and the peasant masses condemned to a passive and alienating role in socialist construction.

In China, the Great Leap Forward and the formation of the people's commune ushered an alternative strategy of simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, heavy and light industry, central and local industry, with a view of minimizing the central procurement of rural resources and releasing the production enthusiasm of the peasant masses. Industrial production which had hitherto been concentrated in the big urban centres were decentralized on a massive scale to local-county and commune — levels. Heavy industry continued to be a priority sector in the national economy, but light industry was also to develop at a great pace, while both heavy and light industrial products were to gear more closely to the demands of the agrarian sector.

The cornerstone of this new strategy is the proper 'handling' of the contradictions between the state, the units of production (primarily the collective farms) and the

individual producers (primarily the peasants).¹³ The individual peasant is seen to be torn between the desire to increase his personal income and the need of the collective to maximize its accumulation; the collective to maximize its accumulation; the collective is torn between the desire to maximize its own income, and the need of the state to maximize capital formation. Mao maintained that the interests of the individual, the collective and the state were in the last analysis, isomorphic, and hence the contradiction was not antagonistic. What made it difficult to resolve was the bureaucratic organization and decision-making, which, concentrated at the centre obscured this identity of interest from the people. The state bureaucracy was regarded as the biggest obstacle to the cultivation of understanding among the people of the dialectical identity of individual and communal interests. The solution was to minimize bureaucratic responsibility for accumulation and centralization of resources, and to limit taxation and procurement in order to leave most of the savings from increased production in the hands of the collectives/localities so that the latter might have the initiative and responsibility for the development both of local industry and agricultural mechanization.

According to the Chinese formulation, there does not exist any contradictions between the rapid development of the productive forces and the reducing of the 'three major differences'; indeed the latter is held to be a necessary condition for the former. By decentralizing existing industrial capacity to local levels and at the same time allowing the retention of a substantial proportion of rural savings in the countryside, it was believed that agricultural production would be greatly promoted which in turn would create the basis for rapid development of industry. Industrial undertakings located at the doorsteps of the rural producers and

which gear closely to the latter's needs would enable the peasants to better appreciate the symbiotic relationship between agricultural and industrial development.

It is true that both heavy and light industrial products are generally over-priced relative to agricultural ones, that is to say, exchange of the values of products between

industry and agriculture is far from equivalent. Although the terms of trade between town and country have improved in favour of the latter since liberation, it is still primarily through the unequal exchange between agriculture and industry that the state accumulate funds for industrial development. As Mao has written in *On the Ten Major Relationships*.

"Our policies towards the peasants differ from those of the Soviet Union and take into account the interests of both the state and the peasants. Our agricultural tax has always been relatively low. In the exchange of industrial and agricultural products we follow a policy of narrowing the price scissors, a policy of exchanging equal or roughly equal values."¹⁴

In this formulation, Mao underlines the fact that the state has followed a policy of narrowing the price scissors, which implies that in most cases exchange between industry and agriculture is not based on equivalent values. On the face of it, it may seem that what Preobrazhensky has envisaged as the process of 'primitive socialist accumulation' is also evident in China and further that the Chinese measures are even more faithful to Preobrazhensky's initial conception of primitive socialist accumulation than those carried out under Stalin in that the major mechanism for accumulation is 'manipulative pricing'. This is, however, only a very superficial observation. The essence of Preobrazhensky's formulation is that in order to finance rapid industrialization, the maximum possible resources are to be channelled to the state sector from the private sectors (mainly agriculture), the assumption being that the socialist transformation of the latter has to await the attainment of a high level of development of the productive forces in the country. In China, on the other hand, the crux of the policy since agricultural collectivization was to minimize state procurement of agricultural surpluses

and to leave the grass-root collective units more leeway in accumulating resources for 'self-reliant' development. 'Manipulative pricing' in China could only be understood in terms of the triangular relationships between agriculture, light industry and heavy industry which can be expressed as follows: increased agricultural production through collective effort and collective accumulation at grass-root levels; expansion of light industries (which are granted high profit margin) oriented towards peasant needs, thereby improving the latter's standard of living and stimulating their production enthusiasm; and with rising agricultural productivity, greater capital could be raised for heavy industry development and the collective units in a position to consume agricultural capital goods.

We may now move on to examine the role of the people's commune in facilitating the narrowing the 'three major differences', focusing primarily on the progressive transformation of the ownership system in the countryside.

THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNE SYSTEM

One of the primary conditions for

eliminating the class distinctions between the worker and the peasant — which are manifested in the distinctions between town and country, industry and agriculture — is the elimination of the distinction between the two coexisting forms of ownership of the means of production: ownership by the whole people and collective ownership. The continued existence of these two forms of ownership is due primarily to the still marked differences in the levels of development of the productive forces in the respective sectors. In the Chinese Marxist conception of socialist transition, one of the principal tasks in this historical epoch is to gradually raise the level of collective ownership in the countryside until of single form of ownership — that is, ownership by the whole people — comes into being for the whole country. The accomplishment of this task depends primarily but not exclusively of the pace of development of the productive forces in the countryside as well as of industrial development of the economy as a whole.

In China, the entire process of socialist transformation of agriculture — which is coextensive with the whole epoch of socialism — is conceived in terms of three principal stages. The first stage was the transformation from private to collective ownership of agricultural means of production, a process which includes the progressive phases of the formation of the mutual aid teams, the agricultural producers' cooperatives and the collectives (1952-58). The second stage began with the introduction of the people's commune (1958), the development of which involves the process whereby the level of collective ownership is progressively raised from the team to the brigade and then to the commune level. Full communal ownership of the means of production in the country will mark the completion of this stage. The third stage refers to the transition from full communal ownership to ownership by the

whole people, the realization of which necessitates above all the elimination of the 'three major differences'.

The basic features of the people's commune can be summarized as follows. The people's commune is first of all characterized by its huge size. In terms of the number of households it comprises, it is far larger than the cooperatives and collectives which had emerged in the years immediately preceding its formation. The original 26,000 communes were amalgamated from some 750,000 advanced agricultural producers' co-operatives. In 1970, there were approximately 51,000 communes averaging 2,900 households, 13,000 persons per commune.

Another key feature is that the commune is not only a production unit but is also the basic organ of state power in the countryside. Before the formation of the commune, the township (hsiang) was the grassroot political unit, while the economic organizations functioned quite separately in the forms of agricultural producers' cooperatives. By 1958 the newly formed commune unified the two functions, organizing political power on the one hand, and production, distribution and consumption on the other.

The commune also provides the institutional framework for integrating all aspects of rural life including agricultural, subsidiary and light industrial production; politics and administration; social services such as education, health, and welfare; transportation and communication; finance and commerce; water conservation and basic construction; and defense and military training. The previously existing organizations for production, marketing, education, welfare and the militia were all incorporated into the commune structure in accordance with the strategy of 'comprehensive and simultaneous development'.

In terms of the ownership system, the rural people's commune in China consists of a three-tier ownership system, that is to say, there are basically three levels of ownership of the means of production *within* the commune, ownership by the commune, by the brigade and by the team. The lowest level, the production team, is the *basic* level of ownership, which means that it is at this level that the principal means of production for day-to-day productive activities are owned. It is at the team level that commune members are mobilized to engage in regular productive labour and receive remuneration for their work. The production team serves as the basic accounting unit in the commune, owns and controls most of the means of production in China's countryside and takes final responsibility for most of the economic decisions made in the rural areas.

The production brigade (which comprises about 10 to 20 production teams) apart from performing the vital functions of coordinating agricultural production of the constituent teams and providing a range of vital social services, also owns part of the means of production in the commune. Typically, production brigades purchase (out of the accumulation fund contributed by the constituent teams) and manage medium-sized agricultural implements such as tractors, trucks, pumps, processing equipment, electricity generating equipment, etc. which are too expensive for individual teams to buy and utilize efficiently. The production brigade also plays a significant role in generating new inputs for agriculture. The construction of irrigation and drainage projects such as small and medium scale dams, reservoirs, canals, deep wells, etc. is most important. The teams concerned contribute labour and other resources in proportion to anticipated benefits and on completion of the projects, ownership and management responsibility of these facilities rest with the brigade. In addition, the production brigade also runs small-scale

factories, farm equipment repair shops, grain processing plants, etc.

At the commune level, agricultural as well as industrial production are undertaken. The commune retains ownership of the means of production of these enterprises. Commune agricultural production does not produce a significant portion of basic agricultural commodities since the team owns and controls most of the labour and land, and is limited mainly to such undertakings as forestry, fishing, animal husbandry and fruit orchards. Of far more importance are commune-run industrial undertakings the products and services of which are closely geared to agricultural production, and peasant consumption. Typical commune-run enterprises include: agricultural implement manufacturing and repair shops, grain processing mills, fertilizers and pesticides plants, edible oil presses, brick, tile and lime kilns, and factories producing light industrial products such as light bulbs, shoes, porcelain, etc. The commune also owns and manages large-scale water conservation projects, hydro-electric stations, tractor stations, large-scale agricultural implements. With the income generated from the operation of these undertakings together with contributions from the constituent brigades and teams (a certain percentage of the accumulation and welfare funds of the lower levels is transferred upwards), the commune also provides a variety of social services for its members.

At the moment — two decades after the first people's commune appeared in China's countryside — the basic unit of ownership in the commune is still generally at the team level, as can be seen from Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China adopted in March, 1973:

"The rural people's commune sector of the economy is a socialist sector collectively owned by the masses of working people. At present, it generally takes the form of three-level ownership, that is, ownership by the commune, the production brigade and the production team, with the production team as the basic accounting unit."¹⁵

That is to say, after the basic completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production and the creation of the people's commune in the late 1950s, there has been *basically* little changes in the ownership system in the rural areas. This statement, however, requires two major qualifications. First, since the formation of the people's commune in 1958, collective ownership by the production team has existed within the context of two larger collectivities — the brigade and the commune, which alters profoundly the conditions of operation of the production teams. Second, collective ownership of the means of production is not confined to the team only; both the brigade and the commune also own part of the means of production in the countryside. Although the proportions of the means of production owned at brigade and commune levels in total commune assets are generally rather small, they have been steadily increasing in the past two decades. Further transformation of the ownership system in the people's commune depends to a larger extent on the rate of expansion of the productive activities — and hence the increasing amount of means of production owned — operated at the brigade and commune levels.

It is instructive to note that at the very inception of the commune in 1958, the commune was prematurely employed as the basic unit of ownership — that is, all of the means of production within the commune was owned at this level. At the height of optimism and nation-wide mobilization during the Great Leap Forward it was believed that the second stage outlined above had been completed and the third stage — the transition to ownership by the

whole people — was on the agenda. In the Peitaiho Resolution of August 29, 1958, for example, it was envisaged that "the transition from collective communal ownership to ownership by the whole people is a process the completion of which may take less time — three or four years — in some places, and longer — five or six years or even longer — elsewhere."¹⁶ Although this optimism had scaled down somewhat in the course of the movement, the basic assumption was still implicit in the second resolution, the Wuhan Resolution, in December 1958: "it is possible that socialist ownership by the whole people may be *fully* realized at a somewhat earlier date but this will not be very soon.... The whole process will take *fifteen, twenty or more years* to complete, counting from now."¹⁷ (Emphases added)

That collective ownership was at first instituted at the commune level had very much to do with the attempt during the Great Leap Forward to rapidly transform the natural conditions of agricultural production in China's countryside. After the formation of the Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (AAPC's) and before the emergence of the people's commune, a gigantic mass movement swept over the rural areas in an attempt to construct and improve large-scale water works. Over four hundred million people throughout the country were involved in water-work projects of various sorts. The movement was carried out at the village level with the AAPC's as the nuclei of work organization. In the course of the campaign the limited size of the AAPC's came into sharp contradictions with the imperative of organizing and coordinating water-works on

a large scale. Collective organizations far larger than the AAPC's were called for. The spontaneous amalgamation of the AAPC's in various forms — which subsequently took the form of the people's commune — was primarily a response aimed at resolving this contradiction. The people's commune with its huge size and high level of collective ownership was instrumental in facilitating the launching and completion of a large number of water conservation projects.

At the height of the 'high tide of socialism in the countryside', the people's commune assumed ownership of *all* the means of production within its confine. The land, labour and other resources of the AAPC's became the property of, and were centrally managed by, the commune, thus equalising at one stroke the economic well-being of the constituent units. With the commune serving as the basic unit of account, equality of income among the commune members was also attained but at the expense of the production enthusiasm of the peasants since it was now difficult for them to perceive any correlation between individual efforts and remuneration. The politically and economically disastrous consequences of the attempt to institute collective ownership at the commune level were speedily recognized by the Chinese leaders and in the subsequent readjustments of commune organization the level of ownership was shifted downwards from the commune first to the brigade in 1959 and then to the team in 1961. From this point on the commune took the form of three-level ownership, with the higher levels owning only those means of production too expensive or non-economic for the lower levels to acquire or maintain, or those means of production and facilities serving all members of the larger collectivities. The commune and the brigade, however, continue to play an important role in coordinating the productive activities of the constituent teams/brigades and remain

crucial for mobilizing labour and other resources for agricultural capital construction serving a large number of collective units.

It has been pointed out above that generally speaking basic ownership at the production team corresponds more closely to the level of development of productive forces in China's countryside. The relatively small unit enables the peasants to exercise collective control over the means of production and the conditions of labour. It also makes possible an intimate relationship between the team cadres and the ordinary members, which serves to facilitate the democratic management of productive and other activities of the team. Given the technological level of agricultural production in most communes, the team represents a unit large enough for the collective and rational utilization of the productive resources of a relatively large number of peasant households, but small enough for its members to recognize the close relationship between individual productive efforts and collective well-being which is critical for releasing the production enthusiasm of the peasants.

Collective ownership at the team level is thus considered to be a necessary and indispensable stage of the protracted process of socialist transformation of the Chinese peasantry. Through working and living in a team, the peasant would gradually become accustomed to collective (in contrast to private) mode of labour, develop ability and capacity for collective management, and improve their standard of living through collective efforts, all of which are essential for developing the peasant's collective consciousness and enabling them to gradually cast off the centuries-old small peasant mentality. In short, corresponding to the level of economic and social development in the Chinese villages in the 1950s and 1960s, basic ownership at the team level represents

a collective form of ownership best suited for facilitating the development of agricultural production in the communes, promoting the socialist transformation of the relations of production (which cannot be reduced to the ownership system alone), and transforming the peasant's consciousness.

We have thus far been concerned with what the Chinese have conceived as the 'correspondence' between the productive forces and the relations of production; the commune's three-level ownership with the team as the basic level corresponds basically with the character of the productive forces. But contradictions between the two also exist. These contradictions tend to become increasingly acute in proportion to the progress made in the development of production on the basis of the team. Let us elaborate.

Insofar as the production team is the basic unit of ownership, it serves as the basic unit of production, distribution and accumulation. Given the tremendous variations in the initial possession of material means of production and labour resources, natural endowments and locations, as well as in the quality of leadership and access to outside assistance of various forms, production and income levels of different teams (even within the same brigade/

commune) necessarily vary greatly. To the extent that the crucial decisions of the rate of accumulation were generally taken at the team level under the principle of 'self-reliance', different rates of development of production (a major index is the level of mechanization) may result even within a single brigade and commune. Insofar as this is likely to be a cumulative process, the disparity in levels of production and therefore income among different teams could become very great.¹⁹

If these inequalities are allowed to be consolidated or enlarged in the course of time, political difficulties in future transformation of the ownership system will greatly be enhanced. The better-off teams will tend to resist such changes and 'defend' the existing system of distribution of 'to each according to his work' which guarantees their hard-won privileges. Ideologically, the reproduction of these inequalities would also serve to strengthen — not weaken — the importance of material incentives for productive labour and limit the horizons of the peasants to the material interests of their own small collective unit such as the team. This could constitute another major obstacle in the path along socialist transition. In a pamphlet entitled *Teaching Political Economy to People's Commune Members*, it was stated that:

"At the present stage the people's communes take the form of three-level ownership with the production team as the basic accounting unit... but the disparities between rich and poor teams are relatively great. If this is allowed to continue for long, bourgeois right will be enlarged, class polarization will result and capitalism will emerge. It is therefore imperative to help the poor teams to raise their production and income to reach those of present levels of the average of advanced teams, and when conditions are ripe, to effect the transition from basic ownership by the team to basic ownership by the brigade and the commune. This is now on the agenda."²⁰

In this formulation, some of the likely consequences of perturbing the existing forms of ownership are highlighted: enlargement of bourgeois right, class polarization and restoration of capitalism. Enlargement of 'bourgeois right' here refers primarily to the consolidation of the rights of the small collective units to the possession of their means of production and the relatively privileged levels of income. 'Class polarization' can be understood as the differentiation and polarization of the *collective units* such as the teams — rich teams becoming richer and poor teams becoming poorer, resembling class polarization in the old societies. When the Chinese speaks of 'restoration of capitalism', they are stressing a tendency or direction of development. The prolonged 'consolidation' of basic ownership at the team level does not necessarily entail the restoration of capitalism as such, but it does represent a stagnation in the process of socialist transformation of the peasantry and to this extent enhances the danger of retrogression and the ultimate re-emergence of an exploitative system; on the ideological level, it also tends to reinforce 'bourgeois' values and habits of thought.

The contradiction between the existing forms of ownership and the development of the productive forces also manifests itself in a number of other ways. There is for instance the contradiction between the increasingly social character of the agricultural production process following mechanization and the relatively limited sources of accumulation available at the production team level. The accumulation at the team level has been crucial for financing the mechanization process thus far. But as the scale and sophistication of the machinery to be employed gradually increased, the resources for accumulation available at the team level will no longer suffice. Thus the relative significance of the team as a primary unit of accumulation will tend to diminish as the

process of mechanization proceeds. Without a corresponding change in the ownership system towards a higher level to accommodate this higher degree of socialization of the production process, the contradiction between basic team ownership and the development of mechanized agriculture could become acute and impede the development of the productive forces in the country side.

Another manifestation of this contradiction arises from the imperative to constantly expand the scope of capital construction to facilitate the development of agricultural production. For instance, the development of farm mechanization 'necessitates the gradual perfection of the existing irrigation system, the construction of new networks of roads for tractors and trucks, large-scale land improvements etc. The undertaking of these tasks requires not only labour and capital resources which individual teams could hardly provide but also co-ordination of a large number of collective units and sometimes re-arrangement of existing distribution of material resources. All these can sometimes be accommodated within the existing framework of three-level ownership (this is also where the superiority of the commune system lies) but up to a certain point the contradictions among the unevenly developed collective units can become so acute that these contradictions cannot be 'properly handled' without a change of the ownership towards a higher level.

The preceding analyses serve to illustrate aspects of the dialectical relationships between the ownership system and the development of the productive forces at the present stage of China's rural transformation. How to handle and resolve the contradictions arising from the very process of economic development remains a critical concern of the Chinese leaders. On the abstract level, the primary condition for

their 'resolution' at the present stage is to raise the level of ownership upward to the brigade or in some cases to the commune. The question that emerges is: How can this come about in such a way that it will not jeopardize the production enthusiasm of the collective units concerned especially the better-off ones?

One way of approaching it, the negative lessons of which the Chinese peasants have paid a heavy cost, is associated with the notorious expression 'one levelling and two transferring', that is, the brigade simply 'levels' the income of the constituent teams — rich and poor alike — through administrative measures so that they all share the same level of income, and 'transfers' the means of production as well as labour resources of all the teams within it to the brigade level for central allocation and deployment. In this way, the brigade replaces the team as the basic unit of ownership and equalizes the economic well-being of the constituent teams.

But this means that while all teams give up their ownership of the means of production, the richer teams are likely to experience a lowering of their level of income (and the poor teams a rise). Such a process will in practice be contradictory to two basic principles of socialist transformation: mutual benefit and voluntarism,²¹ and would thus be detrimental to the production enthusiasm of the peasant masses. Moreover, to the extent that the better-off teams have attained their existing economic well-being through 'self-reliance', such a process of levelling would seriously undermine the continued advocate and application of this important principle. The 'communist wind' of 'one levelling and two transferring' has blown before, during the Great Leap Forward and again in some places during the later part of the Cultural Revolution, and it has since been recognized as politically and economically counterproductive or what

the Chinese has characterized as 'left in form, right in essence'.²²

The more 'correct' way of handling these contradictions, according to the Chinese, consists of a two-fold task. On the one hand, the brigade and commune are to actively promote the development of production of the constituent teams but particular effort is put in helping the poorer teams to catch up with the richer ones. This can be done through the provision of various assistance to the teams concerned such as advancing loans and according priority to acquire mechanized agricultural equipments, providing technical assistance in production and in training, offering channels for diversification of the team's productive activities, etc. At the same time, it is also necessary to strengthen political and ideological work in the teams, and to upgrade the cadres' organizing and leadership capacity through such measures as attaching higher-level cadres to the teams for an extended period of time and through retraining team leaders at the more advanced units.

On the other hand, the handling of the contradiction between the existing form of ownership and the development of the productive forces necessitates the rapid expansion and strengthening of the collective economy owned at the brigade and commune levels. This constitutes a critical condition for progressively raising the level of ownership in the people's commune. The expansion of the productive capacity of the brigade and the commune implies that an increasingly significant proportion of total commune (three level) production is carried out on the basis of brigade and commune ownership, and also that the sources of accumulation at these levels would tend to be enlarged. In terms of distribution of income this implies, firstly, that an increasingly large number of commune members would receive their

income from brigade and commune enterprises and secondly, that the brigade and commune would be in a position to provide a greater range of social and welfare services for their members. Indeed the latter can in the course of time be extended to such a degree that it outweighs the significance and function of Individually distributed income.

The significance of these changes is that in proportion to the expansion of brigade and commune production, the importance of the team as a unit of production and income distribution would tend to diminish. At a certain point of this development it would be possible to effect the transition from team ownership to brigade ownership (and later from brigade to commune ownership) in correspondence with the character of the productive forces and the political consciousness of the peasant masses without resorting to any measure akin to the 'one levelling and two transferring' policy.

The expansion of the productive capacity at the brigade and commune levels refers primarily to the extension of industrial and other non-agricultural productive activities operated at these levels.²³ Insofar as the process of agricultural mechanization has begun in China's countryside, the development of these non-farm productive activities becomes increasingly important for two major reasons. Firstly, these undertakings constitute in most cases the principal sources of accumulation for financing the expanding scope of agricultural mechanization. Secondly and equally significantly, these productive activities provide the major channels for absorbing the increasingly large number of peasants released from mechanized farming.

The development of industrial production by the brigade and commune is of particular importance. By bringing industry down to the countryside, the

commune members would not have to migrate to the cities or industrial centres for industrial employment as many peasants in other capitalist and 'socialist' countries have done and are doing. Apart from satisfying directly the peasant's demand for agricultural implements and other light industrial products and thus promoting the development of agricultural production and raising the standard of living of the peasants the presence of industrial technology at the door of the peasants also contribute immensely to facilitate the transformation of the peasant's consciousness. The peasants could see with their own eyes how industry works and what industry could do for them, which serves to enable the peasants to appreciate the relationship between national industrialization and the economic transformation of the countryside. This in turn is important for enhancing the peasant's awareness of the relationships between the interests of the individual, collective, and the state. As Mao has pointed out in *On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the People*,²⁴ the appreciation on the part of the peasants of the identity of interests between the individual, the collective and the state on the one hand, and the correct handling on the part of the Party of the contradictions between them constitute two of the primary conditions for rural transformation. That is to say, there is at once identity and contradictions between the interests of the individual, collective, and the state. To the extent that contradictions exist between them (which is partly the result of an imperfect recognition of the identity of interests), it is necessary to properly handle their contradictions by giving due attention to the interests of the three parties. The successful handling or resolution of these contradictions necessitates among other things the demonstration to the peasants through political education as well as in concrete material terms the identity of interests between them. In this respect, the 'educational' functions of

brigade- and commune-run industry are of critical importance.

Commune-based rural industrialization is also likely to contribute significantly to the narrowing of the differences between town and country, industry and agriculture, and mental and manual labour. The gradual industrialization of the people's commune makes possible the retention of the rural population in the countryside, thus avoiding the types of urbanization found in other industrializing countries. At the same time, together with the attempt to de-urbanize the large urban centres and to effect a redistribution of population across the country, large number of former urban dwellers were 'hsisfang' (send down) to the countryside. Of those who thus permanently settled down in the rural areas, a significant proportion are cadres and educated youths. For example, during the Great Leap Forward, over 1.5 million cadres from urban areas were sent down to the countryside,²⁵ most of them were expected to settle there permanently. The total number of educated youths sent down to the countryside from the beginning of the Cultural Revolution to 1970 numbered over 5,000,000.²⁶ By December 1975, the figure was reported to be 12,000,000.²⁷ This large influx of experienced cadres and educated elements into the rural areas is likely to prove to be a powerful catalyst for changing the face of the Chinese countryside.

We have indicated that the Chinese have envisaged the socialist transformation of the peasantry in terms of three principal stages: the transition from private to collective ownership, the transition from a low level to a high level of collective ownership, and the transition from full communal ownership to ownership by the whole people. It is instructive to indicate here the present stage of this protracted transformation process.

As we have pointed out above people's commune in China today still generally takes the form of the three-level ownership system *with the team as the basic unit*, this means that in terms of the principal stages outlined above, rural China at the moment is still in a relatively early phase of the second stage of socialist transformation. It is likely to take considerable period of time before the second stage will be completed. Even with the completion of this stage, the form of ownership in the country would still be collective — collective ownership at the commune level. This already presupposes a gigantic development of the productive forces in the countryside as well as a profound transformation of the ideological superstructure, but even then the distinction between the worker and the peasant, town and country, mental and manual labour will necessarily persist. The complete elimination of these differences, the Chinese envisaged, will await the completion of the transition from communal ownership to ownership by the whole people.

It is possible to say that two decades after the formation of the people's commune, the differences between town and country, worker and peasant, mental and manual labour have by no means reduced significantly. This is of course empirically true. What I have tried to show in this paper, however, is the Chinese *attempt and persistent struggle* to reduce these differences, and how they have tried to accomplish this task through the institution of the people's commune. I have attempted to demonstrate above all the internal logic of the commune system and its direction of development which manifests the Chinese preoccupation and insistence that the reducing and ultimate elimination of the 'three major differences' constitutes a fundamental task in the epoch of socialist transition.

FOOTNOTES


- 1 *Capital*, Penguin., p.637
- 2 Engels, *Anti-Duhring* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p.385.
- 3 Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), p.69.
- 4 "A Characterization of Economic Romanticism", *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), Vol.2, p.229.
- 5 *Selected Works in 3 volumes* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975) vol.3, p.172. (Emphases added)
- 6 "Deception of the People with Slogans of Freedom and Equality", *Collected Works*, op.cit., Vol.29, p.358-9. (Emphases added)
- 7 It is of course impossible to discuss systematically and extensively all these issues in the scope of the present paper. I have, however, attempted to examine them in considerable details in my Ph.D. thesis, "Theories of Socialist Transition and the Historical Experience of the People's Republic of China", University of Manchester, 1978.
- 8 *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), p.27. This quotation and the one that follows are taken from Chanter 4, "Abolition of the Antithesis between Town and Country, and between Mental and Manual Labour, and Elimination of Distinctions between Them."
- 9 *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, op.cit., p.27-9
- 10 Mao Tse-tung, *A Critique of Soviet Economics* N Y: Monthly Review Press, 1977), translated by Moss Roberts, p.145.
- 11 As Mao has put it in 1955, "There are two things some of our comrades do not think of linking up: the large sum needed to complete both national industrialization and technical reconstruction of agriculture, and the fact that a considerable portion of these funds is derived from agriculture." *The Question of Agricultural Cooperation* (Peking: People's Publishers, 1955), p.26.
- 12 This refers to the collections of Mao's talks and writings unofficially published in China during the Cultural Revolution, some of which were subsequently included in Volume V of Mao's *Selected Works*.
- 13 See Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Major Relationships", *Selected Works*, Vol. 5(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p.384-420.
- 14 *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, op.cit., p.291.
- 15 *Documents of the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), p.137.
- 16 "Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC on the Establishment of People's Communes in Rural Areas", translated in *People's Communes in China*, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p.4.
- 17 "Resolutions on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes", December, 1958, in *Documents of the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p.17.
- 19 For documentations and analyses of this issue, see W.F. Wertheim and L.C. Schenk-Sandbergen, *Polarity and Equality in China's Countryside* (Amsterdam: Centre for Anthropological and Sociological Studies, 1973); Martin K. Whyte, "Inequalities and Stratification in China", *China Quarterly*, No.68, December 1976; Ng Gek-boo, "The Commune System and Income Distribution in Rural China", *World Employment Programme*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1976, mimeographed.
- 20 The pamphlet was serialized in *Theoretical Study* (Kiran), April, May, June 1975 issues. (My translation).
- 21 Except perhaps in those brigades and communes in which there is an exceptionally high level of socialist consciousness among the peasants concerned who are politically prepared to 'self-consciously restrict bourgeois right'.
- 22 See my "Institutional Change and Agricultural Modernization: Aspects of the Chinese Theory and Practice" in Steve S.K. Chin (ed.), *The Gang of Four: First Essays after the Fall* (H.K.: Centre for Asian Studies, 1977), p.21-39.

- 23 Data concerning the actual scope of these activities in the average commune in China are difficult to obtain. The following table compiled by Ng Gek-boo at the International Labour Office gives an indication of the situation in some of the more advanced communes and localities:

Localities	Non-agricultural incomes (incl. industry) as a percentage of total income	Year
Huasi Production Brigade, Kiangsu	53%	1975
Chekiang Province	50.0	1975
Siyau Commune, Shantung	42.9	1975
Kaihsien County, Liaoning	40.0	1972
Tachai Production Brigade, Shansi	40.0	1972
Sub-urban Shanghai	38.0	1973
Luchuang County, Kwangsi	38.0	1973
Wangan Commune, Hunan	35.0	1972
Anhsiang Commune, Shansi	35.0	1972
Shuangliao County, Kirin	30.0	1972

Source: Ng Gek-boo, "The Commune System and Income Distribution in Rural China", World Employment Programme, ILO, Geneva, 1976, mimeographed, p.14.

- 24 Dated February, 1957. *Selected Works*, Vol.5, *op.cit.*
 25 New China News Agency (Peking), February 22, 1958.
 26 New China News Agency, May 3, 1970.
 27 People's Daily, December 23, 1975.



主席（蘇裕強）

轉眼間又是一年了。身為主席的許多莫名的感覺，我到現在還未能完全適應過來。另一方面，更是自覺到一年的工作有未臻完善之處。因此，在行將卸任之前，頗有一種衝動要將主席這崗位作一分析，除了幫助自我檢討之外，更希望能讓大家對這個崗位得到多些認識和瞭解。

首先是代表性的問題。似乎大家都會接受主席作為幹事會或院會的代表。這裏有兩種意義。其一是象徵性的，例如被邀請出席某場合（包括會內、其他學會、以至校方）。這種代表性無可否認是缺乏了完滿的理性根據來支持

却不難明白及無可厚非——但是對於我仍然構成一個工作上的難題。因為自己覺得主席必須有合乎一定要求之行爲表現，無奈却未有完整概念，更且不易習慣。事實上這方面更是與個人性格多於與院會事務有關，而且不能透過羣體力量解決。

其二是權力性的，可分作對外對內兩方面。對外例如參與單位聯席會議。表面上看來這與象徵性代表並無大分別，事實却不然。在理論上主席會先得到幹事的意見而集體作出決定，但實際上却會出現一些情況須要主席作出其個人判斷及估計。這些判斷和估計可能是基於已經討論過的原則或基本看法；不免也含有個

人主觀成份在內，將會對院會事務產生影響。對內方面，很多時候（尤其是當幹事會議未有召開或未有表示意見時）主席常被置於「最後決策者」的位置。決策的內容、過程，甚至後果都未必會再經討論及評價。

大家或許會感到奇怪：這不就正是主席的職責嗎？在一定程度上來說是對的。而我要說的是主席這崗位在很多時候就缺乏了相應的監察。實在，其他幹事要求瞭解或討論主席的工作的主動性總是相對地薄弱。在崇尚集體的原則底下這是不應鼓勵的。我並非認為須從架構或條文上尋求客觀限制，因為從有條理、有彈性的組織角度來考慮這也是不需要並且不易達到。但在認識到主席擁有或許是過份的權限後，却產生了一定的指導意義。就是如何引導幹事注意，討論主席所應付的事務，並表示意見。這個互相監察的問題值得多想想。從集體原則、會章精神及組織管理幾方面來看都饒有意義。


似乎在這個權力問題上有點糾纏不清。事實上這對於我個人來說影響頗深，雖然我未能清楚估計到影響的程度及性質。當別人祇等你一句說話才要有所行動時這種感受對我來說實是不易習慣。尤其是當我清楚地認識到自己實在不比別人多知甚麼而仍要去作出決定時，這

種嘲諷意味更是不易忍受。

或許這要部份歸咎到決策本身的限制。

很多時候其實並沒有足夠的選擇須要深入地衡量，要做的祇不過就是將一個（可能根本是唯一的）可行性說出來。誰去說的分別不在於誰有更佳決策條件。祇不過是責任、權限等崗位的分別罷了。這裏所出現的問題就是忽略了最初擴闊決策範圍的第一步。當然這亦須受到一定的環境、時間、資料、能力的限制。無論是可容忍或不可容忍，對這種決策的先天不足必須有所估計及考慮。

嚕嚕唆唆的談過了權力、決策等問題，對於主席整個崗位實在未算全面。而且更是反映出自己的心情多於有系統的分析。不過自己覺得這算是較有啟發性的幾方面，希望以後有機會再與大家談談「三蛇」組織裏面的其他層面。



副主席（外務）

（陳鋒明）

接近「落庄」期間，碰上較知心的朋友，都會被問上一句：「做了一年幹事，滋味如何，開不開心？」我回答說：「有開心，也有不開心。沒有開心，也沒有不開心」我這般說，倒不是愛故弄玄虛，祇是覺得，自己對別人的態度，和對院會工作得失之間的感受，一直受著情緒起落的影响，而情緒的起與落，却多半是和院會的事情無關的，所以，無論我說開心或不開心，都並不恰當。

聖誕假前，出版秘書千叮萬囑，幹事那篇登在年刊的文章，最遲要在開學前寫好。

寫什麼呢？做幹事的滋味是不會寫的了。最主要的原因，倒不是因為無法寫得到，而是認為，假如所表達的感受不是連結著院會的未來命運，而純粹以個人的喜樂哀愁為中心，那就失去了刊登在年刊的意義了。

假期裏的十多天，由於為這篇文章找尋題材的緣故，除了回望過去一年來的學生活動之外，也著實的想過了一些院會未來發展的問題。動筆之時，對學生組織的本質，居然也有些大徹大悟的意思，這個收穫倒是意料所不及的。

學生組織為何？這是一個慣被疏忽或被曲解的問題。我們經常談及院會的功能，但我們不曾談及這些功能是否從院會存在的真正基礎出發的，自然也不曾考慮學生組織的真正基礎在那裏？

人類要生存，就必須生產，而在生產的過程中，人與人之間就無可避免的建立起某些生產關係，這些生產關係是互利的，也是構成社會制度的真正基礎。

院會跟社會的本質一樣，它也不是一個興趣團體，它只是一個具有功利主義色彩的組織。院會的責任，就是為了交會費的，不同興趣、不同意識形態的同學提供福利。然而，團結院內七百多同學的利益基礎在那裏呢？

在大學的幾年中，同學們的學習生活必然是受校方的決定所影响的，因而，唯有在校政方面所爭取的利益才是同學們共通的，也才是令他們團結成一體的條件。可惜，這真實情況一直未被發覺，校政參與只是成為學生活動的其中一環，而不是重心。而另一方面，同學的强大適應能力，及滿於現狀的心態，也都是令致校政參與停滯不前的原因。因而，學生組織存在的基礎是存在的，但隱蔽的。

學生活動的不從基礎出發，註定了學生組織的畸形發展和失敗。學生組織的方向成為幹事會及其它同學的主觀願望，所以，學生組織的方向是搖擺不定的，步伐也是不一致的。

那麼，學生組織搞什麼活動呢？從歷史遺留下來的限制，學生組織大致上可分為兩大主流——文康式的和關社式的。無疑，文康式的活動是較受同學歡迎的，因為參與文康活動並

副主席（內務）

（何鑄鈞）

嚴寒乾旱冬

花葉多凋零


樹根還未枯

盼望早春到

不需要背負什麼社會責任，不過，文康活動的意義是淺薄的，以文康活動作為團結同學的主張本身就含有文康活動只是一種手段，而非目標。另一方面，關社的活動必然要脫離同學的，因為關社活動的出發點是倚賴特有的社會意識的。這不是同學的普遍意識形態。所以，關社活動的出發是脫離同學們的功利關係的，怎至是損害他們在社會上所能享受的利益的。

同學們對學生組織候選人的熱誠製造了同學仍然關心學生組織的虛假現象，學生活動的膨脹也掩蓋了同學參加活動積極性低落的事實。或者，我們可以用社會運動陷於低潮、功課壓力加重、幹事工作經驗不足作為理由，然而，這是基本的原因嗎？

只有從同學實際利益出發的活動才會得到同學支持，這是一個事實，但有時也是幹事會同學的一種悲哀。服務同學的出發點固然是好，不過，絕對的依隨同學，這種服務精神是否有價值呢？



常務秘書（馬寶珠）

常務秘書一職，在多少個團體組織裏是當正印花旦，內外大小事務兼顧，以輔助天字第一號人物推行會務。在別的團體，他也可以是個雜務文員，專責書信來往、會議記錄、文房用具打點等。前者有如大鵬振翅，可任憑本領，剛毅豪邁地乘風勢而去。後者亦如河塘小鴨，兒時羽毛未豐，閒在水邊欣賞湖光山色，不時傳來老鴨呼喚，拍拍雙翼，搖搖擺擺的回家去也。

在三蛇當 gen. sec.，可作大鵬，也可作小鴨。面對院會衆多同學，統籌多項不同型式活動，三蛇的担子可不算輕。由於幹事會的工作量頗為繁多，便有需要成立多個工作小組及委員會，例如社會科學節籌委會，時事委員會，「號刊」編印小組等，以加強辦事效率，亦藉此達成「齊參與，共籌謀」的目標。然則，幹事與幹事之間反而缺少了實質上的合作機會，加上聯絡工夫失效，幹事會即使不會變成一盤散沙，也失却了整體的帶動作用。某些職位更流於事務性，幹起事來也多處於被動狀態，哀哉！

常務秘書的工作，大抵比其他幹事為輕，沒有一班 sub. com. 共事。書信文件不算繁複，其他工作亦可按自己的時間分配來處理。實際上，很多事務已由籌備單位的文書代勞，她

主要是處理中央內部的文件及書信而已。再者，沿照着多年積累下來的經驗，很多事務已是習已成規，她又不大用去摸索，只要是一點耐心，便可應付自如了。

幾許人心，抱着事不關己，己不勞心的心態。做好自己的本份已是難得，還管得別人的麼！有人認為，大學生的本份是讀好書，上足堂，考取榮譽學位，就不失為黌門弟子了。唉！這般的想法不知何時才能遠港大同學而去。多少未來社會棟樑正在沉醉於一片黃金夢中。隨着學運冷鋒緊迫，愛國熱潮在一個缺乏民族意識的社會中打着退堂鼓，大專界一遍沉寂。再看三蛇的成立及存在意義，它的指標不單是在於聯絡院內同學，而是引發起同學將書本知識連結到社會，通過種種學生活動參與、提高同學的自覺性及社會責任感。

三蛇的主力集中於幹事會。雖然每一職位已定明了各位幹事的職責範圍，但這並不表示你我一份，互不斟衡。我們既然認同了院會的目的意義，便要齊心協力，朝着既定方針進發，不可萎縮。奈何最近幾年，幹事會遇到種種阻力，同學面臨日益繁重的功課壓力和多方面的拉力，對院會所籌辦的活動提不起興趣，至令院會未能發揮其功能。就今屆幹事而言，部份為未多經考驗者，為事倍感吃力。就算是

有經驗者，亦似是做到「化」的一班，當年的幹勁、熱忱又不復再。

當了一年幹事，確體會到攪學生活動有其困難所在。羞愧自己除本份工作外，又少積極地去參與其他活動。有時候，真感到自己只是一部開會時所用的錄音機，一個信紮文員，對院會有何供獻呢。後來發覺到自己的不是，開始關心到整個院會的運行，與其他同學討論三蛇的路向，交流意見，逐漸地才挽回自己過往的失落、迷濛。回首過去一年，我在多方面均有成長，亦得到其他資歷深厚的幹事帶領。要不是參加了三蛇工作，相信自己現在還是埋葬於教室或圖書館裏。

踏入八十年代，我對學運前景不甚樂觀。社會經濟發展及大學校方政策，同學們迫得要為讀書金錢奔波，令學生運動捉襟見肘。自四人幫倒台後，一羣理想主義者受到嚴重打擊。際此路線還未明朗的時刻，他們又不得不從頭摸索。但望他們不要將調子拉得太高，以至脫離同學。更希望他們能從實際中獲取經驗，帶出一條明確的道路出來，令大專界再次顯露昔日的光華。以三蛇的潛質條件，人材濟衆，曾幾何時也是學運的中堅份子，誠盼它能再次肩負起這個重任，即使不能有大鵬高飛，也可引令小鴨走進正確的人生道途，不致大雨淋漓時，才大叫大嚷，不知所措。

WE
NEED

ENERGY!



Current Affairs Secretary

LAI KON SUN

I did not know how to get on the post. I only know that I have been performing because of its duties, which I myself wonder what and how they should be. Someone will ask me what I feel memorably, in my just nearly one year's work as EXCO. I, with many things reeling round in my mind, can only give the answer that it is 'nothing'.

It is truly nothing not because I have been absent-minded and also neither I have been duty-orientated, which I have been strongly opposing to and to be avoided eternally; nor I am a rock, which I am going to become as I once wish feels no pain and hard to break as well as no need to think who and where it is.

It is truly 'nothing' in the sense that I want to do 'something in nothing' but resulting with something from nothing. This seems to be, as it should not be, metaphysical. But actually a ontologically 'nothingness', for itself being, is objectified outside me that I cannot touch and I do want never to touch. Wishing it being cleared at once, but I would treasure what it would have left to me.

It comes the time a 'panel discussion' meeting and I rush into the Room K723. The meeting is proceed as usual, again, I feel, there is no difference between a discussion meeting and a tutorial class meeting. I am a tutor? No, never can it be. I hate to be like that. I am a student, even a C.A.S. does to be, as everyone there. Either,

Idealism or Materialism, Dualism and Positivism, Marxism and Existentialism have gone their ways — leaving me a 'blank' me. One thing that I can realize to make difference between a tutorial and a discussion meeting is that there is no obligation for their attendance and to prepare materials for discussion.

I can no longer endure this institutional relationship, a relationship between such a C.A.S. and his committee. 'He' does want to have a sentimental one, and (hitherto) it seems to be developing.

Now I no longer want to be a rock, that will not and cannot feel, think and express. I want to be myself, as it should be. I feel, therefore I am. I have to search for a more meaningful and concrete "Nothingness" I choose, therefore I am.



學術秘書（陳玉珍）

一年了！轉眼間又是行將落任的時候，依稀還記得答應競選幹事時的戰競心情，和準備諮詢大會的忙碌。說來慚愧，回首過去一年的工作，實在是乏善可陳，在此總結反省的時候心緒特別凌亂，唯有順思緒所至，聊抒一些感受吧！

猶記得決定競選之時，只是渡過了大學生活半年，對院會的運行及功能，實在談不上甚麼深入的認識，對院會學術活動應走的方向，亦是無甚掌握；由於很懷疑自己的工作能力，當想到要面對同學，要負起推動院會學術活動的重責時，不禁有點兒惶然失措，在缺乏足夠的心理準備下，便毅然走上了院會幹事的崗位，轉眼就是一年的時光！


一年來在院會工作，使我深深看到自己是何等的不足；在工作的時候，往往是過於緊張，對自己要求很高，却又缺乏自信心，還有那重要的敢於去「闖」的勇氣，也是那樣的不足，再加上自己不習慣開放自己，與別人坦誠交流，這些都在影響我幹事的工作，很多時候，活動就停留在一個思索的階段，未能真正實現，這一點是我感到遺憾和抱歉的。

另一方面，一年的工作，亦叫我體會到單靠一股熱誠，是不足以支持自己推動活動的。誠然，熱誠是很重要，但持久的熱誠是要建基

於對工作意義的理解和掌握，單搞活動而不問意義目的是不足夠的，我必須要誠實的回答自己：為什麼要辦這一活動？我期望達到一些什麼？這些又和我們的價值觀、對社會的了解有不可分割的關係。

還有，幹事的工作給予我更多機會去面對社會國家問題，這使我看到接受沖擊的重要，此外，無論是關心社會，認識國家，都需要一股源自內心的動力，否則這個關切便不能持久，經不起考驗。而作為一個院會幹事，又應怎樣推動這些活動呢？我想不斷誠懇的探索，和多方與他人交流都是重要的。

寫到這裏，再回首過去一年的工作，實在有很多失責和不完善的地方，希望大家原諒，更願能忘記背後，努力面前，繼續不懈地尋找自己應走的方向，和接受隨時的考驗，最後，又願在此祝福曾共事一年的幹事們，讓我們奮勇向前，邁步、走！



出版秘書（吳麗娟）

「當出版秘書會剝削自己許多的時間！」若要過充實而有意義的大學生活，應該緊抓會去充實自己呢！」「團結同學，推動文康福體」，多好的目標，自己也應該獻一份力。」「做幹事？這個鑊太大了！」一年前，一個個問題呈現腦際，內心洋溢着矛盾和衝突，為了一個不大也不小的決定，猶疑了好幾天。最後，不知那裏來的一股力量，在Nomination Form上簽了名，跟着是一連串的令人透不過氣 來的Class Visit, Campaign Meeting 及週年大選，終於大學的生活開始了新的一頁。

最初參與競選的時候，內心總是暖烘烘的雖然組閣的過程差強人意，但閣員的希望、熱誠、信心相互交織，令人鼓舞。我們深信，倉猝的組合，膚淺的看法、稀疏的經驗，都不足為礙，只要我們有理想，肯努力，院會的前途總大有可為。經過多次的交流研討，訂出了一份冠冕堂皇的政綱，我們要多聯系、廣交流、爭權益、倡福利，重文康，為一個愉快團結而充實的的大學生活而努力。也許是理想太高太廣，也許是計劃太多太大，又也許是環境障礙重重，院會的成就到底和目標相距太遠，憶念昔日競選時候，回顧今日院會情形，興起的是一陣無奈與惆悵。


當了一年的幹事，目睹三蛇的成長發展，感受到的是一陣陣的冰冷冷！院會實在是太少人參與和支持了，無論文康體活動，反應之差簡直令人難以置信。雖然說工作的態度是應該只問耕耘，不問收穫，但一次又一次的淡漠迴響，總不免覺得令人意冷心灰，總不免令人懷疑院會存在的價值。為甚麼同學不參與活動？為甚麼同學不關心院會的發展？是院會的方向走錯了？是幹事工作不少？一個個解不完的結！

一年出版秘書的工作，遇上的工作可真不少，從始至終，院會便患上嚴重缺乏工作人手症。到底約稿、追稿、抄稿、貼版，摺報紙是同學總難提得起興趣呢？同學推卸責任每有他響亮的理由。但願意幫忙的，我又虧欠了一個人情，——掠奪了別人半天或兩小時的寶貴光陰，一向最怕欠人情的我，今年竟欠下了許多債務，不知何時何日清還！

不過做幹事並不是絕對的苦差，尤其是對於個人而言，這是一個極難得的鍛鍊機會，在過去的一年裏，自己無論在工作上或待人接物方面，都得到許多難能可貴的經驗。而且因為受到許多衝擊，在思想上和態度上，都變得比以前成熟，我必得多謝那些一直給我啓示、幫助、鼓勵的同學。

幹事的工作的確耗費了自己許多的時間、精神和心血，無從去衡量得失，也不喜歡斤斤計較。遺憾的是院會的成就和政綱相距太遠，難過的是院會尚未得普遍同學的積極參與和支持，擔心的是院會日後的成長和發展，雖然自己對院會存在的價值曾經一再動搖，但內心對院會的一份感情，却始終希望它站得堅穩，真真正正的做到爭權益、倡福利、重文康、廣交流、多連繫，使各社科同學都過着愉快、團結而充實的大學生活。感激下一屆的幹事，感激他們不畏艱難，願意為院會的前途再闖一闖。

一年的幹事生活刻骨銘心，想起了諮詢大會的嚴肅、投票日的緊張、幹事間的連繫、會議的討論、爭辯的堅持、出版的風浪、同學的反映、蛇房的喧嘩，複雜的感受、矛盾的情懷無以復加，我將永遠不會忘記這一段日子。



體育秘書（女）

（屈慧珍）

曾幾何時，自己曾這樣想過：「假如我能考入港大，我定要一心一意去讀好書，拿個 FIRST CLASS HONOUR 才甘心。」但當我真正踏入這所高等學府後，我才體會到這種想法是何等的狹窄，如果我照做，失去的將比得到的更多。

爲什麼我要出來競選？爲的是我不想放棄我所應得的，這包括了文康體羣的培養和發展，儘管自己時常對自己的能力都有所懷疑，儘管我沒有一副雄糾糾的運動員軀壳，但我卻有股熱烘烘的誠意去將院會的體育活動攪好，我喜歡運動，同時亦希望將院會的體育氣氛提高，所以我下定決心要盡我所能去履行「女體育秘書」的責任。

做了三蛇幹事後，我的感受是兩方面的，其一是外來的沖激，其二是自己內心的成長，其實早在訂立政綱時，我已作好心理準備——活動是要搞，但期望不可過高。雖然如此，好些時，院會所舉辦的一些班際比賽，都比預計中的冷淡更爲冷淡，我並不想去埋怨任何一方面，但我相信愈來愈重的功課壓力和設備仍然不足的 SPORTS CENTRE 都是主要的原因，於是亦造成上體育堂的人數由 $N = 270$ 跌至 $N = 0$ 的自然現象。其實我並不要求甚麼，只想同學們對體育方面施以點滴的關注吧了。

記得在舉辦一些球類的訓練班時，當每一位同學將自己的姓名寫上那報告表上時，我的內心是何等的安慰。因爲起碼他們都有點意思去參與。總之，我學會了要成功，並不是處處都去計較得與失，而是要盡力而爲，這樣除了個人得到滿足外，人家亦會對自己滿足，只有這樣，我才有資格去推行政綱、履行責任。另一方面，我感覺到自己真正地成長中，就算是與同學之間無聊的 FUSSY，也是要講究技巧的，不可太開放，亦不能太含蓄，總之在人與人之間的相處上，我慢慢以忍讓謙卑去替換以前的任性自私，我開始去接受各種善意的批評，好去悉心雕琢一下自己，不再做那頭只是躲藏在牀底下的小貓兒了。

我很多謝那些不斷地鼓勵我的同學，希望今後院會各同學能更加團結起來，院會是我們的家！

體育秘書（男）梅守正

服！

學生教務委員

(鍾沛佳)

一個社會科學院的學生教務委員是於每年約三月的時候與其他三位學生院務委員同時由全社科學院的同學普選出來的。除了與其他三位學生院務委員出席社科學院的院務委員會外，學生教務委員還有以下的職責：

- 一、為社會科學學會的幹事會必然成員
- 二、出席香港大學的教務委員會；
- 三、出席社科學生的評議會；

此外，更可以應學生會評議會的邀請，作為正式觀察者出席學生會評議會。大抵從上述的職責來看，社科學院學生教務委員一職的工作量是不輕的。

校政方面，教務委員會是規定於每個月的第一個星期二的下午三時正在紐魯詩大樓十樓的 Senate Room 開會。議程是於會前一個星期左右郵寄到學生代表手中的。由於教務委員會是大學管理一切教務事宜的組織。議程中的

SECTION A 通常是關於各個學院的院務一些重要的事情或一些無爭論性的事件。SEC

TION B 是一些頗具爭論性的議程，由主席校長引導討論。由於教務委員會的成員是由各學院的院長，系主任、教授、一些普選的講師及七個學生代表（每個學院一個）、及學生會會長，討論起來的詞鋒是別有風格的。

社科學院的院務委員會也是每個月的其中

一個星期二開會（也是在 Senate Rm. ），所討論的事情也是以 Section A 及 Section B 的形式來處理而範圍則圍繞着學院的教學、課程入學等等，出席的有院長（主席），各 Core Dept. 的講師及四個學生代表，而 Non-Core Dept. 的也會有代表參與社科學院的決策。

除了上述的經常上教務及院務會議，學生代表也會參與一些其他大學的委員會。三位學生教務委員中有兩位是會出席大學的 Library Committee, (Amy Yuen) 及 Committee of Computer Management. 可能為同學關注的是社科學院的 Faculty Review Committee，院內考試放榜前，學院是會舉行一個 Board of Examiner（沒有學生代表）的會議，根據現有的 academic and non-academic 的資料來評定學生的 Honours，升班、留班抑或 Discontinue。

所有被評定留班或 Discon 的同學是可以透過 Faculty Review Committee，提出 Non-academic 的理由希望能使 Board of Examiner 改變主意。Faculty Review Committee 的成員包括有一位主席、四個講師及四個學生代表。會議的形式是以五人為一組，主席講師及二學生代表接見希望被 Review 的同

學。

由於學生教務員也是「三蛇」會的必然幹事，他又要肩負起幹事的責任：值日、開幹事會議等等，值日是每星期三個 Lecture hours 的長席，幹事會議則是一個月一次，至於 SSSC。

，由於現時還是在一個很雛形和諮詢的模式故開會次數並不頻密，一年二次左右。

除了這些「例會」外，於每次接到 Senate 或 F.B 的議程時，遇到有深遠或重大影響的議程，學生教務委員們是要在開會時聚首一堂，交換意見，作好準備。在 F.B 的會議之前，我們四個學生代表是會就着議程交換意見，或約見院長、部份講師、學生組織如班會、系會及三蛇以得到更多方面的看法。這類型的小會真是不計其數。

說到現在，學生教務委員一職好像只是出席會議而已。其實由於學生教務委員較其他同學多機會與校方接觸，故在某些學生活動上是能扮演一個應有的角色。每年的 Information Service day（提供資料給一、二年級同學），是由 S.S. 本作爲聯繫各系會的負責人。每年 Matric 放榜時的 academic orientation，三蛇及系會合辦的 Introductory class（給新同學選科輔導）迎新活動，S.S. 及其他 S.F. 也能在時間的協調及資料的提供起着作用。

上述是流水式的扯談學生教務委員及 S.F.M. 的工作，希望能使同學對他們的工作有多些認識，現在我也許應該談談工作上的感受。

入了社科學院後，一直置身於搞活動中。一年級時 Run S.F.B.，暑期時做迎新，二年級幫手班會，S.S.F. 及 Run SS。也許以說，對學生運動是有些認識，亦因此而感到參與校政和其他學生活動，有相異的地方。

活動辦得成不成功，是可以從一些較客觀的東西來衡量，如參與的人數、氣氛、產生的社會影響性及參與同學的得益等等。但我們比較難以這些作爲指標顯示出參與校政同學的工作。再加上很多時，工作是只能集中在幾位出席院務委員會同學的身上，並不能盡量

同學的。幫手。也許這點是所謂「先天性」的不足所致。

還記得在實行 UNIT SYSTEM 之後，第一個考試放榜時同學都爲「(Mortality Rate)」高的結果作出種種反應，有的說是大學而至學院的政策是想肥多些人。就 Senate 及 Faculty Board 而言，我不曾發現，曾討論過有類似的議程，至於私底下會否，就不得而知。然而，從一年的參與的過程中（F.B., Senate, F.R.C. Library Committee），我並不覺得有這種情形出現，所接觸到的講師大抵都不是以肥人爲榮。

也許說校方成立院正想

銳意提高港大的水平是較公平的論點。但這也不能斷然地和「死亡率」高拉上不可磨滅的烙印。有些同學會把校方與同學分成兩個不同的陣營，一方各爲己戰。就以二年多的體驗，講

師們是存在有不同意見的，就算是同一系的講師中也會有不同意見的。在 Senate 及 Fa.B 會議上的決定多數不是以表決形式來定斷。而是多以


Common Consensus 形式來達到結論的，個中並沒有強迫性的感覺。

雖然 S.F.M. 已透過了 medium 作為學院及學生的橋樑及 S.S. 是三蛇必然幹事，在很多方面仍有待改進，不準備在此文再述或許會另文詳述——有一點是肯定，隨着 Unit System working Party 的成立院會及系會遷往 Swire Bldg. 及 Binding Council 的醞釀成立，S.S. 的責任在未來的數年是不輕的。

辦活動的同學多是因此而失去了一些個人喜歡的節目，再加上 Part Time 工作，讀書時間是可能因此而減少了，我相信我也不例外。於五月二日考試時，五月一日正要開 senate，正是問君知否。最後，以下兩句互勉：

參與校政 論成績豈是一朝一夕，

學生代表 講功能還須互策共籌。



民主與社會

陳玉珍

「民主與社會」是今年度（七九至八〇）社會科學學會「專題研究」的主題。舉辦這個專題研究的目的，可從兩方面來看。首先我們選擇「民主」這個主題，是基於民主運動在中國發生而給我們的啓發；還有的是，民主在香港的前途，亦是大家時加討論的題目，因此我們希望透過對民主概念的探討，去掌握民主的要義，從而更有效地分析香港和中國的民主問題。另一方面，認識及掌握民主概念並不是我們的最終目標，我們更期望的，是透過這次研習，去增進同學們的分析思辯能力，使不同意見共同交流，達到互相衝擊的果效；又透過對香港、中國民主問題的探討，使我們的政治、社會意識得以提昇。

「民主與社會」的命題，是基於我們對民主與社會的關係的理解。「民主」，簡單來說，是人民當國家的主人翁，依此而言，民主就是一個政治制度；要認識一個政治制度，是不能抽離當時的社會環境，因為任何一個民族或社會的生活方式都有其相應的社會制度，以及維護這個制度的思想理論。因此我們在處理這個專題時，首先便嘗試探討民主思潮的發展，民主制度的基本概念（如自由、平等、人權），接着便去探討民主問題在香港和中國的意義。

今年的專題研究，我們嘗試從基本理論發，裝備我們的分析工具。一方面我們意識探討研究實際問題的重要性，亦看到香港及國民主政治問題和我們的切身關係。另一方面，我們更看到基本理論的掌握對分析事物的要。為此，我們希望大家一同去研討基本理論，以便更有效地再走前一步，了解及分析現政制上的問題。

關於是次專題研究的工作情況，約在七月初的時候，題目已基本上確定了，接着便是訪校內和校外的講師，在與他們的傾談中，到不少的指引和提議。另一方面，籌委亦於時全部組成，一同開展擬訂學習大綱、內容工作，並多方搜集合適的參考資料，而參予的同學們便各按自己的時間分配去研習，然後藉着討論會，交流分享研習心得。另一方面，在九月初的時間，部份新同學加入了學習小組，集中探討香港、中國的民主問題。

另一方面，我們亦於十月中、下旬舉辦了一連串的講座，去輔助、加深同學對民主問題的認識，講座內容除卻探討民主在香港和中國的前途外，亦嘗試從哲學角度看民主這個概念；而來自不同圈子的講者，亦幫助同學多角度去思考問題。

隨着講座、學習組的結束，整個專題研究在十一月便告一段落。另一方面，我們將會出版一本文集（約在八零年二月出版），內容包括講師撰稿和同學研討心得，希望能使大家進一步了解民主問題。

最後，願意在此談談我們在整個研習過程中所遇到的一些困難。其中一個很大的障礙，就是掌握資料方面的困難，由於我們的認識所限，有點兒力不從心之感。再者，我們所擬定的學習大綱包含太廣，以致在研習時顧此失彼。另一方面，由於「民主」本身並它涉及的一

些基本概念如自由等，都與各人的價值取向有很大的關連，在討論交流的時候，難有任何確定的結論。

誠然，今次的專題研究確實有很多不足之處，有很多需要改進的地方，但這畢竟是一個有意義的嘗試，願意每一位曾參與是次研習的同學都能抓緊，並持守那誠懇開放的態度，敢於接受不同意見的衝擊，又對社會、國家問題保持恒切的關注。

社會科學節

一年一度的社會科學節，終於在一片熱鬧的歡笑聲中完結，心頭的大石亦隨而放下。無論它是成功、或是失敗，我們也總不可否認它的確在學院內牽起熱潮。

在整整半年多的籌備過程中，各籌委均悉力以赴，密鑼緊鼓地準備，就像一個母親，在默默地等候她快將出生的孩子一樣，心情是那麼的緊張，那麼的興奮。

翟笑娟

社科節可算是社科學院裏的一個活動縮影，它肩負起溝通同學，促進院會和系會關係及提高學術氣氛的責任。為着達到更佳的效果，在籌劃開始的時候，我們先來一個檢討。之後，我們擬出今年的方針應是帶出新穎的玩意，提高同學學習興趣及討論氣氛，因此，便定出以下的節目：

開幕典禮

英文辯論邀請賽

班際中文辯論賽

遊戲日

廣播劇

研討日——宗教、人、社會

講座——潮流與品味、香港——金融中心？

橋牌及 MASTERMIND 大賽

社科之夜

隨着節目的增加，今年的社科節亦延長至兩星期。因此，無論在財政、人力及參加者方面，也大大增加，但籌委本着提倡學術，團結院內同學為前題，祇有加倍努力，力求解決各種困難。

在十多位熱心人士的贊助下，加上院長饒餘慶的支持，社科節的龐大支費終於得以解決，各籌委就好像給注射強心針一樣地，提高他們的效率。

宣傳工作在暑假末期開始，校園內隨處可見七彩繽紛的傳單及告示，祇要社科學生會出現的地方，它們亦同時而生。宣傳小組更製造各種書簽、時間表、貼紙及邀請咭，務求喚起同學的注意力，踴躍參予，共同籌備此項盛事。

開幕禮終於在十一月五日下午五時順利舉行。舞獅採青助興，帶來不少同學的圍觀和讚歎；還有那引爆氣球的儀式，更令在場的幾位講師及同學哄得不亦樂乎。禮儀完畢，一場激烈的師生辯論邀請賽隨即開始，這個新嘗試，大大地改善了師生間的隔膜，大家互相合作，共策共謀，帶出了我們各籌委心底裏的願望及

理想！

班際辯論賽的成功是令人鼓舞的。在籌的階段因往年的反應冷淡，它曾一度被考慮置，但各籌委認為大學內的辯論氣氛實在太弱；每年的大學辯論賽，我們都被打得落花水，大敗而歸，身為其中的一份子，我們有任去提倡它，而且，作為社科學生，應該對道更為敏感及關注。事實證明我們的努力是有白費的，隨着社科節，各院會均舉辦辯論賽，繼而演辯學會的光復，大學辯論賽的勝，同學們的熱心參予，心裏的確感到欣慰。們不敢說這些全是我們的功勞，但至少，我也有盡己所能，作出貢獻。

研討日是一項新的嘗試，但卻有空前的功。想不到在星期六舉行，也有逾二百的參者出席。可能是題目有趣的關係，各院會及內的基督徒及對宗教有興趣者均蜂湧而至，這個平淡的講座增添不少熱鬧。比之，講座較為遜色，但也不失為一項有價值的嘗試。要是和同學有深切關係，與學科連結，同學出席率必高。由此也指出，同學是有興趣參學術性活動，而學術氣氛是可以促進的。

此外，康樂活動也是一個不可缺少的節。透過參予，同學得以輕鬆一番及鍛鍊身體。在遊戲日，各班均施出渾身解數，為自己取分。三年班的同學一向都被認為對活動最冷的，却有令人意外的良好表現，不但人多勢，而且勇奪冠軍。有趣的場面不時哄得滿堂笑。例如：二年級在一項遊戲中，因三年級位女同學的冒失而獲勝；當二年級的同學高感謝之際，這位小妮子突然大發嬌嗔，趕在年級一位同學的後面，邊罵邊打，真是有趣

廣播劇是新的嘗試——幸好獲得香港電台的協助，所以技術性的工作均得以解決妥當。各班的参赛作品水準均高，而且有數位同學更做到職業性的表現水準。如那可憐的小孩子——及年紀老邁的錢大富。無論題材、選曲及人物均不落俗套，唯一可惜的是不能把這個節目傳送每位同學的耳朵去，在云云的文康活動，廣播劇提供一種渙新的形象，使同學團結起來，共同合作，作出最佳表現。

橋牌橋牌及 MASTERMIND 比賽卻比預期遜色，可能是同學的興趣不在此，所以參加者不多，唯有從個人比賽改為班際賽。

社科之夜可算是整個社科節的高潮所在，尤其是增加了一項饒餘慶盾，更使各系會的士氣提高，不到最後一刻，也不知鹿死誰手。但見歡笑聲四起，連平時不苟言笑的院長也大開金口，咧嘴而笑。系會的表演多姿多采，除載歌載舞還有戲劇、土風舞、魔術、小提琴伴奏及「小羅文」表演，他們演出，加上台下的喝采聲及啦啦隊的吶喊，令到陸佑堂頓時變成一個夜總會。同學們的興緻並沒有因過長的休息時間削弱，反之，各系會籌委及三年級同學均舉杯向在場同學及師長祝酒，來來往往，鎂光燈閃個不停，為社科之夜牽起另一熱潮。

台幕再開，整個會場變成一個演唱會。各班合唱團，大展歌喉，為爭取黃麗松杯盃作最後努力。二年級的 BORN FREE 把在場同學帶到一個共融境界。剛剛唱完，全場掌聲雷動。三年級的同學眼見黃麗松盃將失，當下發出最大的團結力量，傾巢而出，雖然歌聲不大好，但他們的合作，他們的精神感動全場，結果二

年級衛冕失敗，而三年級亦一洗頹態，勇獲黃麗松盃。節目終結，但同學仍意猶未盡，所以全體三年級同學再上台擾攘一番，此後，才興盡而散。

綜合而言，社科節七九是成功的。它能提供一個機會予各班同學共聚一堂作各種不同的活動，互相認識，共同學習。活動的成功是有賴各人的合作。在此，我誠懇地多謝各位籌委及協助各項工作的同學，希望來年的社科都能繼續作為各同學之間的橋樑，帶出社科特色。



迎新七九

吳麗娟

八九月的港大是迎新的日子。又一批胸懷大志的青年人加入港大的家庭。爲了讓他們多了解校園內的種種情形，不致於在簇新的環境裏變得手足無措，各院會系會的師兄師姊，莫不悉力以赴，籌策各類型的迎新活動。社會科學學會當然也義不容辭，我們一共舉辦了 Academic Orientation (學術迎新)，Welcome Tea Gathering (迎新茶聚)，Orientation Camp (迎新營) 及 Sports Orientation (運動迎新) 四項大型活動，目的是希望讓新同學認識港大校園生活，社會科學學會、各科各系的特色，加強他們彼此的連繫與促進新舊同學的交流，同時也希望藉着這機會，使各級的老柴作進一步的了解和溝通，在宏大目標的指示之下，迎新活動一個一個地開展起來！

Academic Orientation, 學術迎新

「讀 STAT 是否需要很好的 Maths 底？」

1st Year 的 Econ 和 Matric 時有沒有大的分別？」

「什麼科目的組合最好？」

「What is Sociology」

「讀 Social Work 是否一定要兼讀 Psychology 及 Sociology」

「1st Year Social Work 有沒有實習」

問題此起彼落，新同學對一年級課程顯得十分有興趣，因爲這到底和他們未來三年有密切關係呢！出席的教員都不厭其煩地一再闡釋，而高年級的同學更加樂於幫助，無論是課程內容，各科組合等等都一一說過詳細，老柴更將各科的讀書心得及秘訣傳授，新同學可聽得全神貫注呢。

Welcome Tea Gathering 迎新茶聚

迎新茶聚於 M217 內舉行，出席的新舊同學共有百人之多，場面頗爲熱鬧。

在柔和的音樂聲中，新舊同學三五成羣，說的當然又是那一套公式：「我叫×××，來自×××，今年選讀×××……」一時間空氣裏充塞着學校名、人名、科目名，可那些 Matric 時的記憶神功還沒有荒廢的同學，今次儘可大派用場，不過忘記了也不打緊，以後碰頭的機會還多着呢！！

「現在三蛇的迎新茶聚正式開始，首先多謝各位新同學學的出席……」隨着大會主持的幾句說話，迎新茶聚會便步向高潮，一連串的遊戲既緊張又刺激，雖使人應接不暇，但其中樂趣又不足爲外人道。貓捉老鼠玩得多了，想

不到老鼠捉貓也一樣精采。砌英文字的遊戲真令人費煞思量，四五個字母的英文還好辦，但要砌十個英文字母的字則複雜多了。但憑着新舊同學的一股熱誠，冠軍隊順利產生。

「現在要炸旺角了！」同學們頓時走避登時下天大亂大家都恐怕找不到棲身之所呢。當基地相繼被轟炸時，叫罵之聲不絕於耳，仿似人間災難，但其實大家興緻盎然，玩得比較狂放罷了。後來的 Fashion Show，八十年代的新裝紛紛出現，設計之新穎，取材之特別，莫不叫人拍案叫絕。

當然更忘不了那可口的食品，當遊戲正在進行時，新丁還懂得收斂，但老柴却抵受不住引誘，紛紛偷吃了。當大會司儀宣佈茶點時候到了，各新舊同學盡情享用精美小食，音樂聲和着言談歡笑聲，多難忘的一刻，然後是曲終人散！

Orientation Camp迎新會營

「招積蛇，招積蛇，招招積積，威水又唔蛇」！

「同心合作齊努力，奪標實積極！」
Number Ten is Champion, Champion, Champion,
Number Ten is Champion, We are the Champion!
Who do we adore? Number Number Number Four!
Heep! Heep! Hurray! Heep! Heep! Hurray,
Heep! Heep! Hurray!

「粒粒！粒粒！粒粒！粒粒！」
雄糾糾的 Cheer 聲，響遍整個烏溪沙，那是社團的迎新營！

九月三日的早上，各組長已為其組員準備了 pre-camp function，為了促進未來三日的合作倒需要好好地互相認識一下呢！而且還要充份利用時間，改一個威風的組名，想幾個響亮的 cheer，否則節目一開始就陣腳大亂了！pre-camp function 之後，大家便要向烏溪沙進發了，之後是一番安頓，養精蓄銳，三天的節目隨即開始。

當夜的 Mass game 真叫人玩得暢快，緊張刺激灰諧風趣兼而有之，幹事的演出水準雖然差強人意，但掌聲依然熱烈，茶壺舞更令人笑得前仰後翻，真是欲罷不能。大合唱走音，在所難免，但歌聲雄壯，混亂中充滿剛勁。

第二天早上，是奪標的遊戲，各組隊員悉力以赴，長自己志氣，滅他人威風的叫聲不絕於耳。以飲管吸黃豆真不容易辦，傳送汽球想不到竟需要那樣高的技術，啊，那評定成績的方法太落後了，該採用世運會的電子儀器吧，終於冠軍、亞軍季軍產生了，有七組組員又告名落孫山，不要緊，奪標的機會還多着呢。收拾起失敗的心情，晚上再決一死戰！

下午時分，各組展開一連串的 Experience game，這是一些比較靜默的活動，在在均是以發人深思，與早上的激烈氣氛恰成對比，但兩者同樣樂趣無窮。

晚上是各組天才表演的比賽，那取材於越南難民的真切合實際，西樓角事件又重現眼前，還有的是講及打劫銀行，包收爛賬……一切

的演出都那麼傳神，新丁老柴的演技均不俗呢！

Talent Show 之後是營火會，熊熊烈火在草地中央點燃，百多位同學圍在火的四旁，有的引亢高歌，有的手舞足蹈，烏溪沙內充滿一片愉快，只可惜十二時便要返回營屋。


第二天早上，天不造美，細雨濛濛逼得將運動日也取消了，於是羣雄再聚於大禮堂，又是一片歡樂的情景。抽獎的時候到了。人人都洗耳恭聽，獎品雖多但數量畢竟有限，埋怨運氣之聲此起彼落，算了吧，那只不過是斷碼牛仔褲。


午飯過後，迎新營也跟着結束了，各蛇手足惟有忍淚暫別，幸好沒有忘記拍一張全家福。

Sports Orientation 體育迎新

Sports Orientation 出席的人數並不多，一系列的迎新活動準令各新同學疲乏不堪了，於是許多同學只好放棄 Sports Orientation 在家休養休養，參加的人數雖少，但氣氛依然不錯呢。

那籃球比賽也夠精采了，新舊同學的羽毛球技砌礮也蠻不錯呢，只可惜各同學都不能嘗試過各種在中學少有的球類遊戲，不過以後的機會還多着呢！





ECONOMICS SOCIETY

The Economics Society is one of the oldest and most active society in the university. The purpose of the Society is threefold:

1. To encourage the study of economic conditions and the related social and political conditions of the world at large among our members and to assist our members in the study of the discipline of economics;
2. to promote understanding and cordial relationship among our members, and to promote the general welfare among them;
3. to assist AIESEC — Hong Kong in acting as a local committee and extending the activities into the University of Hong Kong

In order to fulfil such an objective, activities of all sorts are organised. One can easily observe that the Society calendar is filled, and at times, even congested, with academic, social, sports, AIESEC and other activities the whole year through. And the space here is only sufficient for a brief sketch of some distance activities.

BUSINESS GAME

The game is a simulation model which aims at familiarizing the students with the nature of corporate management techniques. Participants make decisions in areas like

marketing expenditure, production, research, and development and selling price for their respective companies. After a series of decisions, the computer shows which company is the most successful.

BUDGET TALK

Every year, in March, when the proposed budget of the Govt. is disclosed by the Financial Secretary, the Society will not be slow in contributing to the public discussion on the budget by organizing the Budget Talk. Distinguished people from the industrial and commercial field, the press and other fields concerned are invited to examine and give comments on the budget. The talk is open to the public and attendance has always been excellent.

ECONOMICS JOURNAL

Aside from the reports of the Economics Society and AIESEC — Hong Kong the Economics Journal includes a variety of articles on theoretical and applied economics. Contributors include academics in Hong Kong and abroad as well as leading government officials and business executives. The topics covered are wide-ranging and reflect the continuing concern in application of theory to economic problems, particularly those of Hong Kong.

ECONOMISTS' NITE

It is a delightful evening, filled with fun and laughter. As a tradition, it is held in Autumn in the form of a barbeque, before which there are programmes like group games, inter-year singing competition, drama and lucky draw.

ANNUAL BALL

The Annual Ball, which is held some time during the Chinese New Year at the dancing hall of well-known hotels, is one of the occasions in which we can meet members of the Society's Advisory Board. Besides, the teaching staff, the graduates and the undergraduates are also staunch supporters of the function. Amidst the dining, chatting and dancing, the raffie draw with numerous valuable prizes takes place, to give additional attraction to the Ball.

UNDERGRAD-ALUMNI SPORTS DAY

The undergraduates and the alumni do not get together only at the dancing hall, but they also have meetings at football grounds and basketball courts. Every year, a sports day is held, between the current economics students and the past students. The games include football, basketball and squash. No matter which party wins the games, the other party can be consoled that friendship among them has been enhanced and the fraternal tie has been strengthened by their participation.

AIESEC ACTIVITIES

The AIESEC activities is one of the distinctive features of the Society. AIESEC is the International Association of Students in Economics and Commercial Sciences and the abbreviation is pronounced as 'eye-sec'. Its aims are to foster international communication and transfer of management knowledge and to close the gap between classroom theory and practical experience. Each of the 55 member countries is represented by a national committee while the universities in the member countries from the local committees. In the University of Hong Kong, the AIESEC-Local committee is affiliated to the Economic Society.

At the core of AIESEC is the International Traineeship Exchange Programme, which provides students of the two universities a valuable chance of going abroad to gain practical experience during their summer vacation. Every year there are about 30 successful candidates from the 2 Universities going out to different countries engaging in jobs of different nature — banking, administration, trading, marketing, finance, data processing etc. Apart from gaining practical experience, the programme also enables students of different nations to meet each other, to learn from each other and to exchange their ideas, experiences and cultures.

Since it is reciprocal exchange programme, every year roughly the same number of students from other countries come to Hong Kong and attend their traineeships here.

Then which companies provide the traineeship for them? Where do they live? How do the trainees themselves get to know about each other? All these questions lead to series of activities which are integral parts of the International Traineeship Exchange Programme, i.e. Solicitation* and Reception activities.

Here are more or less major activities of the Economics Society in a typical session. Apart from these, there are many other subsidiary activities which are too much to be mentioned here. Nonetheless, we hope that after reading this article, you will get a more familiar picture about how the Economics Society looks like. And if you are interest, please feel free to participate in our programmes. Wish you all the best!

From the Executive Committee
Session 78-79
Economics Society

Footnote

*Solicitation is the process of getting traineeships from companies

MANAGEMENT STUDIES SOCIETY

HELLO, YOU ARE WELCOME TO JOIN THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND THE MANAGEMENT STUDIES SOCIETY (MSS) !

You don't have to be a manager/senior executive when you complete the course(s) offered by the M.S. Dept.

Management Studies is definitely not boring and unproductive; although it does not guide you how you can speculate in the Gold market.

M.S. Dept. has her own student body – the MANAGEMENT STUDIES SOCIETY (MSS) the members of which include both the under and post-graduates.

One of the objectives of the MSS is to encourage and help promote the study of management concepts & techniques among the students, & to bring the members thereof into close contact with the business community & the professional bodies related to management studies. With this objective in mind, the MSS organizes a great variety of activities.

Should you try to review what you

might have missed during the past academic year? Only the major ones?

ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES:

- Seminar entitled "Marketing & Advertising in Hong Kong." Open to both members & non-members incl. the general public. Highlighted by speakers from HKTVB (The Asst. Gen. Manager); HK Soya Bean Products (Vitasoy) Ltd. (The Chairman); & Survey Research HK Ltd. (The Director), with spectacular audio-visual aids.
- Management Game (designed to introduce company executives to the corporate nature of planning and control and of associated decision making) with more than 100 participants coming from this University (many 1st year students), HK Baptist College and HK Polytechnic.
- Book Exhibition
- Information Day (Introducing the 2nd & 3rd courses)
- Academic Orientation

SOCIAL ACTIVITIES:

- B.B.Q.

- Film Show (twice!) (N.B. greater than Super 8 m.m.; not B/W)
- Inter-departmental Singing Contest, SSF'78
- Bazzar, SSF'78
- Annual Dance, with guests, couple & singles filling every corner of the Loke Yew Hall at the New Year Eve'78, honoured by the presence of our Dept. Head, Dr. and Mrs. Kim Y.S. CHAM
- Meeting friends from the School of Business, Kuwait.

PUBLICATIONS SERVICE:

- Printing of the basic reference materials for the related courses;
- Printing of the articles for the relevant tutorials;
- Printing of the Past Exams. Papers or the required exams.

SPORTS ACTIVITIES:

- Joining the Inter-faculty sports games organized by the S.A.
- Joining the Sports games organized by th S.S.S.
- Joining the tournaments, inter-departmental matches

OTHERS:

- Visit to IBM World Corporation, a review of the latest equipment,
- Visit to Cable & Wireless, received by their senior staff,
- Visit to McDonald (Hambergers), a study of their operation & management
- Training Programme, jointly organized with the Rotaract Club, HKUSU.

HONOURS & AWARDS:

- The MSS has received to mention but a few, the following awards:
Academically:—Co-Champions of the Management Game'78 and Co-holders of the

Management Game trophy donated by Dr. CHAM;

- CHAMPIONS of the inter-university-College Quiz Contest'79 (Participants included CUHK, HKBC, & HKP)

Non-achademically:

- WINNER of the Most Popular Bazzar, SSF'78
- WINNER of the Inter-departmental Singing Contest'78
- FIRST runners-up of the Inter-departmental Soccer.

DON'T bang against your head for having missed sharing the fun of these.....BE a member of MSS!!!! You wanna ask for your application form for membership, NOW! YES, NOW!

POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Just another successful year for Political Science Association!
In 1978-79, we have organized a great number of activities:

ACADEMIC FUNCTION

- a) A Book Exhibition was held on 3rd-5th January, 1979, in the Library Concourse. It aimed at providing our fellow students a cheap access to the recent works on Political Science and other related sciences. The response to this function was very encouraging.
- b) A Panel Discussion on the 'Current Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China' was organized on 8th February, 1979 at K726, Knowles Building. Our guest speakers were Professor P.B. Harris, Head of Political Science Department, Professor D. Tretiak, Centre of Asian Studies, and Dr. T. Liao, Lecturer of Government and Public Administration Department, CUHK. The Function was attended by over 150 people, who showed keen interest in the seminar topic and asked many stimulating questions.
- c) In response to the recent development in South Korea, a Talk entitled 'The Assassination of President Park Chung Hee and the Political future of South Korea' was held on 5th November, 1979, at 5.15p.m., in the First Floor Theatre, Chemistry Building. Speaking at this occasion were Dr. N.J. Miners and Mr. E.V. Roberts of the Political Science Department, who gave the spectators a clear insight and analysis of the event.
- d) The Intervarsity Political Science Debate, as an annual function jointly organized with the Government & Public Administrative Society, CUHKSU, took place on 26th October, 1979, at 6.30p.m. in the Institute of Chinese Studies, CUHK. The Motion was 'There should be Elected Seat(s) in the Legislative Council', with our PSA Team arguing in favour of the motion. The GPA Team was judged champion and our Third Speaker, Mr. Jackson Hon Tze Ki was granted the Best Debator Award.

PUBLICATION

- a) With the aim of promoting public awareness over local issues, a Research Project on 'The Police and the Public in HK', sponsored by the Bank of America Scholarship, was carried out in March, 1979. The Project was conducted through:
1) survey of 300 people: 2) interviews with Government spokesmen and outspoken community leaders; and 3) research on relevant readings and materials. We were particularly indebted to Professor P.B. Harris and Dr. D.J. Clark of the Political Science Department for their precious advice and support.
- b) The theme of our annual Journal, POLITIK, was 'Hong Kong in the 1980's'. This served as a concluding chapter on the local political scene in the seventies and looked forward to the prospect of Hong Kong in the eighties. The journal was a collection of articles of prominent scholars and brilliant essays of our fellow students.

SOCIAL FUNCTION

- a) The Fundraising Annual Dance, held on 28th December, 1978, at Loke Yew Hall, highlighted the Association's social functions. It was attended by over 500 people who all enjoyed a memorial and wonderful evening. The occasion was honoured by the company of Professor and Mrs. P.B. Harris, who also did the raffle draw and presented the prizes.
- b) To promote our external relations, a friendly visit was paid to the GPA Society, CUHKSU, on 10th March, 1979. The Programmes included friendly matches, chats, mass games, and BBQ. Our members received warm reception and hospitality from the GPA Society.

- c) Our Association joined the Social Sciences Society in organizing the Graduation Farewell Dinner for the fresh graduates. It was held on 16th June, 1979, in the President Restaurant, and was attended by more than 120 people.

ORIENTATION PROGRAMMES

- a) An information Service Day was organized on 16th June, 1979, at 2.00 p.m. in K743, Knowles Building, to give some insights and advice to the current students intending to continue their study on Political Science in second/third years. Speakers included fresh graduates and senior students of the Political Science Department, and the function was attended by over 100 students.
- b) The Joint Orientation Camp, which was jointly organized with Management Studies Society, Psychology Society, Sociology Society, and Statistics Society, highlighted our orientation programmes. The Camp took place from 30th August to 1st September, 1979, at the Wu Kai Sha Youth Camp, where about 120 current students and freshmen enjoyed a wonderful time and shared their experience.

SPORTS

We took part in the Interdepartmental Badminton and Soccer Tournament in this year. Although both teams did not win the champion, we played well and showed good sportsmanship.

PSYCHOLOGY SOCIETY

ACADEMIC FUNCTIONS:

During the year, various academic functions were carried out to promote interest in Psychology both among students and the public at large.

1. Film Shows

A series of altogether 7 film shows were shown during the last academic year (78-79) The usual attendance was about 50 each time. Response was generally good. Usually, there were discussion sessions after the films, and Mr. Lee and Dr. Ho had been invited to guide the discussions or to answer queries raised by the students.

2. Panel Discussion

A Panel Discussion was held on 22nd Jan, 79 at 5:15p.m. in K726. The topic was 'Suicide- Whose Responsibility?' It was conducted in Cantonese. The guest speakers were: Dr. T.S. Cheung (Lecturer of Chinese University); Mr. H.F. Tao (Chairman of the Samaritans); and Dr. T.C. Lam (famous psychiatrist) The attendance is about 200. Audience participation and response were very good. A lot of questions were raised by them.

3. Talks

A Talk on 'Three kinds of achievement motives' was jointly organized by the

Psychology Society and the Hong Kong Psychological Society on 4th April, 79 at 5:30p.m. in K726. The speaker was Dr. K.S. Yeung. This academic topic was more suitable for Psychology students. A lot of Secondary School students and members of the Hong Kong Psychological Society came. Attendance was about 150.

On 7th March, a Visiting Psychology Lecturer, Mataragnon, was invited to give a speech on 'The Case for an Indigeneous Psychology' It was held in K930 at 5:00 p.m. As the topic was more suitable for 2nd and 3rd year Psychology students, there had been less publicity to arouse attention from other students or the general public.

Another Joint Talk was held during this academic year on 10th Oct. 79 at 5:00 p.m. in K726. The Topic was psychological rehabilitation after sexual violence, Dr. M.C. Cheung (Chinese University) and Mr. John Koo (Prison Department) were invited to be the speakers.

4. The Society Library

The Society Library was open every Monday, 1:00pm to 2:00pm. But there was not much interest from the students, probably because the books does not fit in with their curriculum.

5. BOOK EXHIBITION

A Book Exhibition was held in the Library Concourse from 12th to 14th, Feb 79. Books were provided by the Hon Wing Book Store, Cave Book Co., Federal Publications Ltd, and Greenfield Book Store. Books in both English and Chinese, mainly about Psychology and Sociology, were exhibited. In the 3 days, around 200 books were sold, indicating that this is a much welcomed function.

6. APPARATUS DEMONSTRATION

The Apparatus Demonstration extended over a week from 15th to 19th of Jan, 79. The Demonstration consisted of 3 sessions, each 1 hour long (at 1:00 — 2:00 p.m.) on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of the week. Nine pieces of apparatus were borrowed from the Department and on display in K664. 10 volunteered demonstrators from second and third year students participated in the demonstration. Approximately 100 first year students came to the demonstration.

7. COURSE EVALUATION

The first course evaluation was carried out at the end of the first semester. The units included in this evaluation were: Introduction to Psychology, Fundamentals of Social Psychology, and Physiological Psychology. Open-ended question sheets were sent to students of all years. The second Course Evaluation was carried out in Mid-July. The units included were: Introduction to Psychology; Perception; Learning; Statistics and Experimental Design; Introduction to Psychopathology; Personality and Introduction to Counseling. With the experience from the first evaluation, 2 questionnaires, one for the 1st year, one for the 2nd and 3rd, were designed for the purpose. Both open-ended and multiple questions were included. Response was better than the previous one.

8. INFORMATION SERVICES

The aim of the Information Service is to assist the first year students in the course selection when promoting to the

2nd year of their studies. It was held on 2 June 79 at 2:00 p.m. The first session was in K726. Mr. Kven was invited to give out information concerning the courses in Psychology and to answer queries raised by the students. The second session was held in K726 as well as K669. There was informal discussion among the senior and first year students. About 70 students attended the function.

9. ORIENTATION GATHERING

On 25th Aug. 79, the Society organized an Orientation Gathering for all freshmen in KB47. Attendance includes 45 freshmen and 10 current students. Programmes include slide-show and a film introduced by Mr. Lee and group discussion. The programmes fulfil the aim of introducing Psychology Society, Psychology Department, and some concepts on Psychology.

PROJECT 79 — CHILDHOOD IN HONG KONG

The Organizing Committee of Project 79 was formed on 12th Feb 79 with 16 members of Hong Kong University students. Long before the formation of the committee, a lot of orientation programmes were launched to promote interest and increase knowledge in Child Psychology which included 5 talks, 3 film shows, and a gathering. Response from the Psychology students was very encouraging, and over 70 of them signed up to join the Project.

On 30th April, 79, owing to their keen interest in the Psychology Project the Boys' and Girls' Club Association joined the Psychology Society in organizational work, and there was common consensus on the Objectives and the master plan originally planned. A working committee has been formed consisting of representatives from both parties. The BGCA contributed much to external co-ordination and publicity work.

May to June:- Owing to the devoted efforts of a number of 2nd year Psychology students, 2 sets of questionnaires had been drafted for the purpose of the survey. A pre-

test was administered among 30 primary students. The content of the survey was finalized as:— 1. parental roles as perceived by the child. 2. Parental attitudes and teachers' demands and test anxiety scale. It was decided that the purpose of the Exhibition, another important programme of the Project to be held in September, was to study the several psychological aspects of child development which included the psychosocial, cognitive and moral developmental aspects through the theories of Erikson, Piaget and Kolberg. The results of the survey was to be exhibited, too. A working committee was formed separately to be responsible for the Exhibition.

July:— The survey proper was administered. 31 schools (24 primary and 7 secondary) were visited, with the aid of over 30 working members from, HKU as well as secondary schools. During the fieldwork process, as there was adequate planning and briefing session beforehand, the survey could be carried out smoothly with reasonable efficiency. Meanwhile, 4 study groups had been formed for the Exhibition and information gathering began.

August:— The data collected from fieldwork was coded and processed. Computer programmes were ready for use. Card checking was finished. A survey evaluation was conducted. On the other hand, the study groups suffered from the inadequacy of manpower because some of their members had commitments elsewhere. Nevertheless, owing to the devotions of the group leaders, the study groups managed to finish their book research and information gathering and translation was on progress.

September:— The data processing was finished. The findings of one of the questionnaire set, the 'perceived parental role' was decided to be presented as part of the Exhibition. The preparation of the Final Report on the Survey is still under progress. The Field Director and Publication Secretary of the Organizing Committee are in charge

of the matter, with the help of others in the future.

The highlight of the Project was the Exhibition held from 20 Sept to 1 Oct at Loke Yew Hall, University of Hong Kong. We have received lots of volunteered aid from the working members, secondary school students, freshmen, as well as students from other Faculties and most sincere thanks must be extended to them for their contribution in pictorial presentation and putting up of posters. The opening ceremony (3:00p.m. on 28, Sept. 79) of the Exhibition was officiated by Mr. Hui Yin Fat and Dr. Ho Kam Fai. The attendance was about 3000, with lots of young parents included. On the whole, the Project is very successful, and the Exhibition receives very positive response from the public. Outside bodies like publishers, magazines, extramural students, school teachers and even film society have contacted the Psychology Society, so as to borrow the materials or the slide shows concerning the Exhibition for various usage.

EXTERNAL LIAISON

This year, we have Mr. P. Whyte, Mr. Hui Yin Fat and Mr. N. Briers accepting our invitation as our Patrons; Mr. Kvan as our Hon. Auditor and Hon. Adviser; and Professor Dawson as the President of our Society.

As in the past years, we maintained constant liaison with the following bodies: Hong Kong Psychological Society; the Psychology Society, Students' Union, the Chinese University; the Sociology Society, Hong Kong Baptist College; the Psychology Society, Heep Yunn School; staff on Psychology, Wellington College, Wa Ying College; Cheung Sha Wan Catholic Secondary School, Maria College, Cognitio College and the Cognitio Matriculation Evening Institute; etc. Relationship with the Hong Kong Psychological Society is very satisfactory.

PUBLICATION

A number of bulletins have been distributed during the session to inform the Psychology students of our current activities and functions.

Post Examination Question Papers of last 3 academic sessions have also been stencilled for circulation to Psychology students of all years. They are free of charge. The objective is to help the students upon revision in preparing for the examination.

The session committee has agreed upon to combine 'Hydris' and 'Psyche' into one journal. Certain advantages behind the act are as follow: savings in time, money, and human efforts involved; a better flow of ideas due to the putting together of articles from both students and lecturers, thus allowing for a richer content.

The 'Psyche' for the session (78 – 79) is still undergoing its process of preparation work. Several articles from both students and lecturers have been gathered. This year's 'Psyche' is scheduled to be published during the coming session. (79 – 80)

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS:

Various social functions have been carried out to promote a closer contact amongst members, these include inauguration lunch gathering, winter camp tea gathering, interdepartmental soccer tournament, graduation farewell tea gathering, summer camp, graduation farewell dinner and joint orientation camp.

SOCIAL WORK SOCIETY

The year for the Social Work Society session 1978-79 has passed. On reflection, the picture was one filled with laughter, yet not without tears. On its positive side, it was intended that the programmes and activities might have fulfilled the task of catering for the social and academic interests of the members; while the difficulties and frustrations encountered during the process could in no way be discounted.

During the year, the Society paid its emphasis on the educational activities to foster the academic development of the students. Talks on the topic of regionalization of the Social Welfare Department and also on community work techniques were arranged. We also made efforts on deepening the students' understanding to social work by holding a discussion and sharing with 1st year students. Furthermore, visits to social service agencies were organized to familiarize the students with the settings and social work function in different agencies. Before the students entered the field to have placement in social work practice, orientation discussions were held to prepare them with basic information so that their placement experience could be smoothed.

The Society in the year also made efforts in promoting external relationship with other fellow social work students from the various post-secondary schools/colleges. This objective was fairly well realized especially through the vehicle of the Joint College Meeting for post-secondary social work students. Activities were organized for the social and academic interflow among different college students, and these ranged from social gathering, seminar camp, work camp, agency visits to professional talks. The Joint College meeting also published an annual journal to serve as a forum for interchange of ideas in social work. On the whole, it was a happy experience to have the opportunity to share and interact with the other college students. Thereupon, an ad hoc committee was established to study the feasibility of setting up a Federation for all socialwork societies in different colleges.

Since this session, the position of current affairs secretary has been set up. This meant the increasing concern of the Society in this area. Throughout the year, the Society attempted to participate in the Chinese Movement, the Boat People Issue and the issue of the strike of the Assistant

Social Welfare Officers. Unfortunately, we were only on the way of searching for the appropriate roles in such issues owing to the inadequacy of experience. It is therefore admitted that we were quite weak in this aspect last year. However, pain was inevitable in such budding stage, and we do hope that this may herald the coming of a brilliant and experienced future.

Needless to say, social activities were arranged to vitalize the students from the burdensome workload and also to promote interaction and solidarity among different classes. These included Christmas gathering, welcome gathering and film show. Orientation Camp was also held to facilitate the understanding of the nature of social work along freshmen and current students. We also participated in the interdepartmental talent competition of Social Science Nite 78. We had a singing performance, which won the third prize in the item.

Last but not the least, we held a number of other activities including the Society's Badge Design Competition, Book printing, Exhibition with Hong Kong Council of Social Services, film production and the Personal Tutor Scheme. These aimed at a variety of internal and external purposes.

On the whole, we tried to fulfil our missions in different aspects during the year. Evaluation of the outcome is difficult, and this only invites no end of fruitless criticisms and rationalizations. Just let our efforts be dedicated to those who participated and cooperated in the various activities during the last year.

SOCIOLOGY SOCIETY

The main purpose of our Society is to encourage the study of Sociology as a scientific discipline. However, we also pay attention to the promotion of understanding among, and general welfare of our members. The 1978-79 session of the Society is still running in its way towards the lines of enriching these aims.

Below is a rough record of the activities held by the Society from Mid-November 1978 to September 1979.

(A) Academic Activities

1. Sociological game: The aim of the game was to stimulate students' thinking on important sociological concepts like 'capitalism', 'class structure', 'class struggle', etc. The game was 'made' by our members — a duplication of the game "Class Struggle" lent out by our tutor Dr. K.K. Tse. Valuable suggestions on how the game should be led, as well as explanations and clarifications on some of the concepts brought out in the game, were given by Dr. Tse. Because of the active participation, the game had to be held twice on 6th and 9th of April, 1979. Stimulating discussions were follow-

ed after each game.

2. Talks:

On March 1, 1979, Dr. S.K. Lau 劉兆佳博士 Lecturer of Sociology Dept., The Chinese University of Hong Kong, delivered a talk on "The political Behavior of Hong Kong Citizens 香港一般人的政治行為". On March 8, 1979, another talk was given by Dr. T.S. Cheung 張得勝博士 and Mr. L.W. Tang 鄧龍威先生 on topics of "The Contradictions Between Education Quality and Social Equality" 教育質素與社會平等的矛盾 and "The Rise and Fall of Collective Ownership and Private Ownership in Agricultural Society" (農業社會中集體所有制與私有制之互相消長).

3. Film Show:

Held on Feb. 26, 1979. The film was a BBC production and titled "Ways of the middle kingdom" — a valuable documentary on the festival and religious activities and customs practised by some of the Chinese people in Hong Kong.

4. Questionnaire Studies:

With the aim of getting a better

understanding on our members' opinion toward Sociology, two studies on first year Sociology students were made in December 1978 and April, 1979. The results as such were sent to Professor Murray Groves, Head of Sociology Dept., who responded with much interest.

5. Information Service on Course Selection:

Held on June 23, 1979. Professor Groves and most of the lecturers in the Dept. came to the occasion and gave valuable information to the potential second and third year students interested in taking sociology courses. Handouts and refreshments were provided, more than 100 member participated.

(B) Publications

1. Dynamic Sociology:

Dynamic Sociology, published in March, 1979, was a battlefield of ideas where the feelings and opinions of our members were expressed

2. Paradigm:

Paradigm is the name of our Annual Journal which is highly academically oriented and contains articles from the teaching staff of the Sociology Dept., prominent figures in H.K., and graduated and undergraduate students studying sociology. Paradigm 1978 was issued in Feb. 1979 to all registered members while Paradigm 1979 is now in preparation.

(C) Welfare

1. Christmas Card:

Two pieces of a specially designed christmas card were distributed free to each registered member in December, 1978.

2. Past Examination Papers:

Past exam. papers on most of the Sociology courses were distributed to members before the examination.

(D) Social Activities

1. Lunch gathering:

Held on Nov. 27, 1978. Professor Groves and most of the lecturers and tutors, together with more than 80 members of the society enjoyed the occasion. Two songs were performed, one by Miss Margaret Lee, and another by a group of second year students.

2. Graduation Farewell Dinner:

The society participated in this function, jointly held among the departmental societies in the Faculty of Social Science, on June 16, 1979.

(E) Sports

The Society participated in the Inter-Departmental Soccer held in March, 1979.

(F) Orientation Activities

The Society participated in a series of orientation programmes.

1. July 14 to 16, 1979. The Society participated in the Union Academic Orientation programmes.

2. August 18, 1979: The Society participated in the Introductory Class of the Social Sciences Society.

3. August 30 to Sept. 9, 1979. An Orientation Camp jointly held by Sociology Society, Management Society, Political Science Association, Psychology Society, and Statistics Society, was held at Wu Kai Sar. About 120 students enjoyed the occasion.

4. Sept. 18, 1979: An Orientation Tea-gathering was held, more than 30 members presented. Refreshments and information on Sociology were provided. A sociological game was played which was followed by lively discussions.

STATISTICS SOCIETY

- I. To encourage the study of Statistics and the application of Statistical technique.
- II. To promote understanding and general welfare among members of the Society.
- III. To secure complete organization and unity within the Society.
- IV. To maintain good relationship between staff and students.
- V. To maintain contact with the Student's Union in the sphere of Social and Cultural activities.

The work of Statistics Society HKUSU is to serve all the statistics students according to the above five objectives. Statistics students, sharing the common interest among themselves, are found to be most effectively coordinated academically. In consideration of this, our society put most emphasis on academic function.

During the last academic year, 78-79, we organized series of academic function such as study group, counselling talk, seminars and survey, etc. Among these, seminars and survey are proved to be the most successful ones.

In the seminar, 'Statistics In Action', experts from various field were invited to introduce the application of Statistics on financial, government and commercial sectors in Hong Kong.

The Society also provide chance for all statistics students to apply their knowledge. During November, 1978, we conduct a Survey on 'The Services and facilities of HKU main-library'. Through this survey, the knowledge in sampling, questionnaire design, data analysis and report presentation were put into practice.

The result of this survey shows that about 40% of the undergraduates are frequent users of the library. By faculty breakdown analysis, the results indicates that the degree of utilization is different among faculties. For example, Arts and Social Sciences students counts for large part of the library users. While the Architecture students study in their studio and law student prefer to stay in the Law library, etc. Furthermore, students from different faculties would prefer different floors. The factor of 'easy access to reference book' is the main reason for this phenomena.

Other interesting results of preference order on floors, utilization on each collection, book borrowing statistics etc. are included in the report published. Those who are interest in this survey may contact us for a copy.



在暮色蒼茫裏

霍

在香港大學的車站，每一天，駛來一輛又一輛的巴士，載着一羣又一羣的年青人，他們魚貫地下車，紛紛走上那條長長的斜坡，滿臉掛着冷峻的沉默與關閉，各自踏着另一條生命的長路，好像這條斜坡一般，陡斜而費勁。

某一天，我發覺我也走在他們中間，同樣，挽着書包，獨個兒攀上這條陡斜的路。

十月，秋色正濃，路旁的大樹依然招遙地散播着草綠的校園氣息，可是沒有太多人注意到，可能這一點點兒的「綠」滿足不了青年人開闊的心胸，校園委實太狹小了，又可能紅底白字的宣傳橫額更加觸目，加上空中飄搖着一串串、一行行的旗幟，構成錯落的圖案，小巧而吸引，走到樓級的拐彎處，每當我仰首看看這一串串的小旗，心裏就產生很大的疑問，這些旗幟背後究竟費了多少精神和心思？這一番付出的心機背後又靠些甚麼去支持？是一份單純的熱情？是一種不計較甚麼的傻勁？還是……。

唸了大學，想不通的問題多的是，肯思索而又誠實的人不能不承認自己的無知，知識的領域何其博大，理性思維的探索又那樣的無休止，走進了大學，就像被拋在洶湧的大海裏，自浮自沉，各人碰各人的運氣。

可是，真正肯思想的人又似乎不多。大學，倒也是個有趣的地方，羣「雄」匯集，裏面有着種種意識形態的人物，有些人冷傲，嚴竣，急激，有很多人安份實際，滿意于平庸的一生，而更多的人苟且，「符碌」以享樂為事，在茫茫人海裡，多少人靈魂乾枯，多少人迷失自己！

在競爭劇烈的教育制度底下培養出來的是競爭好手，爭着乘搭升降機上紐魯詩樓是常見的事，有一次擠擁情況嚴重，站在人羣中間的不幸者被視作「薄餅」看待，擠得透不過氣來，一個女孩子忍不住低聲的說：「這裏像一所大學嗎？」我默言無語，很耐人尋味，也發人深省。另一次，在學生休息室我聽到同學講「粗口」，令我錯愕。又一次，無意中聽到一羣人在興高彩烈地討論，內容中心是如何下大注買六合彩，令我驚訝。大學生太令人失望！

在大學裏，多麼容易使人有一種割離的感覺，每天往來奔馳于課室、飯堂、圖書館、I.C.A.，學生會……之間，這時候自己是一個人，那時候自己又是另一個人，然後你會停下來問一問自己這一切為了什麼？跑到荷花池畔，對着紅蓮發歎，池塘裏荷花沉默，田田荷葉重重疊疊交結着千百個疑問，代表着幾許矛盾與費解！

大學生活實太匆匆，一張張緊繃着神經的臉面；一句句千篇一律的招呼話，（去CANT EEN嗎！去LIBRARY嗎？去上堂嗎？……拜拜！）一條條踏實而急促的腿，是什麼窒息了彼此暢快自由的交談？是什麼凍結了大家美麗而愉快的微笑？我曾夢想大學是一塊廣闊的禾場，在綠色鋪綴的草坪上，大學生談人生、談理想，猶如微風拂過一片金黃的麥浪。

九月熱烘烘的迎新過去了，十月也隨着消逝，十一月開始了寒風徹骨的日子，不禁自我反省，逝去了的個把月是怎樣渡過的呢？三年的時間太短了，豈可虛渡？第一個學期將要結，近日同學所關心的都是功課、書本、測驗，圖書館又要「座無虛席」了！

大學，始終是一塊很自由的地方。捧着筆記，往紐魯詩樓拾級而上，盛載着滿腔待發的銳氣，跑進這高聳矗立的知識寶庫，不管大學的氣氛如何，我堅持自己的原則，教育自我，認識周圍，別笑我在童騷地說豪氣話，現在大學生所缺少的就是一份豪情，一份凌霄壯志！

斜暉夕照，淡淡的紅霞一抹，太陽收斂它底光芒，絢難須歸于平靜，橫額仍舊當頭懸掛，一行行的旗幟依然在晚風中招展，一個個年青人又走下斜坡，踏上歸途，在暮色蒼茫裏。



Some strange phenomena in an Affluent Society

- Sweden

Tam Siu Ying. Iris

There is never equality in this world. While many of the poor countries are crying for more food, more fresh water, more space, increasing number of children are born. There in Sweden, although neither space, food, nor water is a problem, the Swedish families are getting smaller and smaller. Despite the very generous help and care the community is giving to mothers and infants¹, people still think children are expensive.

Household size decreases as young people move out earlier and earlier. In my opinion, this in some way is encouraged by the well organized welfare of the society such as loans for apartment buildings, furniture, medical insurance, marriage and maternity benefits. There always seems to be a way out when one is in trouble. Children no longer depend so much on parents as before. For the aged, the state takes over the responsibility to look after their material and physical well-being². Children do not feel much obligation towards their parents as a result. Well, there it is. For a family of 3 generations, we have one household in Hong Kong. But in Sweden, there are 3.

In H.K., newly built flats in apartment buildings tend to have smaller areas, meeting the demand of smaller families. In Sweden, despite the fact that household size decreasing, housing units are getting larger. As both size and number of houses are rising, energy needed for heating and electricity is obviously increasing. In midst of the oil crisis, this appears to be very contradictory to what should be done.

The high taxation in Sweden has produced many special social features. In order to minimize their tax, people no doubt use their brain hard. To many people, especially women, working full time is foolish. One has to calculate really carefully before really setting foot on a job. By paying the progressive tax due to higher income, one might end up no better than working shorter hours. A black labour market is an answer to evasion of the often complained high taxes and wages. Both parties, the employer and employee, will be satisfied so long as an official receipt for a deal is not issued. Some people give up a full-time job and busy with their part-time illegal ones. But when we look at the millions of unemployed in poor countries, we will notice how strongly they crave for a full-time employment.

The richer you are, the deeper you regret the taxation system. This accounts for the billions of kronors being kept in Swiss Banks instead of in Swedish banks.

In Hong Kong, and in many other developing countries, I believe, grannies are still very much engaged in baby-sitting their grand-children. In turn, the aged is looked after by the young. There in Sweden, there are nurseries and day mothers for small kids and home-help for old people. A daughter perhaps is better off to let the society take care of her old mother while she goes out to help another old lady and gets paid.

Education is free and compulsory. But as one attains a higher level of education, one aspires heavier responsibility. However, it is extremely difficult to provide enough jobs to satisfy all people. Therefore it is usually those who received high level education become unemployed.

When one has created "heaven on earth", perhaps eternal life is no longer as attractive. Magnificent Cathedrals are still standing, but I guess more tourists' foot-prints are found there now. Of course, going to churches in itself does not mean very much, but the lack of religious atmosphere is significant in Sweden.

With an almost Utopian social welfare system, a person is well looked after by the community from the time he is in his cradle to the time he lies in his coffin. There is no worry about life. But strange though it may sound, many people do feel empty and lonely there. Life is no longer that precious when one needs little effort to sustain it. Many others simply end their lives in their free will.

Footnote:

¹ a mother usually gets around HK\$15,000 for giving birth to a baby besides full-paid maternity leave for around 2 months if she works.

² An old person after 65 gets around HK\$ 1,600 a month hand rent subsidies as well.



我——大學生？

惠

實在有些反感，也有些沮喪——

開學至現在只不過短短的兩個星期，原來已是嶙峋的臉兒如今更顯得凹凸分明，深陷的眼睛裏再也找不到往日的活潑和歡樂，反而帶着無限的失望和負擔……功課和參改書實在令人難以消受。

「進入大學後一定要好好學習，一面讀書，一面參加活動，享受一下大學的生活，發揮一下自己的潛能，像小說上所說的，電影中所描述的一樣，有意思極了……」只是兩星期前的憧憬，現在已化作雲煙，消失在圖書館裏。

大清早就要趕着上堂、上導修，食飯，其餘的時間都化在圖書館中。拿着一大堆的書名，找着找着，等着等着，最後只得一句：「給借去了，下星期來預定吧！」當時的心情就像一個垂死的飢民在輪着食物，輪到時食物剛巧分配完一樣的絕望。「下星期才來預定」，那時才可借到？一個月後？學期尾？只好天天來碰運氣了。逐漸，圖書館就如洗手間一樣，每天都要去，而且還不只去一趟！

我承認是香港教育制度的犧牲品——一隻肥肥大大的填鴨！我給填慣了——十五年——十五年的填鴨教育使我接受不了現在的「自由」，多日來的頻撲使我厭倦起來。讓我回到以前的生活方式去！我甘願做一隻填鴨！不要折磨我……

不！我是一個大學生，應該經得起這些考驗，那怕是挑燈夜讀到三更半夜！但，我真真的受不了，那種看上去十分自由輕鬆而實際上使人喘不過氣的大學生活！坐在一個二百多人的演講室裏，就如置身於大會堂音樂廳，或是藝術中心，總有一種無形的鬆弛感，不能集中上堂，況且一張張的臉孔都不是熟悉的，同學們就像走馬燈一樣，在你眼前忽忽的溜過，沒有留下一絲的笑容和感情。在這樣的一個陌生地方，加上找不到半點溫情，我又豈能不回想過去的同學、過去的生活，還有過去的溫情、慰問、關懷、親切……這一些在大學裏只能是一些幻覺，不過，我想在這感情的沙漠裏，終會有找到綠洲的一天。我一直在找著……

曾經讀過一篇小說，內容描述一所大學的生活，那裏有「保護人制度」，就是由二、三年級的舊生負責帶領一年級的新生，使得他們能在陌生的環境下得着一些歸屬感，不致於徬徨不知所措。我多麼渴望這樣制度能在港大出現啊！

香港大學——你我曾經拼命擠進來的一所專上學府，經過多年來的夢想和掙扎，始終進來了，得到的又是什麼呢？或許人就是這樣矛盾，得不着的東西總是十分完美，當你得着時，也不外如是。

然而，得着的這一切都是自己討來的，不管是快樂還是痛苦，我會承担一切，珍惜一切。

三六事件

好此道者

秋風起，三蛇肥，三六滋味更新奇。當氣溫在十一月十八日驟降十餘度之時，不少走私慣了的三六食客，早已食指大動，「香港三六」檔往何處去？「這個問題比「香港往何處去」更令他們著急，更令他們左思右想。

好了，胃已預備好，天公也已安排就緒，就等那一條肥狗交上厄運，給三六偵探綁了來上碟。可是，與此同時，這些可愛的狗兒們却都突然大出風頭；吃狗肉本是件靜悄悄的勾當，現在却被人公開談論，談論的人且是一班鬼佬，談論的問題竟是三六合法化！

原來，於皇家防止虐畜會（ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS-很多人把「皇家」ROYAL略去了）服務多年，且擔任副主席的韋士達先生，於該會之年報上發表一言論，聲稱吃狗肉並無不妥，問題在於該狗隻是否特地為食家而設之「菜狗」而非寵物或接受特別訓練之狗隻，及宰殺狗隻之方法是否人道，而不是「應否吃狗隻」的問題，蓋我們無權操縱市民之菜譜云云。此言論發表後，有人額手稱慶，有人切齒痛呼，於皇家防止虐畜會中更引起軒然大波。首先有幾位幹事表示強烈反對，並以辭職為脅，要求韋先生收回言論，有兩位坐言起行，罷職去矣，其後陸續有人表示反對，韋先生在皇家會內頓成眾矢之的，皇家會之幹事並欲召開一特別會議以討論此事；適逢

此時韋先生之頂頭上司（主席）身在他方，韋先生拒絕召開會議，此於港大以外少見之「鋤人大會」遂告吹。其後，韋先生更施行反擊，指所有反對純乃情緒反應，反對者沒有仔細思索他的說話，並謂他私人有更多支持者，又說不會離開幹事會，若會員喜歡，可於十二月三日之會員大會踢他出會。

韋先生事後有無被踢出會，本人不得而知，惟韋先生所提出之建議，却甚富研究之價值。

首先，三六之問題中心不在應否吃，而在殺狗之方法是否人道，賣狗肉和賣淫一樣，既不合合法，却又禁不了，因為禁不了的緣故，勉強禁之只會令更多狗隻無緣無故的被綁架，被札在布袋內，在亂棍下送命；不但如此，禁吃狗肉還會引起極嚴重之衛生問題，蓋通常被非法捕殺之狗隻，多屬病狗或瘟狗（也只有病狗才較易被捉），吃時滋味無窮，吃完則可能後患無窮，其最終問題在於：禁亦禁不了，不如不禁！

或者曰，賣淫亦禁不了，販毒亦禁不了，不見得都把他們合法化吧。在此，好狗肉者，狗隻沒有甚麼特別神聖的地方，要使我們誓死保衛之。

的確，我們不能想像一個比丈夫更馴服的床上良伴，在第二天變成了桌上香氣四溢的佳餚的情形。貓狗是人的良伴，吃之確實不忍。但論到狗兒的本質，又確的是沒有什麼神聖不可侵犯的地方，尤其是當狗隻是特別預備的菜狗時，更可心安理得，因其既非寵物，又非受訓而懂人之狗隻，且若吃狗合法化，則在自由競爭之下，病狗、殘廢狗之市場必要關門，家裏的狗亦安全得多了，因綁狗的行業生意必大受打擊。


或者說，不錯人有人權，狗無狗權，故吃狗並無不妥，但却似有欠文化。此說更加不通，但不幸地，這却是三六不能合法化的最主要原因。

皇家防止虐畜會的會員，大多數是外國人（「皇家嘛！」）。皇家說，吃狗肉有欠文化，應禁之也。但香港却偏是一中國社會，不少三六家均會以「孔夫子都食狗肉」以還擊禁狗者，更嚴重之，有學識修養之人更可指之為文化侵略，禁狗實為一民族中心（ETHNOCENTRISM）的表現，而我們却不承認中國的文化比皇家的弱，要受皇家的濡化（ACCULTURATION）。比方說，若某天倫敦被伊朗託管，哥曼尼老先生認為吃豬乃回教大忌，故不能喫之，則皇家軍必羣起反對，稱哥先生為「傻豬」也不為過；但不吃豬是回教文化的一種表現，而沒有人能把自己的文化看成比其他的優越，因為這是人權——人有接受及隨從其所處及所取之文化的權利及自由。

在皇家會眾多會員眼中，吃狗肉的人有如生番，不可理喻。但奉勸諸君，在大嚼牛扒的時候，有很多印度人痛不欲觀，小吃豬肉時，有更多回教人怒髮衝冠，故還是不吃為妙！事實上，對生命尊重的人，首先注意的不是應否

吃其他動物，而是其他動物是否被虐待，其生命是否被人以殘忍方法奪去，以滿足人之自私慾望？奉勸防止虐畜會諸君，在反對吃狗肉、却又同時紅燒羊肉的時候，也為香港一羣豬牛等等待遇設想，香港殺豬殺牛的方法雖非特別殘忍，但豬牛等的飼養，運載等仍是問題重重。

筆者並非好三六者，狗肉亦只嘗過一次，以後不敢領教。筆者本身亦為一愛狗之人，寓居亦養有小狗一隻（韋士達先生更巴閉，此大男人與三條狗同往！），惟本人亦如韋先生一樣認為吃狗並無不妥。基於對生命之愛好，我亦同意應防止虐畜，但當一大羣外國防止虐畜者，在豬牛羣等受苦受密閉區位（CLAUSTROECOLOGY）之害，千萬海中生靈受污染之苦時，黯然緘默，卻在中國人應否吃狗肉事件上議論眾多，則此事之蘊涵（IMPLICATION）便非防止虐畜咁簡單了！



愁兒

絮

一向以來，他都稱自己爲「愁兒」，他不曉得這名字的由來，但每當他着實感到不快樂時，他就很自然地想起這個名字！

他是不快樂的，他想，也是從別人眼光中察覺出來的，不是嘛！在學校中他一向孤立自己，不積極的參予羣體活動，不主動的和外界接觸，一直以來，他都板起面孔，帶着一股拒人的冷漠，沈鬱的傲氣。

他告訴自己，他是不快樂的，因爲本身的他絕不是如此，但不曉得從那時開始，他和他的環境就默許了他一個如此的模式，習慣早已使這模式刻得更深更切，連他自己也無從改變，於是他只能去克制自己的種種念頭和感情，及去接受許多有意無意的批評及攻擊，於是他就變得更不快樂，更加深沈了！

他喜歡在家，因爲他感到十分釋放，自由自在，他愛唱歌，愛吵鬧，愛胡扯……。

處在這兩種截然不同的性格中，有時他會問自己究竟真我是誰呢？但每次總沒有答案，唯一他能把握到的是——當他在家時，他感到最快樂而已。

小愁兒逐漸長大，很幸運地遇上了一羣傻朋友，在他們中間他逐漸感到自我的被接受，他感到好釋放，好自由，這是他從來未感受過的。

愁兒長大了，責任推到他的身上來，他欣然接受，盡力的做好自己的一份，他需要接觸許多新鮮的人物，去和他們打交道，但他對這

差事十分欣悅，因爲新的人會用沒有成見的眼光看他 and 接受他！

有一天，一位朋友告訴愁兒，「你真如一隻無憂無慮、快樂的小鳥兒啊！」

愁兒給嚇呆了，他感到無比的驚奇，這怎麼可能呢！他的名字不是愁兒嗎？爲什麼一下子變成了「喜兒」呢？（原諒他過度的聯想能力）

他反問自己，究竟此時此刻他是愁兒或是喜兒呢？他真不曉得。也許人生許多事情都不是絕對的，你不能去說一個人是樂觀或是悲觀的，因爲這都是極片面的看法，同樣人性也是極端矛盾的，去尋找自我絕不是一樁容易的事，更何況人的性格也正不斷地改變呢？

面對這矛盾的人性，喜兒感到徬徨，無所適從，他永不能忘記舊我（也許這是真我？）他也深信「舊我」的朋友不會忘記從前他的形象，於是他陷入重重的藩籬中，跳不出來！

他告訴自己，去離開他的舊環境，去進入另一個新環境去，會對他有幫助的，但現實上他辦不到，更何況「舊我」本屬於他的一部份呢？

他睜開眼，看到的是一張張冷漠的面孔，像在指責他，笑罵他，又像是自己的一個影子反照，他又看到一些親切的面孔，笑容可掬，親切熱誠。他感覺到許多不同的無名的聲音，呼喚着他的名字，而他却仍不曉得往那兒去走！

喜兒！愁兒！喜兒！愁兒！

究竟他是誰呢！

母語教學的問題

奧利花

香港在最近幾年來，提倡用母語作為教學媒介的人是不遺餘力的，這個運動已經進入如火如荼的階段了。可是，它又面對著種種的問題而極需要解決。現在，我們把焦點放在它所遇到的問題上。這一些問題大概可以分為兩類：第一類是「母語」這個名詞的定義問題；第二類是推行這個計劃當中所碰到的問題。

顧名思義，「母語」是指中文，以白話文和標準國語（或者是普通話）為教學基礎。不過，現在香港的學生百分之九十九是說廣東話，而且他們所寫也不是純粹的白話文。他們把廣東話作為第一語言而把普通話作為次要的語言。因此，學生應該學那一種語言而同時放棄另一種語言——我們知道把兩種語言同時來教學生是行不通的，這的確是一個大問題。

香港是英國的殖民地，英文無論在社會上、教育上，都佔著優等的地位；它也是國際語言。英文學校遠比中文學校為多。更可悲的就是那一些本來是中文學校的也相繼變為英文學校，它們為了適應這特殊的環境，英文似乎代替了中文為母語教學。

我們已經說過，母語是為指普通話而言。假如我們用普通話作為教學媒介，我們應該從小學還是從中學開始呢？如果從小學開始，大部份學生會不會感覺學普通話比學英文一樣那麼困難？因為他們都是本地廣東人。如果從中學開始，他們會不會感覺粵語有先入為主的現象發生而影響他們學正確的普通話？還有他們需要把粵語翻譯成普通話，在講和寫的方面，

這對於他們來說是一種困難，這樣可能有事倍功半的不良效果出現。

另外一個問題是師資方面，香港的師範學院及大學的教育學院沒有規定學生必須接受普通話訓練，而且，他們也習慣說廣東話，要找一個會說純正普通話的本地老師可不容易。這會阻礙用母語教學的計劃。

關於教材方面的編訂，教育當局所規定的中文教材都未能適應實際的需要，在中學中文課來說，文言文的率比白話文為多，老師常常著重文言文的講能而忽視白話文的教授，他們認為白話文的內容比較淺易，可以讓學生自己去理解。實際上這對於母語教學的目的是背道而馳的。

在小學課本的編寫來說，不同的問題也存在，書本上的語法和句，有時候錯誤的運用，有時候夾雜廣東方言在內，這對於母語教學的質素有直接影響。

最後，香港中學所用的教科書，除了中文科目以外，全都用英文版本。老師用母語授課而學生面對英文版本的書籍，明白的程度當然不高，還有他們的思維、表達方面應該用那一種語言呢？更糟的是校內和校外的考試，學生如何把學到的東西用英文作答，這是一個頭痛的問題。

總而言之，母語教學在香港並不是一朝一夕可實行的計劃，而是一個百年大計。它還需要政府的倡導，教育人士的協助，其他人士的支持，才能實現的。



大學生活

關社認中

港大同學參予關社活動的途徑大致分為三類：（一）學生會所組織籌辦的單元活動，如暑期關社專題，講座及研討會等。（二）院會或系會的時委會所辦的活動。（三）其他屬會如社會服務團，國事學會，世大，而個別社堂的服務小組亦有舉辦有關的活動。大致而言，校園內的關社途徑是足夠的，但粗略地說，參予的同學並不踴躍，所涉及的人數及層面也較為狹窄，大部份同學對關社活動的參予程度似乎並不深徹。當然，關心社會可以分為認識及實際行動兩方面，認識社會可以以不同的方式進行，實際行動也可以用各種不同的形式進行，所以要以港大同學在校內參予關社活動的程序來推論他們是否關心社會是不可能的。但比較明顯的是，同學對校園內的關社活動的反應並不太熱烈。這個情況不但牽涉到同學的個人興趣，價值觀及自發性問題，也涉及到關社活動本身的組織問題。

按目前情況而言，雖然關社的活動不少，但在整體調協合作方面似乎仍然未達十全十美的地步，也許給同學帶來一種無可適從的感覺。但另一方面，個人本身的思想及價值亦有重大的影響，一般而言，特別是新同學，在某程度上仍然受到中學教育的影響，思想仍然脫離不了一貫的思維形態，因此關社活動的氣氛往往不能維持，個人參予活動的自發性及動力因而減少，漸漸形成一種冷漠的態度。

參予關社活動可以基於對社會事件有深徹的了解，經過個人的是非觀念衡量後，覺得有

實際行動的必要，懷著熱誠，坐然起行。但從另一角度來看，也可能是為了爭取進一步更深入的了解而參加。特別對新同學而言，大學裏每一件事物都是新奇有趣的，他們也樂於接觸，增進見識，為將來發展而作準備。這可能是整個社會的趨勢，所以整天把自己關在圖書館的同學相信是沒有了。這種增加認識和了解的心情與要求實際行動的心境是不盡相同的。但一般來說，參予關社活動需要一定的參予程度，和一定的時間，因此要提高別人對關社活動的興趣並不容易。因為組織及參加兩方面的要求並不完全一致，所以熱烈的氣氛也許很難維持，而個人的熱誠也許產生變化。再者，一些參予的同學可能做的是比較事務性的工作，因而缺乏參予的感覺。

不容否認的是，在校園不參予關社的活動，並不一定表示對社會冷漠不關心。關心社會可以在認識及實際行動兩方面進行。每個人的價值觀不同，採取實際行動與否，純屬個人自由。若然真的覺得有實際行動的需要，也不一定把自己局限於校園的活動形式範疇內。基於思想，價值觀及信仰的不同，對待社會問題的進路亦因人而異，個人亦有選擇認識社會的方式的自由。事實上，也有人在校園外以不同形式關心社會，認識社會。功課壓力的存在是鐵一般的事實，但單是功課的壓力是不足以說明對關社活動的冷漠反應。事情的取捨，時間的安排全繫於個人的價值取向，所以功課壓力只是次要的因素。

參加關社的活動可以出於好奇心，也許是種探索的心理的驅使，亦可視之為對個人一種能力的訓練，人生中一個段落內的一個實驗，亦可能是個人理想的實踐，改革社會的一般熱誠的具體表現。在今天的社會裏，經濟繁榮，生活比較安定，要是撇開原則性的問題，那麼表面的社會衝突是沒有以往那麼尖銳化，有些人察覺到社會不平的存在，有些人則覺得其嚴重性已大大減弱，在這種情況下，把各種動機融匯在一起的機會似乎愈來愈少了。

但無論如何，每個人都有自由選擇關心社會的層面及形式，沒有參予關社活動，不一定就是不關心社會，沒有參予校內的關社活動，也不一定就是不關心社會，個人的價值觀不同，所選擇的關社層面及形式便有所差異。

文康體

學生會大樓的三樓，是臥虎藏龍之地。一羣羣未來的建築家、文學家、法律家、醫學家、工程學家和社會科學學家都聚首一堂。同學們進入了大學，都希望能認識一下週圍的事物、學習一些課本以外的知識、結交多些朋友、充實自己，而學社聯會就為同學們提供了多類的，健康的羣體活動。大家亦踴躍的參加這些活動。但普遍來說，法律系、建築系和醫學系的同學較少參加，這可能是由於功課壓力較大和上課地點距離學生會大樓較遠的關係罷。

很有趣的現象是有些較學術性的屬會所吸引的同學都是來自同一院系的。如文社就多是文學院的同學參加、天文學會就是理學系和工程系的同學、電子學會則多是工程系的同學，相信這是由於屬會的性質與同學所讀科目有連帶關係。而更顯著的是有些屬會純粹是為讀該

科目的同學而設的，如電腦學會便是，當然，其他有興趣的同學亦是無任歡迎的。

除以學術吸引同學外，不少學會是以娛樂性豐富為出發點的，如電影學會、釣魚學會、魔術學會等。更有些是宗教性的屬會，如KA-TSO, CA, 當然認識性的屬會亦是不會缺乏的，如世大、國事學會。

當然，各屬會針對的對象是那樣的不同，提供的活動又是那麼多樣化，協調上是有一定的困難的，加上各屬會的發展成熟程度不同，以致活動規模、會員數目、工作表現亦是有差距的。但在這小天地內、各同學都能分享到這裏獨特的文化，生活在「默契」中。

為了「趕工」、「衝夜」是經常發生的。雖然大部份同學是住在宿舍或MINI HALL的，但有時亦因太夜未能回宿舍。所以一張毛氈蓋在ICA的長梳化上，就是他們溫暖的床位了，不但工作時是大夥兒的一起做，大家亦連羣結隊地、熱鬧的吃晚飯、宵夜、看電影。真的是集體生活了。

此外，ICA 的同學和其他大學生也沒有太大差異，亦嘗試過「較腳」，通常不上課的比例是四份之一。所以期近考試時，學社聯會的工作室失去了平時一份熱鬧，換上了一片讀書奮發的氣氛。當然，不時還有患難與共的集體研究呢！

籌辦活動，讀書以外，同學們中亦有不少希望鍛鍊自己獨立的能力，不再依靠家庭方面經濟上的支持。所以除了一份政府補助的收入外，主要是靠補習來維持支出的。辛苦是辛苦了，卻也是有一份滿足感的。

大學內能提供的活動是那樣的多姿多采，所以不少「老柴」仍未忘懷這裏的團體生活，久不久亦會來這裏環顧一下，參加一些活動，緬懷一下這令他們跳出個人圈子，另他們開始對週遭的事物作出思考、令他們對服務團體有一份熱誠的美好時光。

生活點滴

師生關係

粗陋地比較，港大的師生關係比較疏離，但各院系的情形各有不同。理科同學的關係似較密切，教員與學生較能打成一片。唸建築的同學有時要一起做PROJECT和開夜，似乎感情也較密切。一般情況下，同學與導師較為熟絡。然而接觸的次數只是因素之一，一般情況下，同學與外籍講師的溝通較少，語言可能是妨礙之一，為避辭不達意的尷尬場面，很多溝通的機會都沒有好好利用，但這個情況在近年來似乎在逐步改善。

兼職

文學院及社會科學院的兼職人數較多，工作也比較多樣化，可能是時間比較充足的關係。除補習外，也有教書，翻譯，銀行，雜誌，社區中心或馬會等。而其他院系似乎以補習為大多數，可能是時間安排及功課問題而致。雖然兼職多以賺錢為主，亦有以爭取經驗，增廣見聞，對將來工作者輔助作用。似乎大學生兼職的風氣與整個社會風氣並無差別。

學習態度

大學時的上課情況和中學時期沒有很大分別，只是現在有了導修課或實習實驗的機會多了，但在課堂抄筆記是不可缺少的。也許是社

會意識問題，學習態度往往未夠主動，局制於擬定的課程內，只看講師要求的課本，很少旁徵博引，培養自己的獨立意見，對老師的說法，很少提出疑問。雖然有例外情況，但一般而言，溫習多以考試範圍為依歸。以社科而言，小組討論的風氣並不盛行，與預科讀書方法相差無幾。讀書多是為了應付考試或論文，而非出自本身的興趣，更鮮有抱着問題去學習。可能是功課壓力的關係，同學多沒有時間兼顧課程以外的知識。唸法律的同學討論的風氣似乎較盛，醫學院同學讀書態度認真；可能是功課壓力有關。整體來說，中學的習慣是不容易一下子脫掉的，故此學習的主動性與較他地方為低，比較專而不廣。整體來看，讀書的風氣很濃，但學術研究則相反。同學間缺乏思想的交流及意見的衝擊。而且比較注重筆記及指定書籍，一旦交功課，便很少有討論研究 討的

衣著語言

一般而言，攪活動的衣著比較隨便，但校園的環境狹窄，所以甚樣隨便，也得清潔整齊，這是客觀環境使然。高年級醫科同學需要上病房，必須穿著整齊，以維持專業的形象。理學院唸數學的比較隨和。而通常情況下，最後一年的同學比較講究，可能是為了將來工作環境的關係。大學同學常用一些特別的詞彙如「冇壞」，「騰雞」，「弱雞」，「拉記」等。這些詞彙是自然產生出來的，是基於一種共同的感受，意識及壓力的產品。這些字眼幫助了同學思想的溝通，而並非故意製造出來的。

遲到

遲到的風氣甚盛。雖然距離可能是因素之一，但不少同學是很多屬會的委員，時間衝突在所難免。開會的次數頻密，會議程序本身有問題，可能產生沉悶的感覺，因而輕視開會，缺乏時間觀念。

文學

港大同學參予課外的文學活動大約有兩方面，（一）文社及（二）青年文學獎所籌辦的活動。參予的程度又可分為文學認識，文學創作及文學活動籌辦之方面。

文學認識和創作可算是一種精神的活動。從生活中產生感受和意念，構思表達的方式以至實際創作可以是一個很長時間的過程。生活是文學的基礎，人人都在生活，但不是每一個人都對本身的感興加以注意，但感受或感觸，是把日常生活轉為文學的首要關。因為每個人的性格有異，所學的科目及思想訓練方式有異，因此並不是每個人都把自己日常生活中的感受提取出來，昇華於文學作品中。也許有些同學對自己的感興非常敏感，也對周遭的事物不時產生感受，暇思，但他們卻沒有把突發的意念加以提昇，他們就在意念蘊釀的階段停下來。也許有些同學構思了表達形式及內容，但卻沒有表現於紙章中。就是那些從事了實際創作的，也不一定把他們的作品發表於校內的園地中。所以在文學創作的整個過程中，不同的同學在不同的階段停了下來，而實際從事創作

而又肯拿出來給別人討論批評，可能就是一少部份人了，但不可以從這個事實便推論大部份同學都是對文學冷漠的。文學認識純粹是一種個人的精神活動，要找志同道合的人一起研討與否，純粹是個人的性格問題。雖然沒有實際的數據證明，但實際從事文學創作的同學是比較少（但這不是說其他同學對文學一定冷漠）。

不同的人對文學有不同的概念，有人認為文學是日常生活的反映。文學的題材就是生活的一部份，因此覺得文學創作只是日常的一部份。也有人覺得文學是一種奢侈品，是有空才可以去認識的，而且沒有實際事工那麼來得實用重要。此外不同的學習科目可能訓練一種處理問題的方法，培養出一種特別的思維方式；再者中學時代過早分科可能在某一種程度上限制我們處事的觀點，觀察的角度，使我們在整個感興，提昇及創作的過程中過早的停下來。在校園裏，學院間同學的溝通了解可能並不十全十美，故此就文學活動的參予而言，似乎以社會科學院及文學院同學較多，當然其他院系如工程學院，醫學院及法學院等亦有，但所佔比例而言似乎較少，這當然是指實際創作或活動的籌劃而言。事實上，香港是一個華洋雜處，中西交匯的地方，環境特殊，表面雖然繁盛安定，其「土壤氣候」是非常適合文學創作的，為文學作品提供了多樣化的題材，問題是有那些人注意到該等現象或事物的存在，有些人是察覺到了，但沒有把自己的感受提昇，為創作的素材。也許有些人構思之後，又沒有把思想感受表現於紙章上，亦可能沒有發表出來。每個人都有生活，但在校園內，似乎注意生活感受，提煉之成為創作素材的是比較少了。

自辦社堂

'Mini Hall' 是大專特色之一，港大同學也組織了不少 Mini Hall。近的有位於 west gate, 對面，遠的至置富花園等地。同學們往來大學及 'Mini Hall' 之間就必然乘坐交通工具。相信很多同學都很有興趣想知道 'Mini Hall' 是怎樣的，經過與幾間社堂的堂友談談之後，獲悉一點兒資料。

產生的原因，可從大 Hall 的供求情形着眼。現時只有五分一的同學住在大 Hall 而有住 Hall 需要的同學則超過 50%，在此供求不平衡之際，'Mini Hall' 就興起來了。但為什麼需求是那麼大？綜合堂友們的意見，一些同學要住 'Mini Hall' 的原因是他們認為每天花三四小時於乘坐交通工具上是非常不值得的，他們希望將這段時間運用於更有意義的途徑上，例如一些同學希望爭取多點時間看書，有多一點時間留在“拉記”找材料，而一些較活躍的同學則希望把這些時間放於參與 functions 或 Sport 上，住 'Mini Hall' 有一個特點，就是比較自由，有時有些 functions 會至很夜，如果住的遠的話返家時就不大方便了。但是有些住 'Mini Hall' 的同學的家與校園相隔不大遠，他們搬出來住的動機何在？究其動機乃是由於他們希望嘗試過一種獨立的生活，與一羣年紀相約，教育程

度差不多的年青人一起生活是別有一種樂趣的。在一起 fussy 可以增廣見識，知多一些對事物的觀點，同時會激發思考，去關心多一點事物。

大抵 'Mini Hall' 可分為兩種，一種是 Room Style 另一種是 'flat style' 'Room style' mini hall 是兩三個同學租一房間而組成。因為人數少，地方細而包租往往不許燒飯，堂友多數在快餐店或“瓊天”祭五臟廟，所以舍堂生活就很簡單而清靜，相信同學組織此等舍堂，目的在於獲得更多時間溫習和有一個較為清靜的讀書環境。至於 'flat style' 就有很大的分別了，'flat style'

mini hall 是一羣同學租一個獨立的單位組成的，其形式類似大 Hall 例如有 Hall 名、Hall song 等，也有通常性的 Functions 如 Hightable 堂友生日會等，總之是多姿多彩。此等 mini hall 又可分為 co-educational hall 和 non-co-educational Hall (male or female) ，堂友可能來自不同 Faculty，因此可以知道多些其他 Faculty 的情形，但堂友又可能來自相同的 Faculty ，則大家在功課上，就可以互相切磋了。

綜觀堂友對舍堂的意見意見，大家都認為生活方法有一定程度的改變。例如 Housework participation 大了，在家中家務往往是由媽媽來處

理，現在則需要分工合作了。至於睡眠時間方面，亦起了很大的變化，原因有兩點：


(一) 與堂友 fussy, 至深夜。

(二) 因為住得近，可以遲些起床，所以遲睡一點。

起床時間，在家中時多是由媽咪負責叫醒，而自己無須傷神，但現在則由自己去負責了。

一間舍堂的設立，當然要經過一番努力，

起初困難重重，你們試過在西區跑來跑去找一個適合的單位的滋味呢？添置傢俬用具方面所下的一番功夫你又知道多少呢？再者，環境轉變了，堂友起初是需要一段時間去適應的，雖然舍堂生活是多麼多姿多彩，但近年來在西區適合建成‘mini hall’的單位十分缺乏，而西區樓宇的租金急劇上升，使堂友負擔加重，不少有需要住‘mini hall’的同學，被迫留在家中居住，這是非常可惜的。



訪問體育聯會會長陳建忠紀錄

由於陳同學接觸其他同學多在運動場上，所以不容易從他們的言談中察覺到同學有等關社的意識，但從平日所接觸到的同學而言，就發覺以往的同學都很熱中關社的活動，但今年似乎就不太呼吸到同學認中關社的氣息，可能是體育界不重談論這些問題，加上個人主義風氣盛行所致。

在讀書方面，以工程學院來說，學術風氣不盛，同學只求上課、死讀書，考試過關，而不甚學習，綜觀港大的學生研究風氣不重，即使醫學院，工程學院也是如此。

在運動上則不覺有同學因功課多而放棄體育活動，即使同學讀得很辛苦，也會抽空到體育中心活動活動，有的甚至走堂去比賽，但現時同學不再那麼專心攪活動是事實，無論是什麼事，同學都會以功課為重，絕不肯放棄讀書，可能是近來留級多，同學不能再為昔日的豪氣熱情，放下一切功課，只專心攪活動，以致大學生被譏，說我們攪活動只有三分鐘熱度。

港大同學走堂的情況並不如想像中那樣嚴重，參加體育比賽是同學走堂之主要原因，同學走堂必定事出有因，通常是不會因兼職工作而輕易走堂的，即使社科和文學院的同學做兼職，也會安排到自己空閒時才去做；兼職的同學多幹補習，以理、工、醫三系院的同學較吃香，同學找兼職不外是為賺取外快。

談到港大同學的消遣和課餘活動，發現我們中間很多人都喜歡運動，其次是看電視，但綜合來說，大學生消遣的範圍甚為廣泛，如去DISCO、飲酒等大不乏人。

以一個普通走讀的港大同學來說，上體育課算是參予體育活動最方便的途徑，因為有教師指導，但翻查體育中心的檔案，則發現很少同學會上體育課，而通常住宿舍的同學都不上體育課，他們多喜歡課餘約同堂友去練波。體育聯會下有很多屬會，是同學可自由參加的，但不是每個體育屬會都會舉辦一些訓練班的，通常在暑假會辦一些特別活動的訓練班，例如棍網球等，如同學想打排球、籃球，則等這麼多的機會，因為足、籃、排等都甚注重隊制的合作性，新同學要加入既成的隊伍並不是那麼容易的，因此，總括而言，現時在港大提供給同學參與體育活動之途徑是不足的。

港大體育正面對向「專」還是「廣」的方向走，當然，既「專」且「廣」是最理想不過的，但限於場地之不足，在短期內是不可能雙綫發展，「專」和「廣」都兼顧。體育中心離大學本部遠，以及運動場地之不足令很多同學裹足不前，是導致港大體育不能普及的主因。其實港大的體育師資是一流的，可惜他們都「英雄無用武之地」，現在惟有寄望大口環體育中心之建成，到時有校巴接送同學，相信會有

更多同學願意花時間去練習吧！

若將港大的體育與本港其他大專院校比較，則以三師同學對體育的熱情和投入最可嘉，他們有體育堂，其中都是熱愛運動之中堅分子，只可惜人數少一點；中大在體育方面也人才濟濟，特別是田徑方面；港大同學的潛質不弱，遺憾的是缺乏場地和同學疏於練習，不然，成績定更理想。至於東南亞方面，馬來西亞大學的水準相當高，而星加坡大學則由於沒有室內運動場地，成績稍遜。


港大的各種體育活動，除了足、籃、排球類運動注重隊制合作之外，其他祇為個人的運動如羽毛球、網球、空手道、跆拳道，中國武術等是很吸引個別同學參加的。足、籃、排方面多由各屬會負責補充新血，而其他較為冷門的運動——如曲棍球、棍網球等則多由舍堂訓練，校隊往往也等於舍堂代表隊。

問及體育聯會的理想時，陳同學說去年競選時提出「以攪好港大體育界之間之關係」為政綱，因為有感於舍堂之間會為比賽而衝突，因此提高體育精神，實屬義不容辭之事，而體育聯會對個別屬會之控制不易，所以不能強求他們必須辦訓練班，有時實在感到有心無力。


普遍來說，各院系對體育並不重視，文學院較為重看，如有院際比賽都張貼海報通知同學去打氣，其次是工程學院，他們有會長盃的

設立，對提高同學的體育興趣和培養新秀之功是不可抹的。若以同學普遍對運動的興趣來比較，則首推醫學院，他們男女同學人數平均，而參與體育活動的人非常踴躍，殊為難得。各學院對體育的重視遠不及舍堂，舍堂因由來自不同院系的同學組成，他們無共通的地方，唯一足以維繫堂友感情和代表舍堂精神的，就是鼓勵堂友參予體育活動的表現，藉參加、練習和比賽來提高並表現同學對舍堂的歸屬感，而學院則無需以運動來維繫同學的精神，因此反映在週年運動會上的，就是堂際比賽的參加人數遠比院際的多，有時院際比賽甚至有棄權的情形出現，而在堂際比賽，這些事可說是絕無僅有的，由此可見舍堂對體育活動之重視了。

陳同學以為校方實行「強迫體育課」政策是有助於普及體育活動的，但最後他還是強調「港大體育得以生存實有賴舍堂間的互相競爭」。



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